Article 8 — Whether the creature's free choice can be established in goodness by a gift of grace

Eighth, it is asked whether the creature's free choice can be established in goodness by a gift of grace. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1; STI.62.8; I.100.2.)

Obj. 1: It seems not, for grace does not destroy nature when it comes upon it. Therefore, since it is naturally in the creature's free choice that it be able to be turned toward evil, it seems that this cannot be taken from it by grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is in the power of free choice to use grace or not to use it, for free choice cannot be forced by grace. But if free choice does not use the infused graced, it falls into evil. Therefore, no added grace is able to establish free choice in goodness.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, free choice has dominion over its acts, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a17; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 6, a. 1, s.c. 3; cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776A).) but to use grace is an act of free choice. Therefore, it is in the power of free choice to use or not to use it; and so it cannot be established by grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, there is a pliability toward evil within the creature's free choice inasmuch as it exists from nothing, as Damscene says. (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960C).) But no grace can take away from the creature that it exists from nothing. Therefore, no grace can establish free choice in goodness.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Bernard says that under God free choice is most powerful, (The text is compiled from Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 9 (PL 182:1016B); ch. 10 (PL 182:1019A-B).) which does not admit of increase from grace and justice, and neither does it admit of loss from sin. But the establishment in goodness that comes upon free choice increases it, for according to Augustine, among things that are not large in mass, to be larger is to be better. (Cf. Augustine, De Trin. VI c. 8 (PL 42, 929).) Therefore, free choice cannot be established in goodness by grace.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, as is said in The Book of Causes (Book of Causes, comm. 10 [9]; comm. 12 [11]; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 3; Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:693B); Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 12, para. 2 (PG 3:293A); Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 4 (PL 63:848C).) whatever is received into another is in it according to the mode of the receiver; but free choice is changeable toward good or evil with regard to its own nature. Therefore, grace that comes to it is received such that it can change to good or evil, and so it cannot be established in goodness.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, it seems that whatever God adds on to a creature he could have conferred upon it at the beginning of its creation. Therefore, if free choice could be established by some added grace, it could also be established by something placed within the spiritual creature with respect to the creating of nature. Thus it would be naturally established in goodness, which is impossible, as was said. (supra a. 7.) Therefore, it cannot be established by grace.

On the contrary (1) is the fact that the saints who are in heaven are so established in goodness that they are not able to sin anymore, otherwise they would not be certain of their blessedness, and thus not be blessed. However, this establishment is not in them by nature, as was said. (Above: a. 7, ad 7.) Therefore, it must be by grace; and so free choice can be established by a gift of grace.

Furthermore (2), just as man's free choice is such that it is pliable toward evil by its own nature, so also is the human body such that it is corruptible by its own nature. But the human body is made incorruptible by the gift of grace; 1 Corinthians 15:53, this corruptible must put on incorruption. Therefore, free choice can be established in goodness by grace.

I answer that it must be said that Origen erred on this question, (Cf. Origen, On First Principles [Peri archon], bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 11:178A-B).) for he wanted that the creature's free choice should not be established in goodness in any way, not even for the blessed, except for Christ on account of his union with the Word. However, from this error he was forced (Cf. Origen, On First Principles [Peri archon], bk. 1, ch. 6 (PG 11:169C); see also Augustine, City of God, bk. 21, ch. 17 (PL 41:731); below: a. 10, resp.; Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 5.) to posit that the blessedness of the saints and the angels was not permanent, but that it would end at some time, from which it followed that it was not true, since immutability and security belong to the notion of blessedness. Therefore, because of the incompatibility that follows from this, the position is to be utterly rejected, and it must be said simply that free choice can be established in goodness by grace, which is indeed clear from this.

For the creature's free choice cannot be naturally established in goodness for this reason, that it does not have the perfect and absolute notion of goodness within its own nature, but rather that of a particular good. However, free choice is united by grace to this perfect and absolute good, namely God. Thus, if there should be a perfect union such that God himself is the entire cause of action for free choice, it would not be able to be turned toward evil. Yet this does occur among some things, and especially among the blessed, which is clear from the following. The will naturally tends to the good as to its object. However, that it tends toward evil at times only happens when evil is proposed under the form of the good, for evil is involuntary, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 32 (PG 3:732B).) Hence, there cannot be sin in the will's motion such that it desires evil, unless there should preexist a defect in the apprehensive faculty by which evil is proposed to itself as good. However, this defect in reason can happen in two ways: in one way from reason itself, in another from something outside.

It happens indeed from reason itself, for there is naturally and universally within it a knowledge without error of the universal good, both of the good that is the end as well as the good that is for the sake of the end, though not of the good in particular. But one can err regarding this, thinking something to be the end which is not the end, or to be useful for the end which is not useful. For this reason also the will naturally desires the good which is the end, namely happiness in general, and similarly the good that is for the sake of the end, for each thing naturally desires what is useful for it. But in desiring this or that end, or else in choosing this or that useful thing, one falls into a sin of the will.

But reason fails with regard to something external, since the act of reason is interrupted on account of the lower powers which are intensely moved toward something, such that that they do not propose to the will their own judgment of the good in a clear and stable way; as for example, when someone has a correct opinion regarding the preservation of chastity, yet because of the lust for pleasure, one desires what is contrary to chastity, because reason's judgment is in some way bound by concupiscence, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 7.3, 1146b31.)

However, both of these defects are completely removed from the blessed on account of their union with God, for in seeing the divine essence, they know that God himself is the end that is to be loved above all. They will also know in particular all things that they unite to him or whatever they separate from him, knowing God not only in himself, but inasmuch as he is the reason for other things. From the splendor of this knowledge the mind is strengthened to such an extent that no movement in the lower powers will be able to arise except according to reason's rule. Hence, just as we now immutably desire goodness in general, so also do the minds of the blessed immutably desire the appropriate good in particular. However, beyond the will's natural inclination, there will be in them perfect charity, binding them completely to God. Hence, sin will not be able to occur in them in any way; and so they will be established by grace.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that this is from a defect of created nature which is able to be turned toward evil, and grace removes this defect by perfecting nature, establishing it in goodness, just as light that comes upon air removes its shadow, which it naturally possesses without light.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that it is in the power of free choice not to use a habit, yet it is able to propose to itself that it not use a habit under the notion of the good, which is unable to happen among the blessed because of grace, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: From this the solution to the third is also apparent.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that since free choice exists from nothing, it belongs to it that it not be naturally established in goodness; but neither can it be granted to it by grace that it be naturally established in goodness by means of grace. However, it does not belong to free choice that it be unable in any way to be established in goodness from the fact that it is from nothing; just as neither is there in air by its own nature that it not be able to be illuminated in any way, but rather that it is not naturally luminous in act.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that Bernard speaks of free choice with regard to freedom from coercion, which admits of neither intensification nor remission.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that with regard to what is received in another one can consider both the existence and the notion. With regard to the things existence, it exists in it according to the mode of the receiver, yet it draws the recipient itself to its own notion, like heat received into water possesses existence in the water in the mode of the water, inasmuch as it exists in the water as an accident in a subject: yet it draws the water by its natural disposition into being hot and makes it to be the activity of heat. Light and air are similar, though not contrary to the nature of air. Likewise, grace exists within free choice according to its own existence, but in the mode of free choice, as an accident within a subject. Nevertheless, it draws free choice to the form of its own immutability, joining it to God.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the perfect good, which is God, is able to be united to the human mind by grace, but not by nature. Therefore, free choice is able to be confirmed in goodness by grace, but not by nature.