Article 2 — Whether all things desire God himself

Second, it is asked whether all things desire God himself. (Parallel texts: ST I.6.1, ad 2; I.44.4; In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; II, d. I, q. 2, aa. 1-2; SCG III.17-18; Compendium Theologiae, ch.100-101.)

Obj. 1: It seems not. For a thing is ordered to God inasmuch as he is knowable and desirable. But not all things ordered to him as he is knowable in fact know him. For not all knowing things know God. Therefore, neither do all things ordered to him as something desirable in fact desire him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the goodness that is desired by all, according to the Philosopher in Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 1.1, 1094a3.) is being, as the Commentator indicates in the same place. But God is not the being of all things. Therefore, God is not the good desired by all.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing desires what it refuses. But some refuse God, since they hate him, as found in Psalm 74:23: the pride of those that hate you ascends continually; and in Job 21:14 it says: they said to God, depart from us. Therefore, not all desire God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one desires what he does not have. But some who enjoy him, like the blessed, have God himself. Therefore, not all desire God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, natural desire is only of what can be had. But the rational creature alone can have God, since it alone is made to the image of God, and for that reason, the image of God is that by which it has a capacity for him, as Augustine says in On the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (PL 42:1044).) Therefore, not all naturally desire God.

On the contrary (1), is what Augustine says in the Soliloquies: whatever can love, loves God. (Augustine, The Soliloquies, bk. 1, ch. 1 (PL 32:869).) But all are able to love, since all desire goodness. Therefore, all desire God.

Furthermore (2), anything naturally desires the end for whose sake it is. But all are ordered to God as to an end; the Lord has made all things for himself (Prov 16:4). Therefore, all things naturally desire God.

I answer that it must be said that all things naturally desire God implicitly, but not explicitly. In evidence of this, it must be known that a secondary cause cannot influence its effects except inasmuch as it receives power from the first cause. However, just as the influence of an efficient cause is its acting, so is the influence of a final cause to be sought after and desired. And thus, just as a secondary agent does not act except by the power of the first agent existing within it, so also the secondary end is not desired except by the power of the principal end existing within it, namely, inasmuch as it is ordered to it, or else has a likeness to it. And therefore, just as God acts in every agent, inasmuch as he is the first efficient cause, so also is he desired, inasmuch as he is the final end. But this is to implicitly desire God himself. For in this way the power of the first cause is within the second, like principles in their conclusions. However, to resolve conclusions to their principles or secondary causes to first causes pertains only to a rational power. Hence, only rational nature can reduce secondary ends to God himself by way of resolution, such that it should explicitly desire God himself. And just as a conclusion is not correctly known in demonstrative sciences, except by a resolution to first principles, so also the rational creature's desire is not correct, except by an explicit desire, whether in act or in habit, of God himself.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it must be said that all knowing things know God implicitly in any knowledge. For just as nothing has the notion of being desirable except by a likeness to the first goodness, so also nothing is knowable except by a likeness to the first truth.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that created being itself is a likeness of divine goodness. Hence, inasmuch as some things desire being, they implicitly desire God and a likeness to God.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that God can be considered in two ways: either in himself, or else in his effects. In himself, he cannot not be loved, for he is the very essence of goodness. Hence, he is loved by all those seeing him in essence, and in that state, each one loves him to the extent that they know him. But in some of his effects, inasmuch as they are contrary to the will, such as imposed punishments, or commands which seem burdensome, God himself is shunned and in some way hated. Nevertheless, those who hate him with respect to certain effects, love him in other effects, such as the demons, according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 23 (PG 3:725C).) who naturally desire to exist and to live, and in this they love and desire God himself.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the blessed who enjoy God now, desire the continuation of that enjoyment, and thus the enjoyment itself is like some perfect possession of the thing desired, even though the name of desire implies imperfection.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that only the rational creature has a capacity for God, for it alone can know and love him explicitly. But other creatures participate in divine likeness, and so they desire God himself.