Article 11 — Whether man's free choice can be obstinately in evil in this present life

Eleventh, it is asked whether man's free choice can be obstinately in evil in this present life. (The Leonine and Marietti editions do not have any parallel texts for this article.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it can: for whatever is inflicted as just deserts for nature's fall is within all men before the restoration of fallen nature; but the just deserts of obstinacy is the sin of nature's fall, as the Gloss on Romans 9:18 says; (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 9:18, 6.125; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 9:18 (PL 191:1462B); from Augustine, Letter 194, ch. 3, para. 14 (PL 33:879).) thus, before the restoration, any man in this present life is obstinate.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sin against the Holy Spirit can be found in someone who is on the way with regard to all its forms; but obstinacy is a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit, as is held in the Sentences. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 43, ch. 1.) Thus, someone can be obstinate in the state of this current life.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one in the state of sin can return to the good unless there should remain in him an inclination toward the good; but whoever falls into mortal sin lacks every inclination to the good: for someone sins mortally by an inordinate love; however, according to Augustine, love among spirits is like weight among bodily things; (Cf. Augustine, City of God, bk. 11, ch. 28 (PL 41:342); Confessions, bk. 13, ch. 9 (PL 32:849); Epistle 55, ch. 10 (PL 33:212); Epistle 157, ch. 2 (PL 33:677).) yet a heavy bodily thing is so inclined to one part, as is a rock downwards, that there remains in it no inclination upwards; and so it seems that there does not remain in the sinner an inclination to the good. Thus, whoever sins mortally is obstinate in evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one withdraws from the evil of guilt except by means of penance; but he who sins from malice is unable to be penitent, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 7.7, 1150a21.) for he is corrupt with regard to the beginning of what can be chosen, namely with regard to the end. Thus, since it happens that some person sins in this present life from malice, it seems that it is possible that someone be obstinate in evil in this life.

Obj. 5: But one might say that although someone is incapable of penance by their own power, yet one can be brought to penance from a gift of divine grace.

On the contrary, when something is impossible with regard to lower causes, even though it could be done by a divine operation, simply speaking, we say that it is impossible; such as for a blind man to see or for the dead to arise. Thus, if someone is not capable of penance by their own powers, it must be said simply that he is obstinate in evil, even though he could be brought to penance by divine power.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, every sickness that works against its cure seems incurable according to doctors; but the sin against the Holy Spirit works against its cure, that is divine grace, by which someone would be freed from sin. Therefore, someone can have an incurable spiritual sickness in this present life, and so can be obstinate in evil.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, it seems that the sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be unforgivable in Matthew 12:32 for this reason, which sin certain people in this life commit. (The vocabulary "viatoris" has been in use from William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 11, q. 2.)

Obj. 8: Furthermore, Augustine in the City of God (Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch. 24 (PL 41:737).) and Gregory in the Moralia (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 35, ch. 19 (PL 76:739A-B); cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 45, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, s.c. 2.) assign the cause for why the saints do not pray for the damned on the day of judgment as being that they are not able to come back to the state of justice; but there are some in the state of this life for whom one should not pray, as in 1 John 5:16 at the end, there is a sin unto death, and I do not say that one should pray for him, (sec. recens. Veteris Latinae, cf. ed. Beuron; Ier. 7:16; videtur textus conflatus ex Ier. 7L16 vel 11:14 et 14:11.) and in Jeremiah 7:16: you therefore do not pray for this people and so on. Therefore, there are some that are so obstinate in this life that they are unable to return to the state of justice.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, just as being established in goodness pertains to the glory of the saints, so does being established in evil pertain to the misery of the damned; but someone in this present life is able to be established in goodness, as has been said; therefore for an equal reason it seems that someone can be obstinate in evil.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, Augustine says in the book On the Faith to Peter (Scil. Fulgentius cap. 3 n. 34.(PL 40, 764).) that an angel is gifted with greater faculties than man; but an angel is unable to return to justice after sin; therefore neither can man, and so there is someone who is obstinate in this present life.

On the contrary (1), is what Augustine says in the book On the Words of the Lord and as it says in the Gloss on Romans 2:4: (It is actually Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 2:5, 6.35; Augustine, Sermon 71, ch. 13 (PL 38:456); Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Romans, at Romans 2:4–5 (PL 191:1340A).) this impenitence or impenitent heart cannot be judged so long as someone lives in this flesh; for one ought not to despair of anyone so long as God's patience leads to penitence: and so it seems that no one is obstinate in evil in this present life.

Furthermore (2), in Psalm 67:23 it says that I shall turn toward the depths of the sea, (Sec. litteram Glossae Petri Lomb. ibid. (PL 191:614A) et recens. Veteris Latinae.) that is toward those who were most desperate: (Glossa Petri Lomb. ut hic supra, from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 67:23 (PL 36:832).) and so whenever those who seem to be most desperate in this life are turned toward God, God turns toward them.

Furthermore (3), commenting on Psalm 147:17, he sends his ice, (sec. litteram Glossae et August. ut hic infra et recens. Veteris Latinae.) the Gloss says that ice means the obstinate, yet by which he feeds others, that is, he makes them to be in such a way that they feed others by God’s word, (Glossa interlinearis; Peter Lombard, Commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 147:17 (PL 191:1282A); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps 147:17 (PL 37:1933).) and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Furthermore (4), some sickness can be incurable either because of the nature of the sickness, or because of the ineptitude of the doctor, or because of the subject’s lack of disposition; but man’s spiritual sickness while he is in this present life, namely sin, is not incurable from the nature of the sickness, for it does not go to the extreme of malice; nor again from the ineptitude of the doctor, for God knows how and is able to cure; nor again from man’s indisposition, for since he fell by another, so also is he able to rise by another. Therefore, in this current state of life man is in no way able to be confirmed in evil.

I answer that it must be said that obstinacy implies a certain firmness in sin by which someone is unable to turn back from sin. However, that someone is unable to turn back from sin can be understood in two ways: in one way such that one’s powers are not sufficient such that one be wholly freed from sin, and in this way, anyone falling into mortal sin is said to be unable to return to justice; but someone is not properly called obstinate from this firmness in sin. In another way, someone has firmness in sin such that one is unable to cooperate so as to rise up from sin. But this happens in two ways: in one way such that one cannot cooperate in any way, and this is complete obstinacy by which the demons are obstinate: for their mind is so established in evil that every motion of their free choice is disordered and a sin; thus, they are unable in any way to prepare themselves to have grace, by which sin is remitted. In another way it is such that one cannot easily cooperate so as to get out of sin; and this is imperfect obstinacy by which someone can be obstinate in this life, that is while one has a will so established in sin that no motion arises toward the good, except one that is weak: but since some do arise, a way is provided from these so that one might be prepared for grace.

The reason that any man in this present life cannot be so obstinate in evil as to be incapable of cooperating in his own deliverance is clear from what has been said, (supra a. 10.) for passion is broken up and restrained, and a habit does not completely corrupt the soul, and reason does not so pertinaciously cling to falsehood that it is unable to be drawn back by a contrary argument. But after this current life, the separated soul will not understand by receiving from the senses, nor will it be in the act of the appetitive sensible powers.

And so the separated soul is made similar to the angel both with respect to the mode of understanding and with respect to the indivisibility of the appetite, which were the cause of perfect obstinacy in the sinning angel. Hence, there will be obstinacy in the separated soul for the same reason. However, in the resurrection, the body will follow the soul’s condition; and thus the soul will not return to the state in which it is now, in which it is necessary that it receive from the body, even though it will use bodily instruments; and so even then the same reason for obstinacy will remain.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the sin of fallen nature is said to be the deserts of obstinacy inasmuch as that same sin is the deserts of eternal damnation: for all human nature is subject to damnation by reason of the first sin, unless some are rescued from thence by the grace of the Redeemer; but it is not such that man is immediately obstinate from the moment of birth, just as he is not damned by a final damnation.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the objection speaks of imperfect obstinacy by which someone is not simply established in evil; for this is a species of the sin against the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that Augustine compares love to weight, for both of them incline: but it is not necessary that there be a likeness in all respects; and thus it does not follow that he who loves something has no inclination to the contrary, except perhaps in that most perfect love, which is the love of the saints in heaven.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that he who sins out of malice is said to be incapable of penance, not that he is unable to repent in any way, but that he is unable to repent easily. For he does not perfectly repent by an exhortation of reason alone, for an exhortation proceeds from some principle, namely from an end, which evil has corrupted; yet he can be induced to repent by being gradually habituated to the contrary. He can be led to this habit because of his mode of thinking, for he accepts things rationally and, as it were, by bringing them together; and also because not the entire appetitive power tends toward one thing: however, the correct notion of the principle, that is the desirable end, is attained by habituation. Hence, the Philosopher says in the Ethics (Aristotle, Ethics 7.9, 1151a17–19.) that neither in speculative things does reason teach regarding principles, nor in practical things; but the power, whether natural or habitual, is the cause of opining correctly regarding the principle.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that when a lower nature is able to dispose or in some way cooperate with respect to something, it is not said to be impossible simply speaking, even though it cannot be perfected except by a divine operation; just as we do not say that it is impossible simply speaking that offspring in the mother’s womb be animated by a rational soul. And similarly, although deliverance from sin happens by a divine activity, yet since free choice also cooperates in this, it is not said be impossible simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that although the one who sins against the Holy Spirit acts against the grace of the Holy Spirit by the inclination of sin, yet since he is not completely corrupted by this sin, some motion remains, though weak, by which he is able to cooperate with grace in some way; for he does not always resists grace in act.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the sin against the Holy Spirit is not said to be unforgivable because it cannot be forgiven in this life, rather, it cannot be easily forgiven in this life. The reason for this difficulty is because the previously mentioned sin is directly contrary to the grace by which the sin is forgiven. Or else it is called unforgivable because it does not possess in itself the cause of forgiveness, it being committed from malice, unlike the sin that is committed from weakness or ignorance.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that no one is prohibited from praying for sinners so long as they are in this life; but the Apostle’s words that were set down mean that it does not pertain to anyone to pray for those hardened in sin, but to someone perfect among man. Or else the Apostle speaks of the sin unto death, namely, that lasts until death. However, it is shown in the prophet’s words that that people was unworthy to attain mercy by God’s just judgment, not that they were completely obstinate in evil.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that confirmation in the good happens from a divine gift, and thus nothing prevents this from being granted by a special privilege of grace to certain people still on the way, even though such persons are not confirmed in goodness in the same way as are the blessed in heaven, as said above; (Above: a. 9.) however, this cannot be said of confirmation in evil.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that from the fact that an angel was gifted with a greater power it follows that immediately after the first choice he was obstinate in sin, as is clear from what has been said. (Above: a. 10.) However, Augustine does not intend to prove that man is obstinate in sin, but rather that he is not sufficient to arise by himself from sin.