Article 11 — Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect, or conversely.

Eleventh, it is asked whether the will is a higher power than the intellect, or conversely. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 25, a. 2, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 4; ST I.82.3; I.82.4, ad 1; I-II.3.4, ad 4; II-II.23.6, ad 1; SCG III.26; De caritate, a. 3, ad 12–13; Disputed Questions on Virtues, q. 2, a. 3, ad 12, 13.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that the intellect is nobler and higher, for nobility of the soul consists in being made to the image of God. But the soul is to the image of God with regard to reason or intelligence. Hence, Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 3, ch. 20 (PL 34:292).) let us understand that man is made in the image of God in that in which he excels irrational living things. However, this is reason, mind, or intelligence, or if it be called by any other suitable word. Thus, the most excellent power of the soul is the intellect.

Obj. 2: He had said that just as the image is in the intellect, so also is it in the will, since image, according to Augustine in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 12 (PL 42:984); cf. ST I.93.7, obj. 3.) is considered with regard to memory, intelligence, and will.

On the contrary, since the nobility of the soul is considered with regard to the image, that must be the more excellent part of the soul where the notion of image is found to exist more properly. But even if the image is in the intellect and the will, it is more properly in the intellect than in the will. Hence, the Teacher says in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 16, ch. 3.) that the image is in the knowledge of truth and the likeness is in the love of goodness. Thus, the intellect must still be nobler than the will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, since we judge powers from acts, that power must be nobler whose act is nobler. But understanding is more noble than willing, thus the intellect is nobler than the will.

Proof of the minor: since acts are specified by their ends, that act must be nobler whose end is nobler, but the act of the intellect regards motion toward the soul and that of the will regards motion from the soul toward things. Thus, since the soul is nobler than exterior things, understanding is more noble than willing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in all ordered things, that is higher which is farther from the lowest, but the lowest among the powers of the soul is sensation. However, the will draws closer to sensation than the intellect, for the will shares with sensitive powers the condition of the object. For the will is of particulars, just as is sensation: for we will a particular health and not the universal that is health. But the intellect is of universals. Therefore, the intellect is a higher power than the will.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what rules is more noble than what is ruled. But the intellect rules the will. Thus, it is nobler than the will.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, that from which something is has authority and rank over it, if it is of a different essence. But intelligence is from memory as the Son is from the Father: however, will is from memory and intelligence just as the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. Thus, intelligence has authority with respect to the will and it is greater and more powerful than it.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, an act is nobler to the extent that it is more simple and immaterial. But the intellect's act is simpler and more immaterial than that of the will, for the intellect abstracts from matter, but not the will. Thus, the intellect's act is nobler than the will.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, the intellect within the soul is compared to splendor in material things; but the will or the affection is compared to heat, as is clear from the sayings of the saints. (The Leonine editors were unable to find these sayings of the Saints; cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 24, part 1, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 7.) But splendor is nobler than heat since it is a quality of a nobler body. Thus, the intellect is also nobler than the will.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 10.12, 1178b24.) whatever is proper to man inasmuch as he is man is nobler than what is common to man and other animals. But understanding is proper to man, whereas willing belongs also to other animals, hence, the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.5, 1111b8.) that children and beasts participate in the voluntary. Therefore the intellect is nobler than the will.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, something is nobler to the extent that it is closer to the end; for the notion of goodness is from the end among things for the sake of the end. But the intellect seems to be nearer to the end than the will. For man attains to the end by first knowing it through the intellect than he does by desiring it through the will. Therefore, the intellect is nobler than the will.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, according to Gregory in Morals on the Book of Job 6, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 6, ch. 37, para. 61 (PL 75:764D); cf. Homilies on Ezekiel, bk. 1, homily 3, para. 9 (PL 76:809B) as referred by ST II-II.182.2.) the contemplative life is of greater merit than the active. But the contemplative life pertains to the intellect, and the active pertains to the will. Therefore, the intellect is nobler than the will.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 10.11, 1177b27.) that the intellect is the best of things within us. Therefore it is nobler than the will.

On the contrary (1), a more perfect habit belongs to a more perfect power. But the habit which perfects the will, namely charity, is nobler than faith and knowledge which perfect the intellect, as is clear from the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13:2. Thus, the will is nobler than the intellect.

Furthermore (2), Furthermore, whatever is free in itself is nobler than what is not free, but the intellect is not free in itself since it can be forced; but the will is free since it cannot be forced. Therefore the will is nobler than the intellect.

Furthermore (3), the order of powers is according to the order of the objects. But goodness, which is the object of the will, is nobler than truth, which is the object of the intellect, therefore, the will is also nobler than the intellect.

Furthermore (4), according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 3 (PG 3:817A).) any one of the divine participations is more noble to the extent that it is more common. But the will is more common than the intellect, since some things participate in will that do not participate in intellect, as was said before. Therefore, the will is nobler than the intellect.

Furthermore (5), something is nobler to the extent that it is closer to God, but the will approaches God more than the intellect since, as Hugh of Saint Victor comments on the Heavenly Hiearchy, (Hugh of St. Victor, Commentary on the Celestial Hierarchy, bk. 6, ch. 7 (PL 175:1038D).) love enters where knowledge remains outside. For we love God more than we are able to know about him. Thus, the will is nobler than the intellect.

I answer that it must be said that something can be called more eminent than another both simply and in a certain respect. However, in order for something to be shown as being simply better than another, their comparison must consider their essential properties and not their accidental ones; for something is shown to be more eminent in a certain respect in this way, as when a man is compared to a lion with regard to essential differences, he is found to be simply nobler than the lion, inasmuch as man is a rational animal, whereas the lion is irrational. However, the lion excels the man if he should be compared with regard to bodily strength: but this is to be more noble in a certain respect. Therefore, in order to understand which of these powers is better simply, whether the will or the intellect, this must be examined from their essential differences.

However, the intellect's perfection and dignity consists in this, that the form of the understood thing exists in the intellect itself; for it understands in act with regard to this, and in this is considered its entire dignity. However, the will's nobility and its act is constituted from this, that the soul is ordered to another noble thing according to the being that the thing has in itself. But it is more perfect, simply and absolutely speaking, to possess the nobility of another thing rather than to be compared to a noble thing existing outside oneself. Hence, the will and intellect, if they are considered absolutely, not comparing them to this or that thing, have an order such that the intellect is simply more eminent than the will.

But it happens that something is compared to a noble thing in a more excellent way than the way that is possesses the nobility of that thing within itself, namely, when the nobility of that thing is possessed in a more inferior way than how that thing possesses it within itself. However, if the nobility of that thing exists within another thing, whether equally or more nobly than in the thing itself of which it is, then without doubt that will be more noble which has the nobility of another thing within itself than what is ordered in any way to the noble thing itself. However, the intellect perceives the forms of things that are higher than soul in way inferior to how they exist in the things themselves; for something is received into the intellect in its own mode, as is said in the book On Causes. (Comm. 8(7); earum...rebus: cf. e.g. supra q. 4 a. 6.) And for the same reason, the forms of those things that are inferor to the soul are nobler within the soul than they are in the things themselves.

Thus, the intellect can be compared to the will in three ways: in one way absolutely and universally, without regard for this or that thing; and in this way the intellect is more eminent than the will, just as to possess what pertains to the dignity in any thing is more perfect than to be compared to its nobility. It is compared in another way with respect to material sensible things: and in this way again the intellect is simply more noble than the will, as for example, to understand a stone is nobler than to will a stone, for the form of stone is in the intellect in a nobler way as being understood by it than it exists in itself as being desired by the will. It is compared in a third way with respect to divine things, which are higher than the soul; and in this way to will is more eminent than to understand, just as it is more excellent to will or love God rather than to know him; for the divine goodness itself exists more perfectly in God himself as desired by the will than it is participated in us as known by the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it must be said that Augustine takes "reason" and "intelligence" for the whole intellective part, which embraces within itself both the apprehension of understanding and the appetite of the will; and thus the will is not excluded from the image.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the Teacher appropriates the image to reason inasmuch as it is prior, but likeness to love since knowledge is completed by love with regard to God, just as an image is perfected and adorned with colors and other such things by which it becomes similar to the exemplar.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the objection argues with respect to those things that are less noble than the soul, though by the same argument one can prove the preeminence of the will in comparison to things more noble than the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that the will does not share its object with the senses except inasmuch as it is carried toward sensible things, which are inferior to the soul; but inasmuch as it is borne toward intelligible and divine things, it is more removed from the senses than is the intellect, for the intellect is able to grasp less about divine things than the affection desires and loves.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the intellect rules the will not by, as it were, inclining it toward that to which it tends, but as showing it where it ought to tend. Thus, when the intellect is less able to show something noble to the will than the inclination of the will is borne toward it, then the will is stronger than the intellect.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the will does not directly proceed from intelligence, but from the soul's essence, with intelligence being presupposed. Hence, this does not show the order of dignity, but only the order of origin by which the intellect is naturally prior to the will.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the intellect does not abstract from matter except when it understands sensible and material things, but when it understands things above itself it does not abstract; on the contrary, it receives these things less simply than than they are in themselves. Hence, the act of the will, which is borne to the things themselves inasmuch as they are in themselves, remains more simple and noble.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that those words, by which the intellect is compared to splendor and the affection to heat, are metaphorical, and one should not draw an argument from such words, as the Teacher says in the Sentences. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 11, ch. 2.) Dionysius also says in the Letter to Titus (Dionysius, Letter to Titus, letter 9, para. 1 (PG 3:1105D).) that symbolic theology is not argumentative.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that to will belongs to man alone just as to understand, even though to desire belongs to things other than man.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that although the soul is first present to God by the intellect rather than by the affection, yet the affection attains to him more perfectly than the intellect, as was said.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that the will is not excluded from contemplation, hence Gregory says in the Commentary on the Book of Ezechiel (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel, bk. 2, homily 2, para. 8 (CCSL 142; PL 76:953A).) that the contemplative life is to love God and neighbor. Hence, the eminence of the contemplative life over the active does not prejudice the will.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking of the intellect as taken for the entire intellective part, which also embraces within itself the will. Or it can be said that he is considering the intellect and the other powers of the soul absolutely, not as compared to this or that object.

Reply Sed Contra 1: To what was first objected on the contrary, it must be said that charity is a habit perfecting the will in its order toward God, and in this order the will is nobler than the intellect.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that the will's freedom does not show that it is nobler simply, but nobler in moving, which will be more clear from what follows.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that since truth is a certain good, for it is the good of the intellect as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.2, 1139a27.) it should not be said that goodness is nobler than truth, just as neither is animal nobler than man, since man includes the nobility of animal within itself and adds to it. For we are now speaking of truth and goodness inasmuch as they are the object of the will and the intellect.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that to will is not found in more things than is to understand, even though to desire is found in more. Nevertheless, it must be known that the authority of Dionysius is not introduced in this argument according to his intention, and this for two reasons: first, because Dionysius speaks of how one is included in the definition of another, as for example to exist is included within to live, and to live within to understand, for he says that one is simpler than another; second, because even though a participation that is simpler is nobler, yet if it is taken according to that mode which is found in things that lack superadded participations, it will be less noble; as when the being that is nobler than living, if it is taken according to the manner in which inanimate things exist, then that mode of existence will be less noble than the existence of living things, which is to live.

And so, it is not necessary that what exists in more things is always more noble; otherwise one would have to say that sense is nobler than intellect and the nutritive power than the sensitive power.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth it must be said that the objection argues with regard to the will as ordered toward God; and in this sense it is granted that it is nobler.