Article 14 — Whether free choice is capable of the good without grace

Fourteenth, it is asked whether free choice is capable of the good without grace. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.109.2; I-II.109.5; I-II.114.2; SCG III.147; In II Sent., d. 28 a. 1; d. 39, exposition of text; In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; Commentary on 2 Corinthians, ch. 3, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it is the case, for a command is not given to do what is impossible; hence, Jerome says that the one who says God has commanded something impossible is to be accursed; (Apud Petrum Lomb. Lib. Sent. III d. 36 c. 6.) but it is commanded to man that he do good; therefore he is able to do good by free choice.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one should be corrected for not doing what one cannot do; but man is corrected justly if he omits to do what is good; therefore man is able to do what is good by free choice.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, by free choice man is able to avoid sin in some way, at least with respect to one individual act; but it is good to avoid sin; therefore man is able to do what is good by free choice.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, each thing is more capable of what is natural to itself than of what is contrary to its own nature; but free choice is naturally ordered to the good, whereas sin is for it against nature. Therefore, it is more capable of good than of evil. But it is capable of evil through itself; therefore, so much more is it capable of good.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the creature retains a likeness of the Creator within it by reason of the vestige, and much more by reason of the image; (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 1.) but the Creator is able to do good through himself, and so also the creature, especially free choice, which has been made to the image.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 2.1, 1103b6.) virtue is begotten and corrupted by the same thing; but by free choice virtue is able to be corrupted, for mortal sin, which man is able to do from free choice, corrupts virtue; therefore man is also able by free choice to beget what is good, which is a virtue.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, in I John 5:3 it is said that his commandments are not heavy; but man is able to do by free choice what is not heavy; therefore man is able to fulfill the commandments by free choice, which is most of all good.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, according to Anselm in the book On Free Choice, (Cap. 3 (PL 158, 494 B), ibid. cap. 13 (PL 158, 505 A).) free choice is the power of preserving uprightness of will for its own sake; but uprightness of will is not preserved except by acting well; therefore someone is able to do good by free choice.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, grace is stronger than sin; but grace does not bind free choice in such a way that man is not able to commit sin; therefore, neither does sin bind free choice in such a way that a man who is in a state of sin is unable to do good without grace.

On the contrary (1) is what it says in Romans 7:18, I can will what is right, but I cannot do it; therefore man is unable to do good by free choice.

Furthermore (2), man is unable to do good except by an exterior or an interior act; but free choice does not suffice for either, for as it says in Romans 9:16, it is not of the one who wills, (Cf. Petrus Lomb. Lib. Sent. II d. 25 c. 9.) namely to will, which pertains to an interior act, nor to the one who runs, namely to run, which pertains to what is exterior, but to God who has mercy; therefore free choice cannot do good in any way without grace.

Furthermore (3), the Gloss says on that passage in Romans 7:15, what I hate this I do, that indeed man naturally wants what is good, but the will always lacks this in effect, unless it should augment its willing with God’s grace; (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 7:15, 6.96; Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Rom 7:15 (PL 191:1423A).) therefore, man without grace cannot do what is good.

Furthermore (4), the thought of the good precedes the activity of the good, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105a31.) but man is unable to think of the good by himself, for as it says in 2 Corinthians 3:5 not that we are sufficient to think any thing of ourselves, as of ourselves; therefore man is unable to do what is good by himself.

I answer that it must be said that nothing acts outside its own species; but each thing is able to act according to the needs of its own species, for nothing is deprived of its own activity. (Cf. above: q. 19, a. 1, resp.; John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:949B).)

However, there exists a twofold good: one that is proportionate to human nature, but another that exceeds the capability of human nature. And these two goods, if we are speaking of actions, do not differ according to the substance of the act, but according to the mode of acting; as for example, the act of giving alms is a good that is proportionate to human powers inasmuch as man is moved to do this from a certain natural love or affability; however it exceeds the capability of human nature inasmuch as man is led to do this by charity, which unites man’s mind to God. Therefore, it is manifest that free choice is not capable of the good that is above nature without grace; and since man merits eternal life by a such a good, it is manifest that man cannot merit without grace. However, man is able by free choice to fulfill that good which is proportionate to human nature. Hence, Augustine says that man is able to cultivate fields, to build houses, and to do many other good things by free choice, (Cf. Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognosticon, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PL 45:1623); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 26, ch. 7.) but without operating grace. But although man is able to do these good things without sanctifying grace, yet he is unable to do them without God, for nothing is able to spring forth in natural activity without divine power, for a secondary cause does not act except in virtue of the primary cause, as is said in the book On the Causes. (Comm. 1.) And this is true both in natural agents as well as in voluntary ones. But is true in different ways for each of them.

For God is the cause of natural activity in natural things inasmuch as he gives and preserves the principle of natural activity within the thing, from which a determinate activity follows by necessity; as for example, when he preserves heaviness in the earth, which is the principle of downward motion. But man’s will is not determined to any one activity, but it stands indifferently to many things; and so it is in potency in some way, unless moved by something active, which is either represented to it exteriorly, such as is the apprehended good, or else which works interiorly within it, such as is God himself; as Augustine says in the book On Grace and Free Choice, (Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 21 (PL 44:908).) showing in many ways that God works in the hearts of men. However, all exterior motions are also moderated by divine providence, inasmuch as he judges that someone should be incited to the good by these or those actions. Hence, if we do not wish to call God’s grace a habitual gift, but rather God’s mercy, by which he interiorly acts on the mind’s motion and orders exterior things to man’s salvation, then man is not capable of any good without God’s grace. But speaking commonly, we use the name "grace" for any justifying habitual gift. And so it is clear that in some way both arguments conclude something false; therefore, we must respond to each of them.

Reply Obj. 1: Hence, to the first it must be said that what God commands is not impossible for man to observe, for he is able to observe the act’s substance by free choice, and he is able by the gift of grace to observe the mode by which it is elevated above nature’s capability, namely, inasmuch as it is done from charity, even though it is not from free choice alone.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that a man who does not fulfill the commandments is rightly rebuked, for it is from his own negligence that he does not possess grace, by which he would have been able to observe the commandments even with regard to the mode, for he would be able nevertheless to observe them by free choie with respect to their substance.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that a man avoids sin by performing an act in the genus of the good, even though he would not merit a reward; and so, although man is able to avoid some sin by free choice, yet it does not follow that he is capable of a meritorious good by free choice alone.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that man is capable of the good that is connatural to him by free choice; but the meritorious good is above his nature, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: to the fifth it must be said that although the creature is a likeness of the Creator, yet it is not perfect; for this belongs to the Son alone; and therefore it is not necessary that whatever is found in God should also be found in the creature.

Reply Obj. 6: to the sixth it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking of political virtue, which is acquired from acts, but not of infused virtue, which alone is the principle of a meritorious act.

Reply Obj. 7: to the seventh it must be said that as Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace, (Augustine, On Nature and Grace, ch. 69 (PL 44:290).) for love, God’s commands are understood to be light, but for fear, they are hard; hence it does not follow that one can fulfill them perfectly, without possessing charity; but although one not having charity is able to fulfill any one of them with regard to substance and with difficulty, yet one cannot fulfill all of them; just as neither can one avoid all sins.

Reply Obj. 8: to the eighth it must be said that although free choice is able to preserve an upright habit, yet not when it does not possess it.

Reply Obj. 9: to the ninth it must be said that free choice does not require a binding for it not to be capable of a meritorious good, for it exceeds its nature, just as when a man, even though he might be bound, is unable to fly.

But the solution is clear concerning what was objected on the contrary, for they either proceed with regard to a meritorious good or they show that without God’s activity man is capable of no good thing.