Article 1 — Whether there is free choice in man

The question is about free choice. And first, it is asked whether there is free choice in man. (Parallel texts: ST I.59.3; I.83.1; I-II.13.6; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 6, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems not: for as is said in Jeremiah, 10:23, the way of man is not in himself, and it is not in man who walks to direct his steps; but in this respect something is said to have free choice, inasmuch as it is the master of its own actions; (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a17; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 6, a. 1, s.c. 3; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776A).) thus, man does not have free choice.

Obj. 2: But one might say that the words of the prophet are understood regarding meritorious acts, which are not in man's natural power.

On the contrary, we do not have free choice regarding the things that are not in our power; thus, if merits are not in our power, we do not have free choice to merit, and so meritorious acts do not proceed from free choice.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3, 982b25.) that is free which is its own cause; but the human mind has another cause of its own motion besides itself, namely, God, for on Romans 1:24, therefore God gave them up, the Gloss (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 1:24, 6.27; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Romans 1:24 (PL 191:1332A); from Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 21 (PL 44:909); cf. ST I-II.79.1, ad 1.) says it is manifest that God works in the minds of men to turn their wills to whatever he wants; thus, the human mind does not have free choice.

Obj. 4: But one might say that the human mind is like a principle cause of its own act, but God is like the remote cause; and this does not impede the mind's freedom.

On the contrary, a cause is more primary to the extent that it has greater influence on the effect; but the first cause influences the effect more than the second, as it says in The Book of Causes; (Book of Causes, prop. 1.) therefore, the first cause is more a principle than the second, and so our mind is not the principle cause of its own act, but rather it is God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, anything that moves having been moved moves like an instrument, as is clear from the Commentator on the Physics 8; (Averroes, Physics, bk. 8, comm. 35.) however, an instrument is not free to act, for it only acts inasmuch as someone uses it; thus, since the human mind does not act unless moved by God, it seems that it does not have free choice.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, free choice is said to be a faculty of the will and of reason, by which the good is chosen with grace assisting, or when it is lacking, evil is chosen; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 3.) but there are many who do not have grace; thus, they are not able to freely choose the good, and so they do not have free choice for the good.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, servitude is opposed to freedom; (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 1, lect. 3.) but in man there is found servitude to sin, for whoever commits sin is a slave to sin, as is said in John 8:34; thus, there is no free choice in man.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, Anselm says in the book On Free Choice, (Anselm, De libero arbitrio, ch. 1 (PL 158:480B).) if we should have the power to sin and not to sin, we would not need grace; however, the power to sin and not to sin belongs to free choice; thus, since we need grace, we do not have free choice.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, each thing is denominated from the best, as is held by the Philosopher in On the Soul; (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.9, 416b23.) but the best among human acts are meritorious acts; thus, since man does not have free choice in regard to these, since as is said in John 15:5, without me you can do nothing, which is understood regarding meritorious acts, it seems that man should not be said to have free choice.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, Augustine says that since man did not wish to abstain from sin when he was able, it was inflicted upon him to not be able to when he wished; (Cf. Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PL 32:1296), sec. litteram Glossae Petri Lombard, on Rom. 7:14 (PL 191:1422B).) thus, it is not in man's power to sin or not to sin; and so he seems unable to be the master of his own acts and neither to have free choice.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, Bernard distinguishes a threefold liberty, (Cf. Bernard, De grat. et lib. arb., ch. 4 (PL 182:1007C).) namely, free choice, the freedom of counsel, and the freedom of being well pleased; and he says that free choice is that by which we discern what is permitted, freedom of counsel that by which we discern what is expedient, and freedom of being well pleased that by which we discern what is pleasing. But human discretion is wounded by ignorance. (cf. Oratio ad Laudes feriae V infra hebd. Passionis ante Dom. Palmarum.) Thus, it seems that free choice, which consists in discretion, did not remain in man after sin.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, man does not have freedom with regard to those things that are under necessity. But man is under necessity with regard to sins, for after sin, according to Augustine, (Apud Petrum Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 25 c. 5 ut dicitur supra q. 22 a. § 52, cf. August. De civ. Dei XXII c. 30 (PL 41, 802).) it is necessary that man sin, damnably before reparation, but at least venially after reparation; thus, man does not have free choice with regard to sin.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, it is necessary that whatever God foreknows happens, for God's foreknowledge cannot err; (cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. Id. 38 c. 2.) but God foreknew all human acts; thus, they happen by necessity, and so man does not have free wil to act.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, the more that any mobile is closer to the first mover, so much more is it uniform in its own motion, as is clear from the heavenly bodies whose motion is always the same; (Cf. Arist. De caelo II 8 (288 a 13).) but since every creature is moved by God, for he moves the bodily creature in time and place, but the spiritual in time, as Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 20 (PL 34:388).) thus the rational creature is the mobile that is closest to God, who is the first mover of all things; therefore, man has the most uniform motion, and so his ability does not extend to many things such that he could be said to have free choice.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On Heaven and Earth, (Aristotle, On Heaven and Earth 2.18, 292b22.) it pertains to the nobility of the highest heaven that it pursue its end by a single motion; but the rational soul is nobler than that heaven, for the spirit is preferred to the body according to Augustine in the City of God 8; (It is actually Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 20 (PL 34:388).) thus, the human soul has a single motion, and so it does not seem to have free choice.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, it was fitting that the divine goodness should arrange the highest creature in the best way; (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 8 (PG 3:821C).) but what is best arranged clings unmovably to what is best; thus, it was fitting that God make the rational nature, which is the highest among creatures, such that it should cling to himself immovably, which if this should be the case, then it would seem not to have free choice. Thus, it was fitting that rational nature should be made without free choice.

Obj. 17: Furthermore, Philosophers define free choice to be the free judgment of reason; (idem dicit Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 25 c. 1, vide Boetium In librum Arist. De interpr. ed. sec. III prol. (PL 64, 492 D) ibi tamen loco ‘ratione’ legitur ‘voluntate’.) but the judgment of reason can be forced by the power of a demonstration; (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1015b6.) however, whatever is forced is not free; thus, man does not have free choice.

Obj. 18: Furthermore, the intellect or reason is able to be forced, for there is something true with which no falsity is intermixed, not even the appearance of falsehood; hence, the intellect cannot escape but must ascent to it; but similarly something is found to be good in which there is nothing of wickedness intermixed, neither in truth nor according to appearance. Therefore, since goodness is the object of the will just as truth is of the intellect, it seems that just as the intellect is forced, so also is the will; and so man is not free, neither with regard to the will nor with regard to reason, and so he does not have free choice, which is a faculty of the will and reason. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, a. 3.)

Obj. 19: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.7, 1114a32.) in whatever way each person is, so does the end appear to him; but it is not in our power to be of such and such a condition, since this man has it from his birth, and it depends, as it seems to some, on the disposition of the stars; (Democritus and Empedocles according to Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 427a21; Metaphysics 4.12, 1009b12; cf. Aquinas, SCG III.84.) therefore, it is not in our power to approve of this or that end; but every practical judgment is taken from the end; thus, we do not have free choice.

Obj. 20: Furthermore, free choice is opposed to necessity; but man's will has necessity with regard to certain things: for he wants beatitude by necessity; thus, he is not free with respect to all things, and so he does not have free choice with respect to all.

On the contrary (1) is that commenting on Ecclesiastes 15:14, God created man in the beginning, and left him (Vulgate: illum.) in the power of his own inclination, the Gloss says that is in the power of free choice. (Glossa interlinearis, at Ecclesiastes 15:14, (in Glossa ordinaria ).) Therefore, man has free choice.

Furthermore (2), a certain agent is found among things which acts from nothing and not by necessity, namely, God; there is also an agent that acts from another and by necessity, such as natural agents: but by holding the extremes in reality, it follows that one must also hold the middle, according to the Philosopher in On Heaven and Earth. (Aristotle, On Heaven and Earth 2.4, 286a28.) However, between these two there can only be a twofold middle, one of which is impossible that it exists, namely, an agent from nothing and by necessity: for to act from nothing only belongs to God, who acts not by necessity but by will; thus, it is granted that there is something which acts from another and not by necessity. And thus this is a rational nature that acts from presupposed matter and not by necessity, but by free choice.

Furthermore (3), free choice is a faculty of will and reason; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 3.) but reason and will are found to be in man; thus also free choice.

Furthermore (4), according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.7, 1112a30.) counsel is only about things in us; but men take counsel regarding their acts; thus, men are in command of their acts, and by this they have free choice.

Furthermore (5), commands and prohibitions should only be made to one who is able to act and not to act, otherwise they would be in vain; but prohibitions and commands are also made to man by divine inspiration; thus, it is in man's power to act and not to act, and so he has free choice.

Furthermore (6), no one should be punished or rewarded for what is not in one's power to do or not to do. But man is justly punished and rewarded by God for his deeds. Therefore, man is able to act and not to act, and so he has free choice.

Furthermore (7), it is necessary to hold that there is a cause for everything that happens; but we can hold the cause of human acts to be immediately God himself, for what exists immediately from God can only be good; whereas human acts are sometimes good and sometimes bad. (Cf. Arist. Metaph. V 6 (1015 a 33).) Similarly, neither can it be said that the cause of human acts is necessity, for what exists always in the same way comes from necessity, which we do not see in human acts. Likewise, it cannot be said that fate or the disposition of the stars is their cause, for then human acts would have to happen by necessity, just as the cause is necessary. Not even nature can be their cause, which the variety of human acts manifests: for nature is determined to one thing (cf. Arist. Metaph. IX 2 (1046 b 5)) and does not fail from it except in the minority of cases. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.13, 198b35.) Neither can fortune or chance be a cause of human acts, for fortune and chance are causes of what happens rarely and beyond intention, as is said in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 2.9, 197a32.) which does not appear in human acts. Thus, it remains that the acting man is the principle of his own acts, and by this he has free choice.

I answer that it must be said without any doubt that man must be held to have free choice. For faith binds to this, since there cannot be merit or demerit, just punishment or reward without free choice. Manifest indications also lead to this, by which it is clear that man chooses one thing freely and refuses something else. Evident reason also compels to this: to the investigation of which we shall proceed in this way, following the origin of free choice.

This difference is found among things that are moved or that do something, namely that some have the beginning of their motion or operation within themselves, but some outside of themselves, such as what are moved by violence in which the beginning is outside, it suffering while contributing no force according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a1 et 1110b15.) in which we cannot place free choice, inasmuch as they are not the cause of their own motion; however, that is free which is its own cause according to the Philosopher in the beginning of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3, 982b25.)

However, among those things whose beginning of motion and operation is within them, some are such that they move themselves, such as animals, but some are such that they do not move themselves, even though they have some beginning of their own motion within themselves, such as heavy and light things; for they do not move themselves since they cannot be distinguished into two parts of which one is moving and the other is moved, as is found in animals, even though their motion follows upon some beginning within them, namely, the form, which, because they have it from the one that begot them, are said to be moved essentially by the begetter, according to the Philosopher in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 8.8, 256a1.) but accidentally by removing the one preventing motion: and these are moved in themselves, but not by themselves. Hence, free choice is not found in them, for they are not their own cause of acting or of moving, but are compelled to act or move by what they receive from another.

However, among those things which are moved by themselves, the motion of some comes from the judgment of reason, but of others from natural judgment. Men are moved and act from the judgment of reason, for they confer regarding what is to be done; but all beasts are moved and act from natural judgment. This, indeed, is apparent from the fact that whatever belongs to the same species acts similarly, just as all sparrows make nests in like manner, (exemplum Arist. Phys. II 13 (199 a 26).) and also from the fact that they have a judgment for a certain determinate work, and not for all works, like bees that do not have the diligence for making any other product except honeycomb, and it is similarly the case with other animals.

Hence, it is clear to those thinking correctly that in whatever way motion and action is attributed to natural inanimate bodily things, in the same way judgment about actions is attributed to irrational animals. Just as heavy and light things do not move themselves so as to be the cause of their own motion, neither do beasts judge from their own judgment, but they follow the judgment placed within themselves by another; and so they are not the cause of their own decision, and neither do they have free choice.

But man is able, by the power of reason, judging regarding what is to be done, to also judge regarding his own decision, inasmuch as he knows the notion of the end and what is for the sake of the end, as well as the relationship and order of one thing to another; and so he is not only his very own cause of moving but also of judging. And thus he has free choice, as though it were said that he has free judgment regarding what is to be done or not done.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that two things are found in the activity of man: namely, the choice of an activity, and this always lies within man's power; and the performance or execution of an activity, and this does not always lie within man's power, but under the guidance of divine providence, man's objective is sometimes brought to its fulfillment, though sometimes it is not. And so man is not said to be free in his own actions but free in his choice, which is a judgment about what is to be done; and the very name of free choice demonstrates this. Or one can distinguish regarding meritorious works, as was mentioned in the objection. But the first response is from Gregory of Nyssa. (Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 37 (PG 40:749B).)

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that a meritorious work is not different from one that is meritorious in what is done but in how it is done; for there is nothing that one man could do meritoriously and from charity that another could not do or even will without merit. Hence, that man cannot perform meritorious works without grace diminishes nothing from free choice, for man is said to have free choice inasmuch as he can do this or that, not inasmuch as he can act in this or that way, for even according to philosophers (cf. Arist. Ethic. II 1 (Merietti, bk5, ch.9) (1103 b 6 sqq.).) the one who does not yet possess the habit of virtue does not have it in his own power to behave in such a away as the virtuous man would, except insofar as he is able to acquire the habit of virtue.

However, even though man cannot acquire by free choice the grace that makes works to be meritorious, yet he can prepare himself to possess grace, which, if he were to do what was in his power, would not be denied him by God. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 2, q. 5.) Hence, to perform meritorious works is not fully outside the power of free choice, even though the power of free choice is not sufficient in itself to accomplish this, since the measure that is required for merit exceeds the capabilities of nature, but not the measure that is found in the works that arise from political virtues. (Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, bk. 1, ch. 8, n. 5; cf. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2.) But no one would say that for this reason man has no free choice just because he cannot will or choose in such a way as does God or an angel.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that God works in every agent with respect to the manner of that agent's activity, just as the first cause acts in the operation of any secondary cause, for the secondary cause cannot begin to act except by the power of the first cause. Hence, that human minds are the cause of their own activities is not excluded by the fact that God is a cause working within the hearts of men; thus, the notion of freedom is not removed.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that, simply speaking, the first cause is called primary inasmuch as it has a greater influence upon its effect; but a secondary cause is primary in a certain respect inasmuch as its effects are more conformed to it.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that an instrument is spoken of in two ways: in one way properly, namely, when something is moved by another in such a way that a principle of such motion is not conferred upon it by the mover, like the saw that is moved by the carpenter, and such an instrument is wholly without freedom.

In another way, speaking more commonly, an instrument is said to be whatever is moving while being moved by another, whether or not there is a principle of motion within it. In this way it is not necessary that the notion of freedom be wholly excluded from the instrument; for something can be moved by another, which nevertheless moves itself, and such is the case with regard to the human mind.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that someone who does not have grace can choose what is good, though not meritoriously. However, this does not diminish the freedom of choice, as has been said (ad 2).

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the bondage of sin does not denote constraint, but rather inclination, inasmuch as a preceding sin in some way leads to what follows, or else a defect of natural power, which cannot rescue itself from the stain of sin once it has subjected itself to it. Thus, freedom from constraint is always within man, by which he naturally possesses free choice.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that Anselm speaks using those words as objecting; for afterwards he shows that the need for grace does not contradict free choice. (De lib. arb. cap. 3 (PL 158, 494 B).)

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that the power of free choice extends to the meritorious work itself, even though not without God, without whose power nothing in the world can be done; but the way that a work becomes meritorious exceeds the natural power, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that there are two opinions regarding this: some say that, being in the state of mortal sin, man cannot avoid for very long from sinning mortally; (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 28, a. 2, q. 2.) but he can avoid this or that mortal sin, as all say in common regarding venial sins. Thus it seems that this necessity does not remove the freedom of choice. Another opinion is that, being in the state of mortal sin, man is able to avoid every mortal sin, (Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.) but he cannot avoid being subject to sin, since he is unable by himself to rise out of sin in the same way as he was able to fall into sin by himself: and with respect to this the freedom of choice is more easily upheld. But we shall ask about this below in the question on the power of free choice. (below: a. 12)

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that our will is borne either toward the end or toward what is for the sake of the end; namely, toward a noble, useful, or pleasurable end, according to which is distinguished a threefold good, the noble, the useful, and the pleasurable. (Ambros. De officiis I c. 9 (PL 16, 35) sec. Thomam I Pars q. 5 a. 6.) Thus, with respect to the noble end, Bernard posits the freedom of choice; with respect to the useful good that is for the sake of an end, he posits the freedom of counsel; but with respect to the pleasurable good, he posits the freedom of being well pleased. However, even though discretion is diminished by ignorance, though not wholly removed, thus, the freedom of choice is indeed weakened by sin, though not completely lost.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that, according to one opinion, (Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.) after sin and before reparation it is necessary that man be sinning, that is, that he have sin, but it is not necessary that he use sin; thus someone is said to sin in two ways, just like seeing in two ways, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.10, 417a10.) According to another opinion, (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 28, a. 2, q. 2.) it is necessary that man sin by some sin, though not being under necessity with regard to any particular sin.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that one cannot conclude from God's foreknowledge that our acts are necessary by an absolute necessity, which is called necessity of the consequent, but rather by a conditional necessity, which is called necessity of the consequence, (SCG I.67; cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 1, inq. 1, tract. 5, sect. 2, q. 1, ch. 4, n. 184, 1:270; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 38, a. 4; Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 1.) as is clear from Boethius at the end of On the Consolation of Philosophy. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6 (PL 63:861B).)

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that one speaks of being moved in two ways: in one way properly as the Philosopher defines motion in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a10.) saying that motion is the act of what is potential as such; and so it is true that however much a mobile is closer to the first mover, so much is a more uniform motion found to be in it, for it is more perfect, more in act, less in potency, and thus movable by fewer motions. In another way, broadly speaking, motion is said to be any activity whatsoever, such as understanding or sensing; and taking motion in this way, the Philosopher says in On the Soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a7.) that motion is the act of what is perfect, for each thing acts inasmuch as it is in act: (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 2; d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; SCG I.73; II.21; Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 202a11; Averroes, Physics, bk. 3, comm. 17; On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 20.) and so the objection is true in a certain sense, but in another way it is not. For if one considers the uniformity of motion on the side of the effect, then it is false; for the power of any acting agent extends to more effects to the degree that it is more powerful and perfect. (Cf. Book of Causes, prop. and comm. 10 [9]; cf. ST II-II.45.3, ad 1; Liber de Intelligentiis x1 [1] (ed. Baeumker, p. 15).) But if one considers the manner of acting, then the objection is true; for any acting agent better maintains the same manner of acting to the extent that it is more perfect, for it varies less in nature and disposition, which follow upon the manner of acting.

However, rational minds are said to be mobile not in the first kind of motion, for such motion only belongs to bodily things, but in the second; so also in this way did Plato hold that the first mover moves himself inasmuch as he wills and understands himself, as the Commentator says in the Physics 8. (Averroes, Physics, bk. 8, comm. 40.) And thus it is not necessary that rational minds be determined to certain effects, but rather they are effective with regard to many things, and for this reason, freedom belongs to them.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that it is not always necessary that what can attain to its end by fewer motions or operations is therefore more noble, for sometimes one thing attains to a more perfect end by more motions than another is able to attain to by a single motion, as the Philosopher says in the same place. (De cael II 18 (292 b 1 sqq.).) And in this way rational minds are found to be more perfect than the highest heaven, which possesses only one motion, for they attain a more perfect end, even though by many activities.

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that although a creature is better if it clings to God immovably, yet that is also good which can cling or else not cling to him; and so the universe in which both creatures are found is better than one in which only one of them is found. And this is the response of Augustine. (Cf. Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 5 (PL 32:1276).) Or one can say, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776 A-B).) and John Damscene, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960B).) that it is impossible for a creature, by its own nature, to cling to God with an immovable will, inasmuch it is flexible, since it exists from nothing. But if a creatures should cling to God immovably, it would not for this reason be deprived of free will, for it can do or not do many things while clinging to God.

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that the judgment to which freedom is attributed is the judgment of choice, but not the judgment by which man thinks of conclusions in the theoretical sciences, for choice itself is like a thought about things deliberated on beforehand. (Ethic. III 6 (1112 a 158).)

Reply Obj. 18: To the eighteenth it must be said that just as there are some truths that are necessarily received by the intellect because they are unmixed with any falsehood, such as the first principles of demonstration, so also is there some good that is necessarily desired by the will because it is unmixed with any evil, namely, happiness itself. But it does not follow that the will is compelled by that object, for compulsion implies something that is contrary to one's will, which is the proper inclination of the one willing; but it does not imply something contrary to the intellect, which does not denote an inclination of the one who understands.

Neither does the necessity of that good impose a necessity upon the will with respect to other things that are willed, in the way that, from the necessity of the first principles, necessity is imposed upon the intellect to consent to conclusions. This is because other willed things do not have a necessary relation to the first willed thing, whether according to truth or appearance, such that the first willed thing could not be possessed without them, in the way that demonstrative conclusions have a necessary relationship to the principles from which they are demonstrated, such that if the conclusions were untrue the principles would necessarily be untrue.

Reply Obj. 19: To the nineteenth it must be said that men do not hold from birth any disposition immediately within the intellective soul by which they would be necessarily inclined to choose some end, whether from a celestial body or from something else; except that there is within them, from their very own nature, a necessary desire for the final end, namely, happiness, which does not impede the freedom of choice. For various ways remain able to be chosen for attaining that end. This is the case because heavenly bodies do not make an immediate impression upon the rational soul. However, from birth, one does acquire in the body a certain disposition both from the power of the heavenly bodies as well as from lower causes. These causes are the seed and the matter of what is conceived, by which the soul is in some way made liable to choose something, inasmuch as the rational soul's choice is inclined by the passions in the sensitive appetite, which is a bodily power following upon the body's dispositions. But no necessity for choosing is imposed upon it by this, for it is in the rational soul's power to accept or refuse the rising passions. But after a while a man is made to be in a certain condition by habit, whether as acquired with us being the cause, or else as infused, yet not given without our consent, even though we are not its cause. From this it happens that man effectively desires an end that is in harmony with his habit, yet that habit does not impose necessity, and neither does it remove the freedom of choice.

Reply Obj. 20: To the twentieth it must be said that since choice is a certain judgment about what is to be done, or else it follows upon judgment, choice can be about whatever falls under our judgment. However, judgment about what is to be done is taken from the end, just as judgment about conclusions is taken from the principles. Hence, just as we do not judge about first principles by examining them, but we assent to them naturally and examine all other things in light of them, so also in what is desired we do not judge regarding the ultimate end with the judgment of discussion or of examination, but we naturally approve of it; for which reason there is no choice regarding it but only will. Therefore, we have free will with respect to it, for natural necessity is not opposed to the freedom of inclination according to Augustine in the City of God. (Augustine, City of God, bk. 5, ch. 10 (PL 41:152).) However, this is not the case, properly speaking, with free judgment since it does not fall under choice.