Article 12 — Whether free choice that is without grace and in the state of mortal sin is able to avoid mortal sin

Twelfth, it is asked whether free choice that is without grace and in the state of mortal sin is able to avoid mortal sin. (Parallel texts: above: q. 22, a. 5, ad 7; q. 24, a. 1, ad 10, 12; below: a. 12; In II Sent., d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5; d. 24, q. 1, a. 4; d. 28, a. 2; ST I-II.109.8; I-II.63.2, ad 2; I-II.74.3, ad 2; SCG III.160; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 12, lect. 1; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 10, lect. 3.)

Obj. 1: It seems not because of what is said in Romans 7:15, for it is not the good I wish that I do, but the evil that I hate, that is what I do, and he speaks in the person of the damned man, as some gloss says in the same place; (Pseudo-Ambrose, Commentary on Romans, at Romans 7:15 (PL 17:117D); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 39, ch. 3; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Romans 7:15 (PL 191:1423A).) therefore without grace man is not able to avoid sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, actual mortal sin is more serious than original sin; but someone in the state of original sin, if he is an adult, cannot help but sin mortally, being without grace: for otherwise he would avoid the condemnation of sensible punishment, which is owed for actual mortal sin; and so, because there is no middle between that condemnation and the glory of eternal life, with respect to adults, it would follow that he could attain eternal life without grace, which is the pelagian heresy. Therefore much less can someone in the state of mortal sin avoid mortal sin, except by receiving grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, commenting on Romans 7:16, but what I do not wish, that I do, the Gloss of Augustine says: now man is described as placed under the law before grace; for then is conquered by sins, so long as he strives to live justly by his own powers without the help of liberating grace, which liberates free choice so that it can believe in the one liberating, and so not sin against the law. (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 7:16, 6.96; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Romans 7:16 (PL 191:1423C); from Augustine, Epistulae ad Romanos expositio inchoata, prop. 44 (PL 35:2071; CSEL 84).) But to sin against the law is to sin mortally; thus it seems that man is not able to avoid mortal sin without grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says in the book On the Perfection of Justice (Augustine, On the Perfection of Justice, ch. 2 (PL 44:294).) that malice is to the soul as crookedness is to the leg, and that the act of sin is compared to limping; however, limping cannot be avoided by the one who has a crooked leg, unless the leg should first be healed; therefore, neither can mortal sin be avoided by him who is in sin unless he is first liberated from sin by grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Gregory says that sin that is not annulled by penance quickly draws toward another by its own weight; (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 25, ch. 9 (PL 76:334B); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 36, ch. 3.) but it is not annulled except by grace; therefore without grace a sinful man cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 7 (PL 41:410); cf. ST I-II.24.1, s.c.) fear and anger are certain passions and sins; but man is unable to avoid passions by free choice; therefore, neither is he able to abstain from sins.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, what is necessary cannot be avoided; but certain sins are necessary as is clear from Psalm 24:17: rescue me from my necessities, Lord. Therefore, man cannot avoid sin by free choice.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, Augustine says that there is some sin when the flesh lusts against the spirit; (Augustine, City of God, bk. 19, ch. 4 (PL 41:629); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 17, ch. 2.) but that the flesh not lust against the spirit does not lie in the power of free choice; therefore the power of free choice does not extend to avoiding sin.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, the power to die follows upon the power to sin: for man was not able to die in the state of innocence except insofar as he was able to sin; therefore the necessity of dying follows upon the necessity of sinning; but man cannot help but die in this current state; therefore, neither can he help but sin.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 2, according to Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 24, part 1, a. 1, q. 2.) man was able to remain in the state of innocence because he possessed the soundness of nature, immune from every defect of sin; but this soundness is not in the man who, being a sinner, is deprived of grace; thus he cannot remain but has a necessity of falling after sin.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, a crown is owed to the winner, as is clear from Revelation 3; (It is actually Apoc. 2:10.) but if someone avoids sin when he is tempted by sin, he conquers sin and the devil: James 4:7, resist the devil and he will flee from you. Therefore, if someone can avoid sin without grace, he would be able to merit a crown without grace, which is heretical.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, Augustine says in the book Retractions: (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 15 (PL 32:609).) the will is unable to resist forceful desire; but desire induces to sin; therefore the human will cannot avoid sin without grace.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, whoever possesses a habit necessarily acts according to the habit; but he who is in sin has the habit of sin; therefore, it seems that he cannot help but sin.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, free choice, according to Augustine, (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 3.) is that by which the good is chosen when grace is assisting and evil is chosen when grace is ceasing. Therefore, it seems that he who lacks grace always chooses evil by free choice.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, whoever is able to not sin is able to overcome the world; for no one overcomes the world except by desisting from sin; but no one is able to overcome the world except by grace; for as it says in 1 John 1:4, (It is actually 5:4.) this is the victory that conquers the world, our faith; therefore, there is not someone able to avoid sin without grace.

Obj. 16: Furthermore, the commandment for loving God is affirmative, and so it obliges to being observed in a place and for a time, such that if it is not observed, a man sins mortally; but one cannot observe the commandment of charity without grace, for as it says in Romans 5:5, God’s love has been diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. Therefore, without grace man cannot help but sin mortally.

Obj. 17: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 76 (PL 40:268; CCSL 46).) in the command of having mercy on one’s neighbor is included the command to have mercy on oneself; but one sins mortally unless one has mercy on one’s neighbor who is in danger of bodily death. Therefore, all the more would one sin mortally if one did not have mercy one oneself when in a state of sin by repenting from sin; and so unless sin should be remitted by repentance, man cannot help but sin.

Obj. 18: Furthermore, as loving God is to virtue so is despising God to sin; but it is necessary that every virtuous person love God; therefore it is necessary that every sinner despise God and so to sin.

Obj. 19: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105a26.) similar acts proceed from similar habits; therefore, if a man is in sin, it seems necessary that he produce similar acts, namely acts of sin.

Obj. 20: Furthermore, since a form is the principle of an activity, whatever lacks form lacks the activity proper to that form; but to turn away from evil is a work of justice; thus, since one who is in sin lacks justice, it seems that he is unable to turn away from evil.

Obj. 21: Furthermore, the Teacher says in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 25, ch. 6.) that after sin, yet before the restoration of grace, free choice is pressed upon and overcome by concupiscence, and it possesses a weakness in evil, yet it does not have grace in the good; and therefore it is able to sin unto damnation; and thus no one is able to avoid mortal sin without grace.

Obj. 22: If it should be asserted that one cannot not sin, that is not to have sin, one can nevertheless not sin; that is, not make use of sin. But on the contrary is that the Pelagians also granted this, yet Augustine condemns their opinion in this regard in the book On Grace and Free Will, (Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 13 (PL 44, 896).) saying, *the Pelagians assert that God’s grace, which is given by the faith of Jesus Christ, which is neither a law nor nature, is only efficacious for remitting sins in this regard, not for avoiding future sins or overcoming obstacles. But if this were true, then surely when we say in the Lord’s Prayer ‘forgive us our trespasses’, we would not add *‘and lead us not into temptation’: for we say that in order that sins might be forgiven; but we say this so that they might be guarded against or else overcome; which we would not ask from the Father who is in heaven for any reason if we were able to do this by the power of the human will. Therefore, it seems that that response is worthless.

Obj. 23: Furthermore, Augustine says in On Nature and Grace *(Augustine, On Nature and Grace, ch. 22 (PL 44:258).)*that the light of truth appropriately abandons the one who violates the law, who having been thus abandoned becomes blind; and it is more necessary that he commit offense, and falling be injured, and injured not get back up. Therefore, the sinner abandoned by grace must necessarily sin.

On the contrary (1) is what Jerome says to Pope Damasus: we say that man is always able to sin and not to sin, so that we always assert that we have free choice; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 28, ch. 4.) therefore to say that man is unable to avoid sin in the state of sin is to deny free choice, which is heretical.

Furthermore (2), if there is some defect in an agent in whose power it lies to use or not to use something, there is no necessity that it should fail in its action; as, for example, if the crooked leg were able in its walking to not make use of its own crookedness, then it would be able to not limp; but free choice subjected to sin is able to make use of sin or not, inasmuch as making use of sin is an act of a free choice that has control over its acts. Therefore whenever it is in sin it is able not to sin.

Furthermore (3), in Psalm 118:95 it says: sinners lay in wait for me to destroy me; and the Gloss, that is, my consent; (Glossa interlinearis; Peter Lombard, Commenatary on the Psalms, at Ps 118:95 (PL 191:1091A).) therefore someone is not led to sin except by consenting. But consent is in the power of free choice; therefore someone is able not to sin by free choice.

Furthermore (4), a demon, who is unable not to sin, is said to have sinned irremediably; but man has sinned remedially, as is commonly held; (Cf. Pseudo-Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sententiarum, tract. 3, ch. 6 (PL 176:96).) therefore he is able not to sin.

Furthermore (5), one does not pass from one extreme to another except through the middle; (Cf. Aristotle, On the History of Animals 8.1, 588b4–6; see Albert the Great, De animalibus, bk. 7, tract. 1, ch. 1, n. 4; De caelo et mundo, bk. 2, tract. 3, ch. 11.) but before sin man had the power not to sin; therefore he is not led to the other extreme immediately after sin, such that he would not be able not to sin.

Furthermore (6), the sinner’s free choice is able to sin; but it does not sin except by choosing, since to choose is an act of free choice, just as sight does not do anything except by seeing. But since choice is the desire for what is deliberated on beforehand, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.6, 1112a15.) thus it follows upon counsel, which is only of those things that are in us, as he says in the same place. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.7, 1112a30.) Therefore, to avoid sin or to do it lies in the power of the man who is in sin.

Furthermore (7), according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Two Souls, ch. 10 (PL 42:103); ch. 11 (PL 42:105); On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PL 32:1295), according to ST I-II.109.8, obj. 1.) no one sins in what one is unable to avoid, for in this way it would be necessary; therefore, if someone in sin were not able to avoid sin, he would not sin by sinning, which is absurd.

Furthermore (8), free choice is equally free from constraint both before and after sin; but the necessity to sin seems to pertain to constraint, inasmuch as that necessity is in us even if we do not want it; therefore man does not have the necessity to sin after sin.

Furthermore (9), all necessity is either of constraint or of natural inclination; (Augustinus, De Civ. Dei, 5 Cap. 10 (PL 41, 152).) but the necessity to sin is not of natural inclination, for then nature would be evil, since it inclines toward evil; therefore, if there is a necessity within the sinner to sin, he would be forced to sin.

Furthermore (10), whatever is necessary is not voluntary; therefore, if it is necessary that the one who is in sin commit sin, sin is not voluntary, which is false.

Furthermore (11), if it is necessary for the sinner to sin, this necessity does not belong to him except by reason of sin; however, he is able to rise up from sin, otherwise it would not have been commanded to the sinner by Isaiah, 52:11, withdraw, withdraw, get away from there, do not touch what is unclean; therefore a sinner is able not to sin.

I answer that it must be said that contrary heresies have arisen with regard to this question. For some, thinking that the human mind’s nature exists in the manner of bodily natures, held the opinion that to whatever they saw the human mind’s inclination to be, man performed it out of necessity, and from this they fell into contrary errors. For the human mind possesses two contrary inclinations: indeed one toward the good by reason’s instinct, which, Jovinian considering, said that man is not able to sin; (Iovinianus: at Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 28, ch. 4.) but another inclination is in the human mind from the lower powers, and most of all inasmuch as they are corrupted by original sin, namely, inasmuch as the mind is inclined to choose what is delightful according to the fleshly senses. The Manicheans, (manichaei: ut hic supra.) considering this inclination, said that man sins necessarily and that he cannot avoid sin in any way. And so both of them fell into the same incompatibility, though by contrary means, of rejecting free choice: for man will not have free choice if he is impelled necessarily to either good or evil, which is inadmissable and is disproved by experience, the teachings of the philosophers, and by divine authorities, as is clear to some extent from what has been said above. (Above: a. 1.) Pelagius, who, wishing to defend free choice, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 28, cc. 1–3.) was opposed to God’s grace, saying that man could avoid sin without God’s grace: indeed, this error most evidently contradicts the Gospel teaching, (Augustine, On Heresies, ch. 88 (PL 42:47); cf. ST I-II.100.10, obj. 3.) and thus it has been condemned by the Church. However, the Catholic Faith follows a middle route, thus preserving free choice, which does not exclude the necessity of grace.

In evidence of this it must be known that since free choice is a certain power constituted below reason and above the power that effects motion, something is found to exist outside the power of free choice in two ways: in one way inasmuch as it exceeds the efficacy of the power effecting a motion, which operates at the command of free choice; such as flying not being within the free choice of man because it exceeds the strength of the motive power within man. In another way, something is outside the power of free choice because it is not comprised under the act itself of reason. For since free choice’s act is choice itself, which follows upon counsel, that is reason’s deliberation, free choice cannot embrace what escapes reason’s deliberation, as are the things which happen without any premeditation.

Thus, in the first way, the sin or the avoidance of sin does not exceed free choice’s power, for although the fulfillment of sin is performed through the exterior act by the execution of the motive power, yet the sin is perfected in the will itself by consent alone before the execution of the deed; hence free choice is not impeded from sin or its avoidance because of some defect in the motive power, even though it may be impeded in the meantime from carrying it out, as when someone wants to commit murder, fornication, or theft, yet is unable. But in the second way, sin or its avoidance can exceed the power of free choice inasmuch as some sin happens suddenly and as though unexpectedly, and thus it escapes the choosing of free choice, even though free choice could do or avoid this if it were to direct its attention or effort to this. However, something happens suddenly in us in two ways: in one way from an impulse of passion; for the movement of anger and concupiscence sometimes precedes reason’s deliberation, which movement that is tending toward what is illicit from nature’s corruption is itself a venial sin; and so after the state of corrupted nature it is not in the power of free choice to avoid all sins of this kind, for they escape its act, even though it can block some of these motions if it should exert itself against them. But it is not possible for man to continually endeavor to avoid such motions because of the various occupations of the human mind and necessary rest. Indeed, this happens from the fact that the lower powers are not completely subject to reason, as they were in the state of innocence, when it was very easy for man to avoid by free choice all the individual sins of this kind, insofar as no movement was able to arise in the lower powers except by reason’s command. But, speaking commonly, man is not brought to this rectitude by grace in the present life; yet we await this rectitude in the state of glory.

And thus, in this state of misery, even after the restoration of grace, man is not able to avoid all venial sins, but without prejudicing the free choice at all. In another way something happens suddenly within us from an inclination of habit; for as the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.11, 1117a17. Sec. Transl. Lincolniensis (ed. Gauthier, p. 195).) being fearless and undisturbed amid sudden terrors is more powerful than amid ones that are evident beforehand. For an activity is more from habit the less it is from preparation; this is because someone chooses what is evident beforehand by reason and thought even without a habit, yet sudden things are according to habit. But one should not think that an activity according to a habit of virtue is able to exist completely without deliberation, for virtue is a chosen habit; but rather because a determinate end now lies within the choice of one who possesses a habit. Hence, whenever something occurs that is appropriate for that end, it is chosen immediately, unless it should be impeded by some greater and more attentive deliberation.

However, the man who is in a state of mortal sin cleaves to sin habitually. For although he does not always have the vice’s habit, for the habit of licentiousness is not begotten by one act of licentiousness, yet the will of the sinner that has abandoned the unchangeable good now adheres to a changeable good as to an end; (Cf. Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 32:1269).) and the force and inclination of this adherence remains in it until it should adhere again to the unchangeable good as to an end. Thus, whenever it happens to a man, being disposed in such a way, that something must be done which agreed with a preceding choice, he is suddenly brought to it by choice, unless he should hold himself back by much deliberation. Yet not even because he chooses it suddenly is he excused from mortal sin, which requires some deliberation; for that deliberation suffices for mortal sin according to which what is chosen is esteemed as being a mortal sin and against God.

However, this deliberation does not suffice to draw back him who is in mortal sin; for someone is not diverted from doing something to which one is inclined, except insofar as it is presented to oneself as evil. However, the one who now casts off the unchangeable good for the changeable good does not now consider being turned away from the unchangeable good as something evil, in which the account of mortal sin is perfected. Thus, one is not removed from sinning by this, that one recognizes that something is a mortal sin; but it is necessary to proceed further in considering until one arrives at something that one cannot not judge as evil, such as misery or something of this kind. Hence, before such deliberation occurs as is required in a man, disposed in such a way, to avoid mortal sin, there precedes consent in mortal sin. Thus, having supposed some adherence of free choice to mortal sin or to some undue end, it is not in his power to avoid all mortal sin, even though one can avoid each one if one strives against it; for although he could have avoided this or that one by applying as much deliberation as is required, yet he is not able to act such that, before so much deliberation, there does not precede consent to a mortal sin: for it is impossible that man should be always or for such a long time in as much vigilance as is required for this because of the many things in which man’s mind is occupied. But he is not removed from this disposition except by grace, by which alone the human mind is made to cling by charity to the unchangeable good as to an end.

Therefore, it is evident from what has been said that we do not remove free choice, for we say that free choice is able to avoid or to commit any sin individually; and again, we do not remove the necessity of grace, for we say that man is not able to avoid every venial sin, even though he is able to avoid them individually, even when possessing grace before it is perfected in the state of glory: and this is because of the corruption of evil desire. (Cf. supra: q. 16, a. 1, obj. 11; cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 30 c. 8.) And also, when we say that man in the state of mortal sin, abandoned by grace, cannot avoid all mortal sins, unless grace should intervene, even though he can avoid individual ones, this is because of the will's habitual clinging to a disordered end. Augustine compares both of these to crookedness of the leg, from which there follows the necessity to limp. (Augustine, De Perfectione Iustitiae, ch. 2 (PL 44:294).) The thoughts of certain teachers who seemed to hold different opinions regarding this are also verified.

For some (Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.) say that man is able to avoid mortal sin without habitual grace, which makes one to be pleasing, yet not without divine help, for he governs man in his providence to do good and to avoid evil; for this is true whenever man wishes to struggle against sin, from which it happens that he is able to avoid individual sins. But others (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 28, a. 2, q. 2.) say that a man cannot remain very long without grace and not sin mortally; which is indeed true inasmuch as it does not happen for long that a man be habitually disposed to sin without it happening to him that he should suddenly do something, in which he falls into the consent of mortal sin from the inclination of a bad habit; for it is not possible that a man be vigilant for so long as to apply sufficient care in avoiding mortal sin. Therefore, since both of the objections conclude in one way what is true and in another way what is false, we must respond to both of them.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the Apostle's quotation can be understood according to different expositions both of mortal sin and of the evil of mortal sin, inasmuch as one speaks in the person of the sinful man, or else of the evil of venial sin with respect to its first movements, (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 28, ch. 1.) inasmuch as he speaks in his own person or of other just people. In both ways, it must be understood that since it is natural for the will to avoid every evil, the sinful man cannot act without grace so as to avoid every mortal sin, even though he can avoid individual ones; and thus he cannot fulfill the natural will without grace; it is similarly the case with the just man with regard to venial sins.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that it is impossible for an adult to be in original sin alone without grace, for as soon as one receives the use of free choice, if one has prepared oneself for grace, one will have grace; otherwise the negligence itself will be imputed to mortal sin. The previously mentioned objection seems to presuppose an incompatibility to which it leads: for if it is possible for an adult to be in a state of original sin alone, if it should happen that he dies in that very instant, he will be in the middle between the blessed and those who are punished by a sensible penalty; the previously mentioned objection leads to this unsuitability.

Yet, in order to see that there is no force in this argument, one must know that there is a habitual turning away from the unchangeable good in original sin, for the one possessing original sin does not have one’s heart joined to God by charity; and so it is the same argument for the one in original and mortal sin with respect to this habitual turning away, although there is in mortal sin, in addition to this, a habitual turning toward an undue end. And furthermore, it does not follow that if someone evades damnation by means of free choice, that because of this he can acquire glory by the strength of free choice; for this is greater, and the instance of man in the state of innocence is also made manifest.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that man without grace is overcome by sin so that he acts contrary to the law; for although he is able to avoid this or that sin by striving to the contrary, yet he cannot avoid them all, for the reason already mentioned.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that Augustine’s example of crookedness is dissimilar in one respect, for it is not in the power of the shin bone to use or not to use its own crookedness; and so it is not necessary that every movement of the curved shin be limping; however, free choice can use or not its own crookedness: and therefore it is not necessary that it sin in any of its own acts, rather it is able to avoid sin at any time: however, it is similar in this respect, that it is not able to avoid all of them, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that although sin, which has not yet been erased, leads by inclining toward something, yet it is not necessary that free choice always obey this inclination, but it is able to struggle against it in any one act.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that fear and anger, inasmuch as they are passions, are not mortal but venial sins, for they are primary movements.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that sins are called necessary inasmuch as they are not all able to be avoided, even though individual ones can be avoided.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that when flesh lusts against the spirit, (Augustine, City of God, bk. 19, ch. 4 (PL 41:629); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 17, ch. 2.) it is a vice, yet a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that the necessity of sinning either venially or mortally accompanies the necessity of dying, except for privileged persons, namely Christ and the Blessed Virgin; but not the necessity of sinning mortally, as is clear in those possessing grace.

Reply Obj. 10: The tenth is answered just like the seventh.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that a crown is given to one who completely overcomes the devil and sin; however, he who avoids one sin while remaining in another, since he is still a slave is not a victor except perhaps in a certain respect, hence he does not merit a crown.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that cupidity cannot be understood to compel free choice absolutely, which is always free from compulsion; but it is said to be compelling because of the vehemence of the inclination, which it is nevertheless able to resist, although with difficulty.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that free choice is able to use or not to use a habit, hence it is not necessary that someone always acts according to habit, but one can sometimes also act against habit, though with difficulty; yet it cannot happen that, with a habit remaining, one does nothing according to that habit.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that, with grace ceasing, free choice is able to choose evil necessarily; yet it is not necessary that one should always choose evil without sanctifying grace.

Reply Obj. 15: To the fifteenth it must be said that it does not follow that someone overcomes the world by avoiding sin, unless one is completely exempt from sin, as was said before. (Above: ad 11.)

Reply Obj. 16: To the sixteenth it must be said that the commandment is observed in two ways: in one way such that, having been observed, it is meritorious for glory; and in this way no one can observe the previously mentioned commandment nor any other without grace.

It is observed in another way such that it makes one to avoid punishment by being observed; and in this way also it is able to be observed without sanctifying grace. It is observed in the first way when the substance of an act is fulfilled with the appropriate mode that charity sets down; and in this way the previously mentioned commandment of love is not so much a commandment as an end of a commandment and the form of other commandments.

It is observed in the second way with only the substance of the act being fulfilled, which also happens in one who does not possess the habit of charity; for the just man can also act unjustly according to the Philosopher in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105a26; cf. Albert the Great, Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, bk. 2, lect. 4.)

Reply Obj. 17: To the seventeenth it must be said that the objection does not apply: for given that someone commits a new sin by not grieving for oneself so as to prepare oneself for repentance, yet he can avoid this sin since he is able to prepare himself; but neither is it necessary whenever a sinner does not grieve for oneself by repenting that he commits a new sin, but only when he is held to this by a particular cause.

Reply Obj. 18: To the eighteenth it must be said that the virtuous man is able not to love God in act, but rather to act contrary to him, as is clear when he sins.

Reply Obj. 19: To the nineteenth it must be said that although habits always return similar acts, yet the one who possesses a habit is able to come forth in act contrary to that habit, for it is not necessary that he always use that habit.

Reply Obj. 20: To the twentieth it must be said that the one lacking justice is able to perform an imperfect act of justice, which is to act justly, and the reason for this is that there are principles of natural law placed within reason; but he cannot perform a perfect act of justice, which is to do a just act justly; and so an unjust person is able turn away from evil now and then.

Reply Obj. 21: To the twenty-first it must be said that the words of the Teacher should not be understood thus, that it is necessary that a man in mortal sin submit to any temptation whatsoever, but that he should fall at some time into some mortal sin, unless he be liberated from sin by grace.

Reply Obj. 22: To the twenty-second it must be said that it is necessary for us in the Lord’s prayer to ask not only that our past sins be forgiven us, but that we might also be freed from future ones; for unless man is liberated by grace, it is necessary that he fall at some time into sin in the previously mentioned way, even though he is able to avoid this or that one by striving against it.

Reply Obj. 23: To the twenty-third it must be said that having been abandoned by the light of grace it is necessary that one fall at some time; yet it is not necessary that one submit in each temptation.

Reply Sed Contra 1: But to the first that was objected on the contrary, it must be said that it would prejudice free choice if it were unable to avoid sin by striving against it; but it does not prejudice free choice if man is unable to act in continuous concern for resisting sin; however, when man is not concerned regarding this, the habitual inclination draws him to what is agreeable to the habit.

Reply Sed Contra 2: To the second it must be said that since free choice has lordship over its own actions, whenever it applies its concern to this, it does not make use of its own defect; but since it is impossible that it always apply such concern, it follows that sometimes it fails in its action.

Reply Sed Contra 3: To the third it must be said that a mortal sin is not performed without the consent of free choice; but consent follows a habitual inclination unless one has had much deliberation beforehand, as has been said.

Reply Sed Contra 4: To the fourth it must be said that man is said to have fallen in a reparable way, for he is able to have a remedy with the help of grace, even though the power of free choice is not sufficient for this.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth it must be said that not being able to sin and not being able not to sin are contraries; but being able to sin and not to sin is the middle between them, hence the argument presumes something false.

Reply Sed Contra 6: To the sixth it must be said that to choose and to take counsel is only of those things that are within us; but, as is said in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 3.8, 1112b27.) what we perform by means of our friends we perform in some way through ourselves: and thus free choice is able to have choice and counsel not only regarding those things for which its own power suffices, but also regarding those things for which it needs divine help.

Reply Sed Contra 7: To the seventh it must be said that someone who is in mortal sin is able to avoid all mortal sins with the help of grace. He can also avoid individual ones by natural power, though not all of them; and therefore it does not follow that he does not sin by committing sin.

Reply Sed Contra 8: To the eighth it must be said that the necessity of sinning does not impose a constraint upon free choice: for although man is unable by himself to remove himself from that necessity, yet he can resist to some extent what the necessity is said of, inasmuch as he is able to avoid individual sins, though not all of them.

Reply Sed Contra 9: To the ninth it must be said that the effect of sin is, as it were, natural for the sinner; for a habit works in the one possessing it like a kind of nature; thus, the necessity that comes from habit is reduced back to natural inclination.

Reply Sed Contra 10: To the tenth it must be said that according to Augustine (De civ. Dei V c. 10 (PL 41, 152) sec. Thomam supra a. 1, ad 20.) something can be both necessary and voluntary at the same time: for the will naturally abhors misery, and it does this because of the natural inclination to which the inclination of habit is likened.

Reply Sed Contra 11: To the eleventh it must be said that the man who is in sin can in no way remove himself from sin except with the help of grace; for he is not removed from sin, which is brought to perfection by a turning away, except that his mind cling to God by charity, which does not come from free choice but is poured into the hearts of the Saints by the Holy Spirit, as it says in Romans 5:5.