Article 2 — Whether there is free choice in beasts

Second, it is asked whether there is free choice in beasts. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 25, a. 1, ad 6–7; ST I.83.1; I-II.13.2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for we are said to have free choice inasmuch as our acts are voluntary; but both children and beasts share in the voluntary, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.5, 1111b8.) Therefore, there is free choice in beasts.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 255a7.) in anything that moves itself there is something that is moved and something that is not moved; but beasts move themselves; therefore, to be moved and not to be moved is found within them; but we are said to have free choice inasmuch as to do something exists within us, as is clear from Gregory of Nyssa and John Damascene; (Cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 40 (PG 40:768 A-B); John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 26 (PG 94:960 A-B).) therefore, there is free choice in beasts.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, free choice implies two things, namely, judgment and freedom, both of which are found among beasts; for they have some judgment about what is to be done, which is clear from the fact that they pursue one thing and flee another. They also have freedom since they can be moved or not. Therefore, there is free choice within them.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if one posits a cause, then the effect is also to be posited; (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 7; cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. 5, n. 24.) but John Damascene posits the cause of free choice as being that our soul originates from change, for it exists from nothing, and so it is changeable and is related potentially to many things; (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960C).) but the soul of a beast also originates from change, therefore, there is free choice within it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that is said to be free which is not bound to another; but the soul of a beast is not bound to either one of two opposites, for its potency is not determined to one thing as are the potencies of natural things, (cf. Arist. Metaph. IX 2 (1046 b 5)) which always behave in the same way. Thus, the soul of a beast has free choice.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, punishment is only due to someone who has free choice; but in the Old Law punishments were frequently inflicted upon beasts, as is clear from Exodus 19:13 regarding the beasts touching the mountain, and 21:29 regarding the bull that gores with its horns, and Leviticus 20:16 regarding the mule under which a woman lies. Therefore, beasts seem to have free choice.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, it is a sign that man possesses free choice that he is incited by commands to goodness and withdrawn from evil, as the saints attest. (Cf. Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 2 (PL 44:882–84); Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 39 (PG 40:765B).) However, we see that beasts are enticed by favors and moved by commands or else frightened by threats to do or to stop from doing something. Thus, beasts have free choice.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, a divine precept is only given to someone having free choice; but a divine command is given to a beast, hence, in John 3:7 it says according to an alternate reading that God commanded the worm and it struck the vine. (sec. recens. Veteris Latinae.) Thus, beasts have free choice.

On the contrary (1), it seems that man is made to the image of God inasmuch as he possesses free choice, as both Damascene and Bernard say; (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PG 94:920B); Cf. On Grace and Free Will, ch. 9 (PL 182:1016B).) but beasts are not made to the image of God; thus, they do not have free choice.

Furthermore (2), all that has free choice acts and is not only acted upon; but as Damascene says, beasts do not act but are acted upon. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960D).) Therefore, beasts do not have free choice.

I answer that it must be said that beasts do not have free choice in any way. In evidence of this it must be known that since three things come together in our activities, namely, knowledge, desire, and the activity itself, the entire notion of freedom depends upon the manner of knowledge. For desire follows upon knowledge, since desire is only for the good that is proposed to oneself by the knowing faculty. If at some times the desire does not appear to follow upon knowledge, this is because the desire and the judgment of knowledge is not taken with regard to the same thing. For desire is concerned with the particular thing that is done, whereas reason's judgment is sometimes concerned with a universal, which is at times contrary to desire. For one who wishes to commit fornication, even though he knows that fornication is bad in general, yet he judges this act of fornication to be good for himself at that time, and he chooses it under the species of the good. For no one acts intending what is evil, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 32 (PG 3:732B).)

However, if there is not something preventing it, then motion or activity follows upon desire. Hence, if reason's judgment is not in one's power but is determined by another, then not only will the desire not be in one's power, but as a consequence neither will the motion or operation be in one's power, absolutely speaking. Yet judgment is in the power of the one judging inasmuch as one can judge about one's own judgment, for we are able to judge what is in our power. However, to judge one's own judgment belongs to reason alone which reflects upon its own act, and which knows the conditions of the things about which and by which it judges. Hence, the entire root of freedom is constituted within reason. Thus, anything stands to free will as it stands to reason. But reason is only perfectly and fully found within man; thus in him alone free will is found to exist completely. However, brute animals have a certain likeness of reason inasmuch as they participate in a certain natural prudence, by which the lower nature attains to some extent to what belongs to a higher nature. There is a likeness inasmuch as they have a judgment that is directed by others.

But they have this judgment by means of a certain natural assessment and not by any comparison, since they do not know the reasons for their own judgment. It is for this reason that judgment of this kind does not extend to all things as does the judgment of reason, but to certain determinate things. There is similarly found in them a likeness of free choice inasmuch as they can perform or not perform one and the same thing according to their judgment, so that they possess something like a conditional freedom; for they can do something if they judge it should be done, or not do something if they judge it should not be done.

But since their judgment is determined to one thing, it follows that their desire and their action are determined to one thing. Thus, according to Augustine in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 11, (It is actually Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 14 (PL 34:402).) they are moved by visible things; and they act by their passions, according to Damascene, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:961A); bk. 3, ch. 18 (PG 94:1076B-C).) for it is clear that they naturally judge about what is seen and about such passions. Thus, they must necessarily be moved by the sight of something or by some passion rising up, whether to run away or to pursue, as a sheep when seeing a wolf must by necessity be afraid and flee, and a dog when it becomes aroused with the passion of anger must necessarily bark and run to attack. (This example is from Avicenna, On the Soul, bk. 1, ch. 5; bk. 4, cc. 1 and 3.) But a man is not necessarily moved by the things that happen to him or by the passions that rise up, for he can accept them or refuse them; and thus man possesses free choice, but not brute animals.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the voluntary is placed by the Philosopher in brute animals not inasmuch as it comes from the will but inasmuch as it is opposed to the will; such thus it is said that the voluntary is in brutes or in children since they do things spontaneously, but not because of the use of free choice.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the motive power of brutes, considered in itself, is not inclined more to one opposite than to another; and so it is said that they are able to move and not to move. But the judgment by which the motive power is applied to either opposite is determined, and so they do not have free choice.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that even though there is in animals a certain indifference of action, yet it cannot properly be said that they possess freedom of action, whether for acting or for not acting. This is the case first of all because actions that are performed by means of the body can be forced or restrained not only in brute animals but also in men, and in this way not even man himself is said to be free in his actions; and secondly because even though there is indifference toward acting and not acting among brute beasts, considering the action in itself, yet if one considers the action's ordering to the judgment from which it comes, which is determined to one thing, then a certain binding is derived even to the actions themselves so that the notion of freedom cannot be found in them, speaking absolutely. But even granting that there is some freedom and some judgment found in them, it does not follow that they have the freedom of judgment, for their judgment is naturally determined to one thing.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that Damascene does not assign the cause of free choice as originating from change or from existing out of nothing, but rather that these are the cause of the changeableness of the will with respect to what is evil; however, Damascene, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960C).) Gregory of Nyssa, (Nemesius, (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776A).) and even Augustine (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 3.) assign reason as the cause of free choice.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that even though the motive power in beasts is not determined to one thing, yet their judgment of what to do is determined to one thing, as has been said. (Cf. e. g. Genesis 1:26–28.)

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that since brute beasts have been made for the service of man, beasts are disposed of inasmuch as it is useful for man, for whom they have been made. Thus beasts are punished by divine law not because they commit sin, but because by their punishment men are punished, being their possessors, (Cf. Moyses Maim. Dux neutr., bk. 3, ch. 41.) or so that they might be frightened by the harshness of the punishment, and likewise so that they might be instructed regarding the meaning of the mystery.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that both men as well as brute beasts are induced by favors and restrained by blows, commands, and prohibitions; but in different ways, for it is in the power of man to choose or to refuse by the judgment of reason things similarly represented either as commands and prohibitions or as favors and afflictions. But in brutes there is a natural judgment determined by the fact that whatever is proposed or happens in one particular way is accepted or refused in that same way. But it happens that from the memory of past favors or afflictions that beasts perceive something as friendly and to be pursued or hoped for, or else as unfriendly and to be fled or feared. Thus, after being struck by the passion of fear that rises upon them, they are led to obey the will of the instructor; and it is not necessary that this happen to such beasts because of freedom of choice, but rather because of the indifference of their actions.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 9, ch. 14 (PL 34:402).) that the divine precept made to brutes is not to be believed to have been made to them like some voice of command coming down from the clouds with certain words, which rational souls are accustomed to understand and obey upon hearing; for they did not perceive this as did the birds and the beasts. But they submit to God according to their kind, not by the choice of a rational will, but in the way that he moves all things in their appropriate times without him being moved in time; brutes are moved in time such that they fulfill his command.