Article 6 — Whether the will wants whatever it wants by necessity.

Sixth, it is asked whether the will wants whatever it wants by necessity. (Parallal text: ST I.82.2; I-II.10.2; In II Sent., d. 25, a. 2; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 3, a. 3; q. 6; Exposition of Aristotle's On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it does. For to the extent that something is more noble, so much is it unchangeable. But to live is more noble than to exist, to understand than to live, and to will rather than to understand. Therefore, to will is more unchangeable than to exist. But the existence of the willing soul is unchangeable, since it is incorruptible. Therefore, its willing is also unchangeable, so that whatever it wants unchangeably, it wants necessarily.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, something is more unchangeable the closer it is to God. But the soul is more conformed to God by the second conformity, which is of the likeness, than by the first conformity, which is of the image. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 16, ch. 3.) However, in the first conformity, it possesses unchangeability, since the soul cannot lose the image according to Ps. 38:7; man goes about as an image. Therefore, with regard to the second conformity, which is of likeness, and which consists in the appropriate ordering of the will, it will have unchangeability such that the will wants goodness unalterably, and so not be able to want evil.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as act is related to being in act, so is potency related to potential being. But since God is good in act, he cannot make anything evil in act. Thus, his power, which is good, cannot produce something that is evil in potency: and so the will, which the divine power produced, has no power to do evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.10, 1144a31; cf. 7.8, 1151a16.) just as principles are related to conclusions in demonstrative sciences, so also are ends related to what are for the sake of the ends in practical and desirable things. But necessity is imposed upon the intellect from principles which are naturally known so that it knows conclusions by necessity. Therefore, from the fact that the will wants the final end by necessity, in the manner already mentioned, (Above: a. 5.) it also wants by necessity other things which are ordered to the final end.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whatever is naturally determined to something follows upon it by necessity, unless there should be some impediment. But the will naturally wants goodness as the Gloss says on Romans 7:15. (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 7:15, 6.96; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 7:15 (PL 191:1423A).) Therefore, it wants goodness unalterably, for there is nothing that can impede it, inasmuch as, according to Bernard, it is most powerful under God. (Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 10 (PL 182:1019 A-B).)

Obj. 6: Furthermore, shadows are opposed to light, so also is evil to goodness. But sight, which is naturally determined to know light and the transparent, sees them naturally such that it cannot see what is in shadow. Therefore, also the will, whose object is goodness, unalterably wants goodness such that it cannot in any way want evil. Therefore, the will has a certain necessity not only with respect to the final end, but also with respect to other things.

On the contrary (1), Augustine says that that the will is that by which one sins and lives uprightly. (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PL 32:596); according to ST I-II.20.1, s.c. 1.) Therefore, the will is not related unalterably either to goodness or to evil.

Furthermore (2), according to Augustine, sin is voluntary to such an extent that unless it be voluntary, it is not a sin. (Cf. Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 14 (PL 34:133).) Therefore, if sin is in no way from the will, it will in no way be a sin; which is clearly false from experience.

I answer that it must be said that something is said to be necessary from the fact that it is unalterably determined to one thing. Hence, since the will is related indeterminately with regard to many things, it does not possess necessity with respect to all, but only with respect to those to which it is determined by a natural inclination, as has been said. (Above: a. 5.) And since every mobile thing is led back to what is immobile, and the undetermined to what is determined, as to a principle; therefore, whatever determines the will must be the principle for desiring whatever does not determine it; and this is the final end, as has been said. (Above: a. 5.) However, there is an indeterminacy of the will with regard to three things: namely, in regard to the object, in regard to the act, and in regard to the order to the end.

With respect to the object, the will is undetermined with regard to what is for the sake of the end, but not what regard to the final end, as was said. (Above: a. 5.) For this reason it happens that one can arrive at the final end by many ways, and different ways for arriving there pertain to different things. Thus, the will's desire cannot be determined by what is for the sake of the end, as is the case among natural things, which only have fixed and determined means for a fixed and determined end. It is clear, then, that just as natural things necessarily desire the end itself, so also do they desire what is for the sake of the end, such that there is nothing in them which they could either desire or not desire. However, the will desires the final end by necessity such that it cannot help but desire it, but it does not desire what is for the sake of the end by necessity. Hence, with respect to such things, it is in their power to desire this or that thing.

In the second place, the will is also undetermined with regard to acts, for with respect to a determined object, it can either use or not use its act when it wishes. For it can issue forth or not issue forth in an act of willing with respect to any object, which does not happen among natural things. For the heavy always descends lower in act, unless something should stop it. The reason for this is that unensouled things do not move themselves, but are rather moved by others. Hence, being moved or not being moved is not from within them. However, ensouled things are moved by themselves, and for this reason the will is able to want or not to want.

The third indeterminacy of the will is with respect to the order toward the end, inasmuch as the will can desire what is truly ordered to an appropriate end, or what is so ordered only according to appearance. This indeterminacy follows from two things, namely, from an indeterminacy regarding the object in the things that are for the sake of the end, and again from an indeterminacy of apprehension, which can be either correct or incorrect. For just as a false conclusion does not follow from a given true principle, except by some falsity of reason in either assuming something false or in falsely ordering the principle to the conclusion, so also there cannot follow from whatever has a correct desire for the final that it desire something inordinately, unless reason should take up something as able to be ordered to the end which is not able to be so ordered; for example, whoever naturally desires beatitude would never be led to desire fornication, except inasmuch as he apprehends it as something good for man, insofar as it is something desirable, and able to be ordered to beatitude in this way as a certain image of it. The will's indeterminacy follows from this, by which it can desire good or evil.

However, since the will is said to be free inasmuch as it has no necessity, the will's freedom can be considered in regard to three things: namely, with respect to the act, inasmuch as it can will or not will; with respect to the object and its opposite, inasmuch as it can will this or that thing, or its opposite; and with respect to the order to the end, inasmuch as it can will good or evil. But with respect to the first of these, freedom is within the will in any state of nature with respect any object. For any act of the will is under its control with respect to any object. But the second of these is with respect to some objects, namely, with respect to those which are for the sake of the end and are not the end itself; and also with respect to any state of nature. However, the third is not with respect to all objects, but only some, namely, those which are for the sake of the end; not with respect to any state of nature, but only that in which nature can fail. For where there is no defect in apprehending and conferring there cannot be a will for evil, even among the things which are for the sake of the end, as is clear with the blessed. For this reason it is said that to will evil is not freedom nor a part of freedom, (Anselm, De libertate arbitrii, ch. 1 (PL 158:490B); as said below: q. 24, a. 10.) even though it is a certain sign of freedom.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that the being of the soul is not determined by itself, but by another, yet it determines its own willing for itself; and thus, even though its being is unchangeable, its willing is undetermined, so that by this fact it is flexible with regard to different things. Nevertheless, it is untrue that understanding and willing are more noble than existing, if they should be separated from existing, rather, existing is more noble than them in this way, according to Dionysius in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 3 (PG 3:817A).)

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the conformity of the image is considered with respect to the natural powers which are determined for it by nature; and thus that conformity always remains the same. But the second conformity, which is of likeness, is by means of grace, habits, and acts of virtue, to which the soul is ordered by an act of the will, which consists in its own power; and thus this conformity does not always remain the same.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that there is no passive or material power in God that is distinguished against act, about which the objection argues, but rather an active power that is the act itself, for each thing is capable of acting inasmuch as it is in act. Nevertheless, the will does not have the capability of bending toward evil as being from God, but as being from nothing.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that in demonstrative sciences the conclusions are related to the principles such that if the principles are removed so are the conclusions. Thus, because of this determination of the conclusions with respect to the principles, the intellect is forced to consent to the conclusions. But what is for the sake of the end does not have this same determination with respect to the end, so that the end would be removed if some of them were removed; for one can arrive at the final end by different paths, either according to appearance or truth. Therefore, it is necessary that whatever is in the voluntary appetite with respect to the end is not bound by necessity with regard to what is for the sake of the end.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the will naturally wants what is good, but does not want this or that determinate good, such as sight which naturally sees color, but not this or that determinate color. For this reason it wants whatever it wants under the notion of the good, but it is not necessary that it always wants this or that good.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that there is nothing so bad that it cannot have some form of goodness, and by reason of that goodness it is able to move the appetite.