Article 7 — Whether there could be some creature that has free choice naturally confirmed in goodness.

Seventh, it is asked whether there could be some creature that has free choice naturally confirmed in goodness. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1; d. 23, q. 1, a. 1; SCG III.108-110; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 2; ST I.63.1.)

Obj. 1: In the seventh place we ask whether there could be some creature that has free choice naturally confirmed in goodness. It seems that there is, for spiritual nature is more noble than bodily nature, (See above: q. 5, a. 4.) but there is some bodily nature which cannot possess any disordered motion, namely the nature of heavenly bodies, thus all the more can there exist some created spiritual nature, which has a capacity for free choice, but which is not capable of any disorder in its own motions; which means to be unable to sin or to be confirmed in goodness.

Obj. 2: But one might say that it pertains to the nobility of spiritual creatures to be capable of meriting; and this cannot be unless one is capable of sinning and not sinning.

On the contrary, being able to merit pertains to a spiritual creature inasmuch as one has governance over one's own actions. But if one could only do good, one would nevertheless remain in control of one's own acts, for one would still be able to do or not do some good, but without falling into evil, or at least choosing between what is good and what is better. Therefore, it is not necessary that one be able to sin in order to merit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the free choice by which we merit, with grace offering assistance, is itself an active power. But it does not pertain to the notion of an active power that it fail. Therefore, a spiritual creature can possess a power for meriting, even if it is naturally unable to sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Anselm says that the power for sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom, (Anselm, De lib. arb. ch. 1 (PL 158, 490 B) ut dicitur infra a. 10, obj. 10.) but freedom is the reason why man is capable of merit, thus if one removes the power for sinning, there will still remain in man the power for meriting.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Gregory of Nyssa and Damscene (Cf. Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776 A-B); John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960C).) assign the reason for why the creature is changeble with regard to free choice, namely that it exists from nothing. But that a creature should return to nothing follows more closely upon it being made from nothing than that it be able to do evil. But there exists some creature which is naturally incorruptible, such as the soul and heavenly bodies. (In De Generatione, 2.10, 336b30) Thus, all the more does there exist some spiritual creature which is naturally unable to sin.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, what God does in one he can also do in others. But God gives to the spiritual creature to tend unchangeably toward some good, namely happiness, and it cannot tend toward the contrary in any way. Thus, for the same reason, it could be conferred on a creature that it naturally desire goodness, such that it not be inclined in any way toward evil.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, God being the highest good communicates himself in the highest way; hence everything is shared with the creature for which it is capable. But the creature is capable of such a perfection, namely to be established in goodness or to be incapable of sin, and this is clear from the fact that it is granted to some creatures by grace. (That is the Blessed Virgin, the man Christ, and likewise the Apostles, as Thomas says below: a. 9, ad 2.) Therefore, there is some creature naturally incapable of sin or else confirmed in goodness.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, substance is the origin of power, and power of operation, but some creatures are naturally unchangeable with regard to substance. Therefore, there is some creature naturally able to be unchanging with respect to its activity such that it is naturally unable to sin.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, what belongs to a creature in virtue of the source by which it exists is more essential to it than what belongs to it by reason of the source out of which it exists, (Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae logicales, tract. 5, nn. 24–25.) for to the effect is given the likeness of the cause from which it exists, however, it has an opposition toward that out of which it exists. But opposites come to be from opposites, as white from black, yet confirmation in goodness belongs to a creature from God by whom it exists. Thus, confirmation in goodness ought all the more to be natural to it than being able to sin, which belongs to it inasmuch as it exists from nothing.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, civic happiness is unchangeable, but man can attain to civic happiness from his natural powers, thus he can naturally possess immutability in goodness.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, whatever is within something by nature is immutable, but man naturally desires goodness, and thus he does so immutably.

On the contrary (1), Damascene says that the rational creature is changeable toward evil with respect to choice, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960C).) from the fact that it is from nothing. But there cannot be any creature that is not from nothing, thus there cannot be any creature whose free choice is naturally confirmed in goodness.

Furthermore (2), what is proper to a higher nature cannot belong naturally to a lower nature, unless it should be converted to the higher nature, such as water which cannot be naturally hot unless it be converted into the nature of fire or of air. But to possess goodness that is unable to fail is a property of divine nature. Therefore, it cannot be the case that it naturally belongs to another nature, unless it should be converted to the divine nature, which is impossible.

Furthermore (3), free choice is only found in man and the angels, yet both man and the angels have sinned, therefore the free choice of no creature is naturally confirmed in goodness.

Furthermore (4), no rational creature is impeded from attaining beatitude except by reason of sin. Thus, if there exists a rational creature naturally unable to sin, it would be able to attain beatitude from purely natural faculties without grace, which seems to smack of the pelagian heresy. (Augustine, On Heresies, ch. 88 (PL 42:47); cf. ST I-II.100.10, obj. 3; I-II.109.4, s.c.)

I answer that it must be said that no creature exists nor can there exist any whose free choice is naturally confirmed in goodness, such that it would be capable of not sinning by its purely natural faculties. The reason for this is that a defect in an action is caused from a defect in the principle of that action; hence if there is something in which the principles of an action are unable to fail in respect of themselves, and unable to be impeded by something external, it is impossible for that action to fail, as is clear in the motions of the heavenly bodies. But among actions, those are able to fail in which the principles of acting are able to fail or be impeded, as is manifest among generable and corruptible things, which admit of a defect in their active principles by reason of their changeability; hence, their actions come forth lacking. It is for this reason that fault occurs frequently in the activities of nature, as is clear in deformed births. For a fault, whether in natural things, artificial things, or voluntary things, is nothing else than a defect or disorder of one's own action, when something is not done in the way that it should be done, as is clear in the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 2.14, 199a33.)

However, the rational nature endowed with free choice differs in its action from every other acting nature, for all other natures are ordered to some particular good, and their actions are determined with respect to that good; whereas the rational nature is ordered to goodness simply. For just as the true is the object of the intellect absolutely speaking, so also is the good the object of the will. Thus, the will extends to the universal principle itself of goodness, to which no other appetite is able to attain; and for this reason the rational creature does not have its actions determined, but stands in a certain indifference with respect to innumerable actions. However, since every action comes forth from an agent by reason of a certain likeness, such as fire that heats, it is necessary that if there is an agent which is ordered to a particular good with regard to its actions, such that its actions are naturally unable to fail, the notion of that good must be within it naturally and unalterably; as for example if unchangeable heat were naturally within some body, it would heat unalterably. Thus, the rational nature that is ordered to the good absolutely by means of various actions cannot naturally have actions that do not fall short of the good, unless there be naturally and immutably within it the notion of the universal and perfect good.

But this cannot be the case except in the divine nature, for God alone is pure act, receiving no admixture of potency, and for this reason he is pure and absolute goodness. However, any creature that has in its own nature a mixture of potency is a particular good, which mixture of potency happens to it because it exists from nothing; and it is for this reason that among rational natures only God possesses free choice naturally unable to fail and confirmed in goodness. But it is impossible that this should be in a creature because of the fact that it exists from nothing, as Damscene and Gregory of Nyssa say; (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:960C); Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 41 (PG 40:776A-B).) and this is the particular good in which the notion of evil is based, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 20 (PG 3:721A).)

Reply Obj. 1: To the first, then, it must be said that bodily creatures, as was mentioned, are ordered to some particular good by means of determinate actions, and thus for error and sin to be naturally absent from their actions it is sufficient that they be made stable in some particular good through their own nature, which does not suffice for spiritual natures ordered to goodness absolutely speaking, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that to be naturally incapable of sin is not opposed to having dominion over one's own actions, since both belong to God. However, it is opposed to having dominion over one's acts within a created nature, which is a particular good. For no creature whose determinate actions are ordered to a particular good is able to have dominion over its own actions.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that although it does not pertain to the notion of an active power that it should fail, it nevertheless does pertains to the notion of an active power, which does not possess within itself sufficient and unchanging principles for its own actions, that it be able to fail.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that although being able to sin is not a part of free choice, yet among created natures it follows upon the freedom of choice.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that a creature acquires an act of existence that is determinate, particular, and from another. Thus, a creature is able to possess a stable and unchanging existence, even though it does not have in itself the notion of the absolute and perfect good. But by its actions it is able to be ordered to the absolute good, and so the objection is not similar.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that every rational mind naturally desires happiness in a universal and determinate way, and in this respect it cannot fail, but the motion of the creature's will is not determined in particular to seek happiness in this or that thing. Thus someone can sin by desiring happiness if they should seek it where it ought not to be sought, as when someone seeks happiness among pleasures. This is also the case with respect to all good things, for nothing is desired except under the notion of goodness, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 19 (PG 3:716C); cf. above: q. 22, a. 1.) The reason for this is that the desire for goodness is naturally within the mind, but not for this or that good: and so in this case one can fall into sin.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that a creature is capable of being unable to sin, but not such that it should possess it naturally; thus the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that the principle of correct activity coming forth from a free will is not substance and virtue or power alone, but rather one needs a due application of the will to things that are outside, such as the end and other such things. Therefore, if there is no defect in the soul's substance or in the nature of free choice, a defect can occur in the action itself; and so one cannot conclude to a natural inability for sin from the natural immutability of a substance.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that God is the cause of creatures not only with respect to what is natural to them, but also with respect to what is added beyond nature. Thus, it is not necessary that whatever the creature has from God is natural to it, but only what God gives to it when initiating its nature; and there is no confirmation in goodness for such as these.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that since civil happiness is not happiness taken simply, it does not admit of immutability, simply speaking, but it is said to be immutable because it does not easily change. Nevertheless, if civil happiness were immutable simply speaking, it would not follow for this reason that free choice is naturally confirmed in goodness; for we do not call this natural because it can be gotten by means of natural principles, which is the way that political virtues are able to be called natural, but rather because it follows from by the necessity of nature's principles.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that although man naturally desires the good in general, he does not in particular, as has been said, and sin and defect occur because of this. (Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, bk. 1, ch. 8, n. 5; cf. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2.)