Article 6 — Whether free choice is the will, or a power other than the will

Sixth, it is asked whether free choice is the will, or a power other than the will. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.83.4; III.18.3–4.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is another power. For what is predicated essentially of something should not be obliquely placed in its definition, (Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. 12, n. 46.) such as "animal" not being placed obliquely in man's definition. But reason and will are placed obliquely in the definition of free choice. For it is called a capacity of the will and of reason. (Cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 24 c. 3.) Thus, free choice is neither reason nor will, but a power different from both.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the differences between powers are known with respect to different acts. But to choose, which is an act of free choice, is different than to will, which is an act of the will, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Nichomachean Ethics. (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 3.4, 1111b26.) Therefore, free choice is also a power other than the will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, "choice" is placed abstractly in the naming of free choice, but "free" is placed concretely. (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 25, part 1, a. 1, q. 6, arg. 1.) However, choice pertains to reason and freedom to the will, therefore, what pertains to reason belongs to free choice essentially, whereas what pertains to the will belongs to it accidentally and as though by derivation; and so free choice seems to be reason more than will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Damascene (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960C).) and Gregory of Nyssa, (Cf. Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776A).) we have free choice inasmuch as we are rational. But we are rational insofar as we have reason. Therefore, we have free choice inasmuch as we have reason, and so it seems that free choice is reason.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the order of powers follows the order of habits. But an act of faith, which is a habit of reason, is informed by charity, which is a habit of the will. Therefore, the act of reason is informed by the will and not conversely; and so if an act of free choice pertains to either one of the two powers—namely, reason and will—to one as eliciting and to the other as informing, it seems that it pertains to reason as the one eliciting. Thus, free choice is essentially reason and so it is a different power than the will.

On the contrary (1), is what Damascene says in book 3, ch. 14, that free choice is nothing else than the will. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1037C).)

Furthermore (2), the Philosopher says in the Nichomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 3.6, 1112a15.) that choice is the desire for what is deliberated on beforehand. However, choice is an act of free choice; therefore, free choice is an appetitive power. But it is not an inferior power that is divided into the irascible and concupiscible, for then brute beasts would have free choice. Therefore, it is a higher appetite, and this is the will according to the Philosopher in On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.14, 432b5.)

I answer that it must be said that some (See also Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3; Albert the Great, Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, bk. 3, lect. 4.) say free choice is a third power, different from will and reason, because they see that the act of free choice is an act different from the act of simple will and the act of reason, for indeed the act of reason consists only in knowing, however, the will's own act regards the good which is the end; but free choice concerns what is for the sake of the end. Thus, just as the good that is for the sake of the end follows from the notion of the end, whereas the desire for the good follows from knowledge, hence they say that the will proceeds from reason by a kind of natural order, and from both of these arises a third power, which is free choice.

But this cannot be held consistently, for an object and the notion of an object pertain to the same power, just as color and light pertain to sight. But the whole notion of desirability of whatever is for the sake of the end is, in this respect, the end itself. Thus, to desire the end and what is for the sake of the end cannot pertain to different powers. The difference between the end being desired absolutely and what is for the sake of the end being ordered towards another cannot cause a distinction among appetitive powers. For the ordering of one thing to another within the appetite is not through itself, but through another, that is, through reason to which it belongs to order and to take counsel. Hence, there can be no specific difference constituting a species of appetite.

However, it seems in the Nichomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 6.2, (Marietti, 7.2) 1139b4.) that the Philosopher leaves in doubt the question of whether choosing is an act of reason or of will, yet in some way supposing that it is a power of both, saying that choice is either the understanding of the appetitive power, or the appetite of the understanding power. But, he says in the Ethics (Aristotle, Ethics 3.6, 1112a15.) that it is an appetite, defining choice as the desire for what is previously deliberated. The object itself shows that this is true, for just as the honorable and pleasurable good, which have the notion of an end, are the object of the appetitive power, so also is the useful good, which is properly chosen. (Cf. supra q. 22 a. 15) It is likewise clear from the name, for free choice, as was said, (Above: a. 4.) is the power by which man is able to judge freely. However, whatever is in some way said to be the principle of the becoming of an act must not be the principle of that act simply, but rather it is signified primarily as being the principle of that mode; just as grammar, by being called the knowledge of right speaking, (Cf. Papias Vocabularium s, v. grammatica.) is not itself understood to be the principle of speech simply, but rather that it is the principle of correctness in speech. Likewise, the power by which we judge is not understood to be that by which we judge simply, namely reason, but what causes freedom in judging, namely the will. Hence, free choice is the will itself, however, it names it not absolutely speaking, but as ordered to a certain one of its acts, which is to choose.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that since free choice does not name the will absolutely but as ordered toward reason, thus, in order to signify this, will and reason are placed obliquely in the definition of free choice.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that although to choose is an act other than to will, yet this difference cannot introduce a distinction of powers.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that although judgment belongs to reason, yet freedom of judgment belongs immediately to the will.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that we are called rational not only from the power of reason but from the rational soul, whose power is also the will, and so we are said to have free choice inasmuch as we are rational. Nevertheless, if "rational" were taken up from the power of reason, the previously mentioned authority would mean that reason is the first origin of free choice, but not the immediate principle of free choice.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that the will moves reason in some way by commanding its act, and reason moves the will by proposing to it its object, which is the end; and thus each power can be informed to some extent by the other.