Article 3 — Whether there is free choice in God

Third, it is asked whether there is free choice in God. (Parallel texts:ST I.19.10; In II Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1; SCG I.88; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 5.)

Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for free choice is a faculty of the will and reason. (Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 24 c. 3.) But reason does not belong to God, since it denotes discursive knowledge. However, God knows all things by a simple glance, therefore, free choice does not belong to God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, free choice is a faculty by which goodness and evil are chosen, as is clear from Augustine; (Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 24 c. 3.) but in God there is no faculty for choosing evil, thus, free choice is not in God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, free choice is a power related toward opposite acts. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.2, 1046b4; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 1; below: q. 22, a. 5, s.c. 5.) But God is not related toward opposite acts, since he is unchangeable and cannot be changed to evil. Thus, free choice is not in God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to choose is an act of free choice, as is clear from the given definition. But choice does not pertain to God, since it follows upon counsel, (Cf. Ethic. III 9 (1113 a 2).) which pertains to one doubting and inquiring. Thus, free choice is not in God.

On the contrary (1) is what Anselm says, (Cf. Anselm, De lib. arb. ch. 1 (PL 158, 489 B).) that if being able to sin is a part of free choice, God and the angels would not have free choice, which is most absurd. Thus, it is appropriate to say that God has free choice.

Furthermore (2), on 1 Corinthians 12:11, all these are inspired by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as he wills, the Gloss has for the will's free choice. (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 25, ch. 1; from Ambrose, De fide, bk. 2, ch. 6 (PL 16:592B); cf. ST I.19.10, s.c.) Therefore, the Holy Spirit has free choice, and likewise the Father and Son for the same reason.

I answer that it must be said that there is free choice in God, but it is in him in another way than is found in angels and in men. That there is free choice in God is clear from the fact that he possesses the end of his own will which he naturally wills, namely his own goodness; but he wills all other things as though ordered to this end, which indeed he does not will necessarily, speaking absolutely, as was shown in the preceding question, (q. 23 a. 4.) inasmuch as the goodness of the end does not require the things which are ordered to it. The demonstration of this fact can be suitably shown in multiple ways. Hence, there exists in him free judgment to choose this or that thing, as there is also in us.

For this reason one must say that there is free choice in God, and likewise that it exists in the angels, for they also do not will what they will out of necessity; and whatever they will, they will by means of free judgment, just like us. Nevertheless, free choice is found differently in us, in angels, and in God; for if prior things are changed, it is necessary that posterior things change also. But, the faculty of free choice presupposes two things, namely nature and the knowing power.

Of course, nature exists in God in a different way than it does in men and in angels. For the divine nature is uncreated and it is its own being and goodness, hence there cannot be in it any defect, neither according to being, nor according to goodness. However, human and angelic nature is created, taking its beginning from nothing; hence, in itself, it is capable of lack. It is for this reason that God's free choice is in no way pliable toward evil, but the free choice of man and the angels, considered in their own natures, is pliable towards evil.

However, knowledge is found to exist differently in man than in God and angels, for man possesses a darkened knowledge and receives notions by means of truth's discourse, (Cf. De Ver., q. 8, a. 3, ad 3; Liber de Definicionibus (ed. Muckle, p. 313).) and thus doubt and difficulty in discernment and judgment come upon him, for the thoughts of men are weak, and our designs are uncertain, as it says in Wisdom 9:14. But there is in God and in angels, according to their mode, a simple knowledge of truth without any discourse or inquiry, hence doubt or difficulty in discerning or judging does not occur in them. And therefore both God and the angels have a ready choice of free will, whereas man suffers difficulty in choosing because of uncertainty and doubt. From this it is clear that the angel's free choice holds a middle place between God's free choice and man's, participating equally in both extremes.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it must be said that reason is at times taken broadly to mean all immaterial knowledge, and it is in this way that reason is found in God; hence, even Dionysius places reason among the divine names in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 4 (PG 3:872 C).) It is taken in another way properly to mean the power that knows with discursion: and in this way reason is found neither in God nor in the angels, but in man alone. Thus, it can be said that reason is placed in the definition of free choice with regard to the first sense, but if it is taken in the second sense, then free choice is defined according to the way that it is found among men.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that to be able to choose evil does not pertain to the notion of free choice, but it follows upon free choice inasmuch as it exists in a created nature that is capable of failure.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the divine will stands to opposites not, of course, in such a way that it wills and then later does not will, which would be opposed to its immutability; nor in such a way that it is able to will good and evil, since this would place the capacity for failure in God, but rather that he is able to will and not to will this thing.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that choice follows upon counsel, which, when done together with inquiry, happens to choice inasmuch as it exists within the rational nature that grasps the knowledge of truth by means of reason's discursion. But in the intellectual nature that possesses a simple grasp of truth, choice exists without any preceding inquiry, and in this way choice exists in God.