Lecture 4 — The Gravity of Extravagance

The things that are proper to extravagance are not increased very much at the same time, because a man cannot easily take nothing and at the same time give with an open hand to everyone. A generous simpleton—such the spendthrift seems to be—is soon separated from his money. A person of this sort, though, is somewhat better than the miser, for he is quickly set right both by age and want. [686]

He can attain the mean of virtue, for he possesses qualities of the liberal person. He gives and does not take, although he does neither of these things properly and as he ought. If indeed he performs them out of custom or by reason of some change, he will become liberal, for he will then give to the right persons and not take from the wrong sources. For this reason he does not seem to be entirely evil in the moral sense, for it is not characteristic of an evil or vicious person to give excessively and not to take, but of a foolish one. [688]

In this way, the spendthrift seems to be much better than the miser because of what has been said and because he benefits many people, while the miser benefits no one, not even himself. [690]

But, as we have noted, many spendthrifts take from tainted sources, and in this way, they are ungenerous. [691]

They are inclined to take because they want to spend. But they cannot readily take enough, for their resources quickly vanish, forcing them to acquire from others. Likewise, they care nothing about what is right and take from any quarter whatsoever. They want to give presents, so the “how” and the “from where” make no immediate difference to them. [692]

For these reasons, their donations are not liberal, being good in neither motive nor mode. But they make rich those who would better remain poor. They would give nothing to good men, yet are generous with flatterers and others who provide them with other pleasures. [694]

Therefore, many of them are intemperate, for being inclined to spend, they waste their resources by intemperance. Moreover, since they do not order their life to good, they turn aside to sensual pleasures. [695]

The spendthrift who will not learn, then, suffers consequences. But, with effort, he may attain the mean and adopt the right attitude. [696]

686. The things that are proper to extravagance. After the Philosopher has explained the opposition between extravagance and miserliness, he now shows that miserliness is the more serious fault for three reasons.

The first reason is taken from the mutability of extravagance: although not readily increased, it is easily eliminated. Hence, he says that the things belonging to extravagance cannot at the same time be increased very much, such that a person takes nothing and gives to everyone, since resources or riches are quickly exhausted for those who spend recklessly, like the simple and senseless. And spendthrifts seem to be of this type. Since, then, a vice, which is not increased very much but easily remedied, is not so serious, it follows that the spendthrift is somewhat better, that is, less evil, than the miser.

687. The spendthrift is easily cured of his vice in two ways.

In the first way, by age, because the older a man grows, the more inclined he is to keep things and not give them away. The reason is that riches are desired to supply the needs of man, and as these needs become greater, a man is more prone to retain and not hand out his wealth.

Second, the spendthrift is cured by poverty resulting from excessive giving, for poverty prevents extravagant spending both by reason of the impossibility of further giving and by the experience of need.

688. At he can attain (1121a21), he gives the second reason, which is based on the likeness of extravagance to liberality. Hence, he says that the spendthrift can easily be directed to the mean of virtue on account of the similarity he has with the liberal man. Since the spendthrift generously gives and does not readily take, he has qualities possessed by the liberal person. But he differs from the liberal man in not doing either of these actions properly and as he ought, that is, according to right reason. Therefore, if he is induced to perform these things as he ought, either by custom or by some change in age or fortune, he will become liberal, such that he will give to the right persons and not take from the wrong sources.

689. He concludes from this that the spendthrift does not seem to be evil precisely as it pertains to moral virtue, which directly regards the power of the appetite. It is not characteristic of an evil or perverted appetite or of an effeminate mind to give excessively and not to take. This belongs rather to a kind of stupidity. Thus, it seems that extravagance does not belong so much to moral depravity, which regards the inclination of the appetite to evil, as to a lack of common sense.

690. At in this way (1121a27), he presents the third reason taken from a defect in extravagance. That the spendthrift is much better than the miser is apparent not only from the two reasons already stated but also from a third—namely, that the spendthrift helps many by his giving, although he may hurt himself by giving extravagantly. The miser, on the other hand, benefits no one, for he fails in giving; he does not benefit even himself, for he fails in spending.

691. Then, at but, as we have noted (1121a30), he considers the man who is a blend of spendthrift and miser.

About this he does two things.

First, he shows in what manner some spendthrifts have a bit of illiberality.

Second, he draws some conclusions from what has been said, at therefore, many of them (1121b7 [694]).

About the first, he does two things:

first, he explains how some spendthrifts sin in taking;

second, how they conduct themselves in giving, at for these reasons (1121b3; [694]).

About the first, he does two things.

First, he presents his proposition, saying that many who are extravagant in unnecessary donations are also ungenerous in some way, taking as they do from the wrong sources.

692. Second, at they are inclined (1121a32), he assigns two reasons.

The first is that spendthrifts are disposed to take because they want to spend their goods in superfluous gifts and expenditures. They readily succeed in this, for their resources are quickly depleted. Hence, in order that they may satisfy their desire regarding unnecessary gifts and disbursements, they are forced to acquire dishonestly from some other place the means they do not possess.

693. The second reason is that they give out of a desire for giving rather than according to right reason, tending, as it were, to some good. They want to give presents, but it makes no difference to them how or from where these come. Consequently, they do not concern themselves about what is right, and so take from any source without distinction.

694. Then, at for these reasons (1121b3), he explains how spendthrifts may be at fault in making donations. He declares that, because they do not care about what is right, their gifts are neither liberal nor good, either in motive or in circumstance. But sometimes they make rich evil men who would be better off poor—men who abuse their riches, and thereby cause harm to both themselves and others. Yet they would give nothing to men who regulate their lives according to virtue. Thus, they are deficient in giving. They are, however, generous with sycophants or others who give them pleasure in any way whatsoever, such as buffoons or panderers. In this way, they go to excess in giving.

695. Next, at therefore, many of them (1121b7), he draws two conclusions from the premises.

The first is that many spendthrifts are intemperate, and this is evident for two reasons:

first, because (being inclined to spend) they readily waste their substance by intemperance in food and sex, from which many people are restrained by fear of the cost;

second, because they do not order their life to an honorable good, and consequently they turn aside to the pleasures of sense. These two (the honorable and the pleasurable) are desirable in themselves—the honorable according to rational desire and the pleasurable according to sensual desire. The useful refers to both.

696. He draws the second conclusion at the spendthrift (1121b10), pointing out what is clear from the premises: if the spendthrift cannot be attracted to virtue, he falls into the previously mentioned vices. But, if he possesses zeal for virtue, he will easily attain the mean, such that he will give and refrain from taking according to what he ought, as was stated before [688].