Article 9 — Whether any creature can change or impress upon the will

Ninth, it is asked whether any creature can change or impress upon the will. (Parallel texts: ST I.106.2; I.111.2; I-II.80.1; In II Sent., d. 8, a. 5; SCG III.88, 92; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 3, aa. 3–4; Commentary on John, ch. 13, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it can, for the will itself is a creature. But the will changes its own act by which it wills. Thus, it seems that some creature changes the will and forces it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is more difficult to change the whole than the part, but according to some philosophers (Cf. Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos [Quadripartitum], bk. 2, ch. 8; Pseudo-Aristotle, De causis proprietatum elementorum, ch. 1; Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 15, a. 5; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 14, part 1, a. 2, q. 3, arg. 2.) heavenly bodies change an entire multitude to will something. Therefore, it seems all the more that they can force the will of one of these.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever is overcome by another is forced by him. But, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 7.6, 1149b3; 7.7, 1150a9.) the incontinent are overcome by passions, therefore, passions alter and force the will of the incontinent.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Augustine in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PL 42:873).) the higher moves the lower by a natural order both in bodily as well as in spiritual things. But just as the intellect of the blessed angels is higher and more perfect than our intellect, so also is their will in relation to ours. Thus, just as with their intellect they can impress upon ours by illuminating it, according to the doctrine of Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, bk. 4, para. 4 (PG 3:181B).) so also does it seem that they can impress upon our will in some way, changing it by their own.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 8, para. 2 (PG 3:240C).) the higher angels illuminate, purify, and perfect the lower ones, but just as illumination pertains to the intellect, so does purification seem to pertain to the affective power. Therefore, just as angels can impress upon the intellect, so also can they upon the will.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, something is more easily changed by a higher nature than a lower one. But just as their is a lower sensitive appetite for our will, so also is their a higher angelic will. Therefore, since the sensible appetite sometimes changes our will, all the more can the angelic will change it.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the head of the household tells the servants in Luke 14:23 to compell them to enter. However, one enters that dinner through the will. Thus, our will can be forced to do something by an angel who is a minister of God.

On the contrary (1) is what Bernard says, (Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 10 (PL 182:1019 A-B).) that free choice is the most powerful thing under God. But nothing is changed except by what is stronger, thus, nothing can change the will.

Furthermore (2), merit and demerit consist in the will in some way. Thus, if a creature could change the will, one could be justified or be made a sinner by a creature, which is false, for no one is made a sinner except by oneself, and neither does someone become just except by God operating and them cooperating.

I answer that it must be said that the will can be understood to be changed by another in two ways, in one way by its object, as when the will is changed by the appetible, and we are not asking about changing will in this sense. For it was shown above that some good moves the will by necessity in the mode of an object, even though the will is not coerced. But in another way, the will can be understood to be changed by another in the mode of an efficient cause, and in this way we not only say that no creature can coerce the will by acting upon it, since not even God can do this, but also that it cannot directly act upon the will so as to change it necessarily, or incline it in any way whatsoever, which God can do. But any creature can in some way incline the will indirectly, though not change it necessarily. The reason for this is that since an act of the will is like an intermediary between a power and its object, the alteration of the will's act can be considered either with regard to the will itself or else the object.

On the part of the will, the creature cannot change the will's act except by operating within the will; and this is the will itself and whatever is the cause that the will exists, which is God alone, according to faith. Hence, only God can transfer the will's inclination, which he gave to it, from one thing to another, however he wishes. But according to those who hold the soul to be created by intellectual beings, which is contrary to the faith, (For example, Genesis 1 and Job 37:18; cf. SCG II.42.) the angel or intelligence has an effect intrinsic to the will, inasmuch as it causes the being that is within the will itself. In this respect, Avicenna holds (Metaph., bk. 10, ch. 1) that just as our bodies are changed by heavenly bodies, so also our wills are changed by the will of heavenly souls, which is nevertheless completely heretical.

But if the will's act should be considered on the part of the object, then one discovers a twofold object of the will: one to which it is determined by the necessity of natural inclination, and this object is proposed to the will and placed within it by the Creator who gave it a natural inclination for that. Hence, no one can necessarily change the will by such an object, except God alone. But there is another object of the will which is made such as to incline the will, inasmuch as there is within it a certain likeness or ordering with regard to the final, naturally desired end. Nevertheless, the will is not necessarily changed by this object, as was said before, (Above: a. 5.) for an ordering to the final, naturally desired end is not uniquely found within it. And any creature can incline the will to some extent by means of this object, though not change it necessarily, as is clear when someone persuades another to do something, proposing to them its utility or goodness. Nevertheless, it is in the will's power to either accept or not accept it, for it is not naturally determined to it.

Thus, it is clear that no creature can directly change the will, acting within the will itself, but it can induce it in some way, proposing something to the will extrinsically, though not changing it necessarily.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it must be said that since the will is master of its own acts, it can change itself directly with regard to some things, and when one says that it is not changed directly by a creature, this is to be understood of another creature. However, it cannot force itself, since this would imply a contradiction, namely, that something is forced by itself: for the violent is that in which one suffers force, though contributing nothing to it, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 11104 1 et b15; sec. transl. Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 179 et 181).) though the one applying the force does contribute.

And so the will cannot force itself, for in that violence it would contribute something inasmuch as it was forcing itself, and would contribute nothing as being forced, which is impossible. The Philosopher proves in this way in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 5.17, 1138a4.) that no one suffers an injustice from oneself, for whoever suffers injustice suffers something against one's own will, but if one should do injustice, it is unjust according to one's own will.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the heavenly bodies cannot change by necessity the will of one man or that of a multitude, but they can change bodily things themselves. However, the will is in some way inclined by a body, though not necessarily, since it can resist it, such as the choleric person who is inclined to anger from his natural constitution, (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 4.13, 1126a13.) and yet any choleric person can resist this inclination by means of the will. However, only the wise, who are few with respect to fools, resist bodily inclinations, for the number of fools is boundless (Eccl 1:15). Thus it is said that heavenly bodies change the multitude inasmuch as the multitude follows bodily inclinations, but they do not change this or that man who resists by means of prudence the previously mentioned inclination.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the intemperate man is not said to be overcome by passion as though the bodily passions force or necessarily change the will, otherwise the intemperate man should not be punished, for punishment is not due to what is involuntary. However, the intemperate man is not said to act involuntarily, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.4, 1111a22.) but the intemperate man is said to be overcome by passions inasmuch as he voluntarily gives in to their impulse.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that angels do not impress upon the intellect by doing something within it, but only on the part of the object inasmuch as they propose some intelligible by which our intellect is strengthened and convinced in its assent. But the object of the will proposed by the angel does not necessarily change the will, as was said; and so the argument is not parallel.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the purification by which angels are cleansed pertains to the intellect, for it is a cleansing from ignorance, as Dionysius says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 6. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 6, part 3, para. 6 (PG 3:537B).) Nevertheless, if it should pertain to affection, they would be said to cleanse by persuading.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that what is below the will, such as the body or the sensitive appetite, does not change the will by acting directly upon the will, but only on the part of the object. For the will's object is the apprehended good, but the good apprehended by universal reason only moves by means of particular apprehension, as said in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.16, 434a16.) inasmuch as acts are among particular things. However, particular apprehension is impeded and at times completely bound by the passion of the sensitive appetite, whose cause can sometimes be a physical constitution or any other bodily impression inasmuch as that appetite uses an organ, such that what higher reason dictates universally is not applied in act to this particular. Thus the will is moved in its desiring toward the good which particular apprehension makes known to it, passing over that good which universal reason makes known. In this way passions of this sort incline the will, yet do not change it by necessity, for it is in the power of the will to control such passions, and the use of reason is not impeded according to Gen 4:7, its desire, that is sin's, (Scilicet peccati: cf. Glossa ordinaria, at Gen 4:7, 1.115.) shall be under you. (Subter: ST I-II.10.3, s.c.; I-II.77.3, obj. 3; II-II.58.2, obj. 2; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 28, a. 1, q. 2, arg. 1.)

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the compulsion that was mentioned is not one of violence but of efficacious persuasion, whether through harshness or gentleness.