Article 9 — Whether man's free choice can be confirmed in goodness in this present life

Ninth, it is asked whether man's free choice can be confirmed in goodness in this present life. (Parallel text: ST III.27.5, ad 2.)

Obj. 1: It seems that it cannot, for the beginning in desirable things is the end, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 7.8, 1151a16.) just as the beginning in speculative things are the first axioms. (Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 5.2, 72a18; Metaphysics 3.2, 997a7, 997a11.) But among speculative things, the intellect is not established in truth by grasping the certitude of scientific knowledge without having made a resolution to the first axioms. Thus, neither can free choice be established in goodness without afterwards arriving at the final end. But this does not happen in the state of this present life, thus free choice cannot be established in goodness in the state of this present life.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, human nature is not stronger than angelic nature. But the establishment of free choice is not granted to the angelic nature prior to the state of glory. Thus, neither should it be granted to men.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a mover only rests in the end of motion, but free choice does attain to its end so long as it is in the state of this life. Therefore, neither does its variability come to rest, such that it not be able to be borne toward good or evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, anything can fail so long as it is imperfect. But imperfection is not removed from man so long as he is in the state of this present life: for we see now in a mirror dimly, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:12. Thus, man is able to fail by sinning so long as he is in the state of this life.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, so long as someone is in the state of meriting, what increases merit should not be taken away from him. But being able to sin is advantageous for merit, and thus it is said in Sirach 31:10 in praise of the just man that he has had the power to transgress and did not transgress, and to do evil and did not do it. Therefore, so long as man is in the state of this current life, in which he is able to merit, his free choice should not be established in goodness.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as sin is a defect of free choice, so also is corruption a defect of the body. But man's body does not become corruptible in the state of this life, thus neither should man's free choice be confirmed in goodness in the state of this life.

On the contrary (1), the Blessed Virgin was confirmed in goodness in this present state of life; for as Augustine says, (Augustine, On Nature and Grace, ch. 36 (PL 44:267); cf. ST III.27.4, s.c.) one should not mention her when one is treating of sin.

Furthermore (2), even the apostles were confirmed in goodness by the coming of the Holy Spirit, as seems to be the case in Psalm 74:4, it is I who keep steady its pillars, which the Gloss applies to the apostles. (Glossa interlinearis, at Ps 74:4 (in Glossa ordinaria); Peter Lombard, commentary on the Psalms, at Ps 74:4 (PL 191:700B).)

I answer that it must be said that someone is able to be established in goodness in two ways, in one way simply, such that one has within oneself a sufficient beginning of one's own firmness, which is completely unable to fail; and in this way the blessed are established in goodness for the reason mentioned before. (a. 8) In another way someone is said to have been confirmed in goodness insofar as one is given a certain work of grace by which one is inclined to goodness in such a way that one is not able to be easily turned away from goodness. Yet one is not on this account withdrawn from evil to such an extent that one cannot sin in any way unless protected by divine providence.

Thus it is said regarding Adam's immortality (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 1, inq. 4, tract 3, q. 1, tit. 1, cc. 1–2, nn. 469–470, 2:631–636.) that he was immortal, not as being able to be completely protected by something within himself from every deadly exterior thing, such as from the cutting of a sword and the like; from which he was nevertheless protected by divine providence. In this way some are able to be established in goodness while in this life, but not in the first way, which is clear from the following.

No one can be completely unable to sin unless every source of sin is removed. However, the source of sin is either from an error of reason, which is deceived in particular regarding the good end and regarding what is useful, which it naturally desires in general; or it is from the fact that reason's judgment is impeded on account of some passion of the lower powers.

But even though it could be granted to someone in this life that their reason should in no way err regarding the end of goodness and the particular means, through the gifts of wisdom and counsel; nevertheless, it exceeds the condition of this present life that reason's judgement be incapable of being impeded, and this for two reasons.

The first and principle reason is that it is impossible that reason be always in the act of upright contemplation in this current life, such that God is always the reason for all of its activities. The second reason is that it does not happen in this life that the lower powers are subject to reason such that reason's act is in no way impeded by them, except in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ who was at once both a wayfarer and a possessor. (This vocabulary is from William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 11, q. 2.)

Yet by grace a man can be so bound to goodness in this life that that he be unable to sin, except with great difficulty, insofar as because of the infused virtues the lower powers are held back, the will is strongly inclined toward God, and reason is perfected in the contemplation of divine truth, whose continuation coming from the vehemence of love, withdraws man from sin. But among those who are said to be established in goodnes, whatever falls short of their being established is made up by the protection of divine providence, such that whenever an occasion of sin should present itself, their mind is divinely provoked to resist.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the affections arrive at the end not only when it perfectly possesses the end, but in some way even when it intensly desire it. In this sense someone can be established in goodness in some way.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that grace's gifts do not follow the order of nature by necessity, (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 9, a. 1, q. 3.) and therefore, even though human nature is not more worthy than the angelic, yet a greater grace is given to someone than what is given to an angel, such as to the Blessed Virgin and to the man Christ. However, being confirmed in goodness pertained to the Blessed Virgin since she was the mother of divine wisdom, in which nothing defiled gains entrance as is said in Wisdom 7:25. It was similarly fitting for the apostles, for they were like a foundation and the base of the entire ecclesial edifice (cf. Eph. 11:20.) and thus had to be firm.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third one must respond as to the first.

Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that from that argument it can be held that no one in this life is utterly established, just as no one is utterly perfect, yet in another way "established" can be said just like "perfect."

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that being able to sin does not result in merit but in the manifestation of merit inasmuch as it shows a good work to be voluntary. Thus it is placed among the praises of a the just man, (Cf. Albert the Great, Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics, bk. 1, lect. 14.) for praise is the manifestation of virtue.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that the body's corruption causes merit materially, inasmuch as someone patiently takes advantage of it, and so it is not removed by grace from the man who is in this present life.

The solution to the other contrary arguments is clear from what has been said.