Article 5 — Whether free choice is one power, or many

Fifth, it is asked whether free choice is one power, or many. (Parallel text: In I Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.83.4.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is many powers, for as Augustine says, free choice is a faculty of the will and of reason. (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 3. Cf. Lottin, ‘Psychologie et morale I, ed. 2, p. 64 nota 3.) However, reason and will are different powers, thus free choice pertains to different powers.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, powers are known by acts, but the acts of different powers are ascribed to free choice, for as Damascene says in book two On Free Will, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 26 (PG 94:960A).) these things happen to us, namely to be moved and not to be moved, to attack or not to attack, to desire and not to desire, and other such things, which certainly pertain to many powers. Thus, free choice is many powers.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Boethius says in the book On the Consolation of Philosophy (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 2 (PL 63:836A).) that free choice is within divine substances, that is angels, in this respect, inasmuch as there is in them an acute judgment and an incorrupt will. But acuteness of judgment pertains to reason, therefore free choice includes in itself will and reason; and so free choice is many powers.

Obj. 4: But one might say that it is one power possessing two capacities.

On the contrary, just as the knowing and the affective powers exist in the higher part of the soul, so also in the lower part. But in the lower part there is no power that has in itself both the knowing and the affective capacity, thus, neither in the higher part.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Boethius says in the book On the Consolation of Philosophy (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 2 (PL 63:836A).) that the extremity of slavery is when human minds given to vices are thereupon clouded by the fog of ignorance and are disturbed by pernicious passions. But the slavery which he spoke about in that place is opposed to free choice, and therefore free choice includes in itself both reason and affection, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary, man is called a lesser universe inasmuch as one can discern within him a likeness to the greater universe. (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 252b26; cf. ST I-II.2.8, obj. 2.) But in the greater universe one does not find two natural extremes without there being a middle. Thus, neither are there in man two extreme powers without a middle. But one does indeed find within man a power that always tends to the good, namely synderesis, and another opposed to this that always inclines toward evil, namely sensuality. (Cf. supra q. 16 a. 1.) Hence there is a single power that is always open to good and evil, and this is free choice. Therefore, it seems that free choice is one power.

I answer that it must be said that some (We have not found this citation. Est opinio 1 apud Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 25, part 1, q. 4.)* were moved to posit that free choice is many powers because of two considerations: indeed, one is from the fact that they saw we are able to perform the acts of all the powers by free choice; and thus they held that free choice is like a universal whole with respect to all the parts. (Cf. ST I.77.1, ad 1.) But this cannot be, for then it would follow that there are many free choices within us because of the multitude of powers, for many men are many animals. Nor are we bound to hold this for the reason previously mentioned, for all the acts of the different powers are not referred back to free choice except by means of the one act of choice, for we are moved by free choice in this respect, that we choose to be moved by free choice, and likewise for other acts. Thus, this fact does not show that free choice is many powers but rather that it is one power moving many other powers by its strength.

But some (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 1, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, ch. 1, a. 2, n. 391, 2:469; cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 25, p. 1, q. 4.) were moved by a different consideration to hold that there are a plurality of powers within free choice from the fact that they saw things pertaining to different powers coming together in the act of free choice, namely judgment which belongs to reason and appetite which pertains to the will. Hence, they said that free choice gathers together many powers in itself in the way that an integral whole contains its own parts. (Cf. ST I.77.1, ad 1.) But this cannot be the case, for since the act that is attributed to free choice is one particular act, namely to choose, it cannot come forth from two powers without an intermediary; rather, it comes forth from one without intermediary, and from another with an intermediary, namely, inasmuch as what belongs to the prior power is given to the power that follows after. Thus, it follows that free choice is one power.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that Augustine says free choice is a capacity of the will and reason because man is ordered to the act of free choice by means of both powers, although not immediately.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that free choice is not ordered to the acts of different powers except by means of its very own unique act, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that Boethius attributes to free choice what belongs to different powers inasmuch as man is ordered to the act of free choice by different powers, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that only simple apprehension is in the irrational part of the soul on the part of the knowing faculty, but there is no bringing together or ordering, as is the case in the rational apprehensive faculty. Thus, the appetite in the sensitive part is borne absolutely toward the object, but without leaving any order from the apprehension in the appetitive faculty. Hence, there is no power in the sensitive part that is somehow embracing in itself both the apprehensive and the appetitive, as is the case in the rational part.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth one must respond in the same way as to the fourth.