Article 4 — Whether free choice is a power, or not

Fourth, it is asked whether free choice is a power, or not. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 24. q. 1, a. 1; ST I.83.2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for according to Augustine, (de bono Coniugali, cap. 21.) free choice is a faculty of the will and reason. (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 3. Cf. Lottin, ‘Psychologie et morale I, ed. 2, p. 64 nota 3.) However, one calls something a faculty inasmuch as it is a capacity for doing easily. (Cf. Huguccio Liber derivationum s. v. facio (ms. Paris B. N. lat. 7625 A, f. 53va).) Thus, since the ease of any capacity comes from habit, since according to Augustine a habit is that by which someone can act easily, (De bono coniug. ch. 21 (PL. 40, 390), ut dicitur supra q. 14, a. 3, obj. 8) it seems that free choice is a habit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, some operations are moral, others are natural. But the faculty that is for moral actions is a habit, not a power, as is clear with regard to the moral virtues. Thus also free choice, which implies an ease for natural actions, is a habit and not a power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 2.14, 199b28.) if nature were to make a ship, it would make it just as does art. Therefore, natural ease has the same conditions as the ease that comes through art. But the ease that comes through art is a certain habit acquired from works, as is clear in moral virtues, as when we say that all things done by reason are done by art. Thus, the faculty or the natural ease which is free choice must be a certain habit.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.5, 11105b23.) habits are what we act by in a certain respect, but powers are what we act by simply. However, free choice denotes not only that by which we act but that by which we act in a certain respect, that is freely. Thus, free choice denotes a habit.

Obj. 5: But one might say that when one calls a habit that by which we act in a certain respect, it must be understood as meaning well or badly.

On the contrary, what pertains to the notion of habit is common to every habit. But to act well or badly is not common to every habit, since it seems that it does not pertain to speculative habits to act well or badly. Therefore, acting well or badly does not pertain to the notion of habit.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, what is removed by sin cannot be a power but a habit, but free choice is removed by sin, since as Augustine says, the man using free choice badly loses both himself and it. (Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 30 (PL 40:246; CCSL 46).) Thus free choice is a habit and not a power.

Obj. 7: But one might say that Augustine's words are understood regarding the freedom of grace, which exists by habit.

On the contrary, no one uses badly the habit of grace, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On Free Will, bk. 2, ch. 19 (PL 32:1268); Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PL 32:597); see Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 27, ch. 5.) Thus, the freedom of choice that someone uses badly cannot be understood to be the freedom of grace.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, Bernard says that free choice is a habit of the soul, free for itself, (Cf. De grat. et lib. arb. cap. 1 (PL 182, 1002 C).) and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, it is easier to begin an act of knowledge than one of activity. But a natural habit has been given to the knowing power, namely the understanding of principles, which exists at the peak of knowledge. Thus, a natural habit has also been given to the acting or moving power. Therefore, since free choice seems to hold the highest place among moving things, it seems that it is a habit or else a power perfected by a habit.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, a power is not restricted except by means of a habit. But the will and reason are restricted in free choice, for the will pertains to what is possible and impossible whereas free choice only pertains to what is possible. (Cf. supra: q. 22, a. 13, obj. 12; Ethic. III 5 (1111 b 20).) Similarly, reason pertains both to what is within us and to what is not within us, but free choice only to what is within us. (Cf. Nemesius (Pseudo-Gregory of Nyssa), On the Nature of Man, ch. 40 (PG 40:768A-B); John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 26 (PG 94:957D).) Therefore, free choice denotes a habit.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, just as "power" denotes something added to essence, so also does "faculty" speak of something added to a power. However, what is added to a power is a habit. Therefore, since free choice is a faculty, it seems that it is a habit.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, Augustine says that free choice is a vital and rational motion of the soul. (Cf. Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognosticon, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PL 45:1623).) But motion names an act. Therefore, free choice is an act and not a power.

Obj. 13: Furthermore, according to Boethius, judgment is the act of one judging. (Cf. De consol. V pr. 4 (PL 63, 850 B).) But free choice is the same as judgment, thus choice is an act. But the fact that "free" is added here does not draw the act outside of the genus, for free acts are also said to be in the power of the agent. Therefore, free choice is an act and not a power.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, according to Augustine's book On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 4 (PL 42:963 sqq.).) whatever exceeds its own subject is within it essentially and not accidentally, and thus he proves that love and knowledge are essentially within the mind, for the mind not only knows and loves itself, but also others. However, free choice goes beyond its subject, for the soul acts by free choice upon the things that are outside of it. Therefore, free choice is essentially within the soul, and so it is not a power, since powers are superadded to the essence.

Obj. 15: Furthermore, no power brings itself forth in act, but free choice brings itself to act whenever it wills. (Cf. supra: q. 12, a. 1, obj. 1.) Therefore, free choice is not a power.

On the contrary (1), according to the Philosopher in the Nichomachean Ethics, (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b20.) there are three things in the soul: powers, habits, and passions. However, free choice is not a passion since it exists in the higher part of the soul, but passions and passable qualities only regard the sensitive part; (Cf. supra: q. 22, a. 13, obj. 13.) similarly, it is not a habit since it is the subject of grace. For as Augustine says, it stands to grace as a horse to its rider. (Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognosticon, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PL 45:1632), according to ST I-II.110.4, obj. 1.) But one habit cannot be the subject of another habit. Thus it follows that free choice is a power.

Furthermore (2), there seems to be this distinction between power and habit, namely that a power which stands in relation to opposites is determined by a habit to one thing. But free choice denotes something standing in relation to opposites, in no way determined to one thing. Therefore, free choice is a power and not a habit.

Furthermore (3), Bernard says remove free choice and there is nothing that is saved. (Cf. De grat. et lib. arb. cap. 1 (PL 182, 1002 B).) But what is saved is the soul or a power of the soul. Therefore, since free choice is not the soul, since it pertains only to the higher part, then it follows that it is a power.

Furthermore (4), the Teacher says in the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 3.) that power of the rational soul by which anyone discerning can will good or evil is called free choice; and thus, free choice is a power.

Furthermore (5), Anselm says that free choice is a power for conserving uprightness of the will for its own sake, (Cf. De lib. arb. cap. 3 (PL 158, 494 B), ibid. cap. 13 (PL 158, 505 A).) and so the same conclusion follows as before.

I answer that it must be said that if one attends to the literal meaning of the words, then free choice names an act, but in spoken usage it is transferred to signify the principle of an act. For when we say that a man has free choice, we do not mean that he judges freely in an act, but that he has within himself what makes him able to judge freely. As a consequence, if judging freely has in itself something exceeding the capacity of its power, then free choice will name a habit or a power perfected by a habit, as to be angry in moderation names something that exceeds the irascible power, for the irascible power cannot moderate on its own the anger of passion unless it should be perfected by a habit by which reason's moderation is impressed upon it. But if to judge freely does not imply in itself something that exceeds the capacity of a power, free choice names nothing but a power taken absolutely, as to be angry does not exceed the capacity of the irascible power. Hence, its proper principle is a power and not a habit.

However, it is the case that if nothing is added to the act of judging, it does not exceed its power's limits by its own nature, inasmuch as it the act of some power, namely that of reason, unless there is required the addition of some habit. In a similar way, the addition of "freely" does not exceed the power's capacity, for something is said to be done freely in this respect, that it is in the power of the one doing it. But that something lies within in our capacity is in us according to some power, namely the will, and not by some habit. Thus free choice denotes not a habit, but the power of the will or of reason, inasmuch as one is ordered to the other. For the act of choice proceeds in this way, that is, in an orderly manner from one of these to the other, according to what the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.2, 1139b4.) that choice is the desire of the understanding faculty, or the understanding of the desiring faculty.

It is clear from what has been said why it is that some are moved to hold free choice to be a habit. (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 25, part 1, q. 4.) For some held this to be the case because of what free choice adds to the will and reason, namely the order of one thing to another. But this cannot be the reason for possessing a habit, taking the name "habit" properly, for a habit is a certain quality by which a power is inclined to act. But some have said that free choice is a habitual power, (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 1, inq. 4, tract. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 3, ch. 1, a. 1, n. 390, 2:468.) considering the ease by which we judge freely. But this does not go beyond the notion of power, as has already been said.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it must be said that something is called easy in two ways: in one way because of the removal of some impediment, in another way because of the addition of assistance. Thus, the ease pertaining to a habit is by the addition of help since the habit inclines the power to act. However, this ease does not denote free choice, inasmuch as by itself it is not inclined more to one thing than to another, but it rather denotes the ease that comes from the removal of an impediment, inasmuch as free choice is not impeded by any constraint from its own operation. Thus, Augustine properly denotes free choice as a faculty and not as ease, for a faculty seems to imply that something is in the power of the one who has the faculty.

Reply Obj. 2–3: And one can similarly respond to the second and the third, which argue from the ease of the habit.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that one can consider a twofold mode in any act: one that pertains to the notion of habit, as when something is done well or badly; another that pertains to the notion of power, as to know immaterially belongs to the intellect from the very nature of the power. Thus, the mode implied in saying that one judges freely does not pertain to some additional habit, but to the very notion of power, as was said.

The reply to the fifth is missing.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that man does not completely lose free choice when using it badly, but in a certain respect, for clearly, after sinning one cannot be without sin as one was capable before sinning.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that although no one can use grace badly, yet for one possessing free choice, even the freedom of grace can be used badly by someone, as when we say that something is badly used which is the principle of bad use, such as a power or a habit. However, if we say that something is used badly as an object of use, then virtues and grace also happen to be used badly in this way, as is clear among those who become proud because of their virtues.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that Bernard takes "habit" improperly for anything that is easy.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that any power requires a habit for a two reasons: first indeed because an operation that is to be drawn out by a power exceeds the strength of that power, even though it does not exceed the strength of all human nature; in another way because it exceeds the strength of all nature. And all the soul's powers need habits in this second way, by which meritorious acts are elicited, whether they pertain to the affections or to the intellect, for in such acts only habits of grace can be superadded.

However, the intellect needs a habit in the first way inasmuch as it cannot understand something unless it be made like unto it by an intelligible species. Thus, an intelligible species must be added by which the intellect is brought into act. However, an ordering of the species causes a habit to exist. For the very same reason the lower appetites, namely the irascible and the concupiscible, require habits, and it is because of this that they are perfected by the moral virtues. For the moderation of their acts does not exceed human nature, but it surpasses the strength of the powers mentioned. Thus, what belongs to a higher power, namely reason, is impressed upon them, and the very seal of reason formally perfects the moral virtues in the lower powers.

However, the higher affective power does not need a habit in this way, for it naturally tends to the good that is connatural to it as to its own object. Hence, in order for it to will the good, it is only necessary that it be shown to it by the knowing power. And thus, the philosophers did not place any habit, whether natural or acquired, in the will, but they placed prudence within reason to direct in practical things, and likewise temperance, fortitude, and the other moral virtues in the irascible and the concupiscible appetites. But according to theologians, the habit of charity is placed in the will because of meritorious acts.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that this restriction of reason and the will does not happen by some superadded habit, but by the order of one power to another.

Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that the faculty that exists through the inclination of a habit adds to the power something that belongs to another nature, namely the habit. But the faculty that exists through the removal of a constraint adds a determinate nature to the power, which nevertheless pertains to power's nature; just as the differences that are superadded to a genus pertain to the nature of the species.

Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that Augustine defines free choice by its proper act, inasmuch as powers are known by their acts. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.6, 415a18; cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 48, a. 2, obj. 2; In II Sent., d. 38, a. 4, obj. 1; d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 3; In IV Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 2.) Hence, that predication is not essential but causal.

Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that even though, with respect to the quality of the word, free choice denotes an act, nevertheless, with respect to spoken usage, it has been transferred to signify the principle of an act.

Reply Obj. 14: To the fourteenth it must be said that knowledge and love can be compared to the mind in two ways: in one way as to one who knows and loves, and in this way they do not surpass the mind, and neither do they become unlike other accidents. But in another way they can be compared to the mind as to something that is loved and known; and in this way they surpass the mind, for the mind not only knows and loves itself but also other things; and so they are unlike other accidents. For other accidents are not compared to something external in the same way that they are compared to their subject; but they are compared to something outside by acting, while inhering in their subject. However, love and knowledge are compared in a unique way to the subject and to the things that are outside, even though there is a way that they are compared to the subject alone. Thus, love and knowledge do not have to be essential to the mind except insofar as the mind is known and loved through its own essence.

The reply to the fifteenth is missing.