Lecture 5 — The Incurableness of Illiberality

Illiberality, however, is incurable, for it seems that old age and every other disability make men miserly. Besides, it is more innate to men than extravagance, because more men are lovers of wealth than donors of it. [697]

Likewise, illiberality can greatly increase and is very diversified, since many species of it seem to exist. It is made up of two elements—namely, deficient giving and needless grasping—which are sometimes found separately and not always together in all subjects. Some indeed are always getting and others never giving. [699]

All those who are given names like “stingy,” “grasping,” and “close” fall short in giving. But they do not covet the goods of others, nor do they want to acquire them. Indeed, this is due to a kind of moderation and fear of disgrace. They seem to be, or say that they are, careful about this in order not to be forced at times to do anything dishonorable. Among these are the cumin-splitter and anyone of the type designated before by reason of an excessive desire of not giving to anyone. Some again refrain from what is not theirs for fear that their taking of what belongs to others should make it easy for others to take what is theirs. Therefore, they are content neither to give nor to take. [700]

Again, others are immoderate in their taking by accepting anything and from any quarter, such a those who engage in disreputable enterprises, those who live from the proceeds of prostitution, and such like, and usurers who lend small sums and at high rates. All of these receive more than they should and from reprehensible sources. Common to them is sordid gain because they all become infamous for the sake of a little money. People who wrongly take great sums from wrong sources are not called illiberal—for instance, usurpers who plunder cities and despoil sacred places—but rather wicked, impious, and unjust. [704]

Among the illiberal, however, we count the gambler, the despoiler of the dead, and the robber—shameful profit-makers. For the sake of evil gain, these engage in occupations having the stamp of infamy. Some run the risk of very great danger for gain, while others would take from friends to whom they should give. In both cases, those wishing to enrich themselves are makers of shameful profit. It is clear, then, that all taking of this kind is opposed to liberality. [704]

Appropriately, then, illiberality is said to be the vice opposed to liberality, for it is a graver evil than extravagance. Likewise, men sin more by illiberality than by extravagance. So far, therefore, we have discussed liberality and the opposite vices. [705]

697. Illiberality, however, is incurable. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on extravagance, he now treats illiberality,

examining it under three headings.

First, he states a quality of illiberality.

Second, he distinguishes the modes or the species of illiberality, at likewise, illiberality (1121b16; [699]).

Third, he makes a comparison of illiberality with its opposite, at appropriately, then (1122a13; [705]).

He says first that illiberality is incurable

and assigns two reasons for this.

The first reason is that human life, and even earthly things, tend to be defective for the most part. It is obvious from experience that old age and every other disability or defect make a man parsimonious, for it seems to him that he is very much in need. Therefore, he has a great desire for external things that supply the wants of man.

698. The second reason is this. That to which man is naturally inclined cannot easily be removed from him. But man is more inclined to illiberality than to extravagance. A sign of this is that more lovers and custodians of money exist than givers. What is natural is found in the majority of cases. And nature inclines to the love of riches to the extent that man’s life is preserved by them.

699. Then, at likewise, illiberality (1121b16), he distinguishes the modes or species of illiberality.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he shows that illiberality is considered from two aspects: excess in getting and defect in giving.

Second, at all those who (1121b21; [700]), he gives the species that are understood according to deficiency in giving.

Third, at again, others (1121b31; [704]), he gives the species that are able to be distinguished according to unnecessary taking.

He says first that illiberality is increased greatly; it extends to a multitude of things and is diversified, inasmuch as there are many kinds of illiberality. Although illiberality may exist in two forms—defect of giving and excess of taking—not all illiberal people sin in both ways, as though they possessed the whole nature of illiberality. But it is found separately in various persons so that some abound in taking who nevertheless do not fall short in dispensing, like the spendthrift previously considered [678]. Others, however, fall short in dispensing and, notwithstanding, do not abound in taking.

700. Next, at all those who (1121b21), he sets down the types of persons who are deficient in giving. He says that some are called stingy who spend very little; others are called grasping who retain nearly everything from a defect in giving. Still others are called close-fisted, or cumin-splitters, from an excessive tenacity they manifest in refusing to give the smallest thing without a return. However, these are not excessive in taking because they do not covet the goods of others, nor do they care much about accepting gifts. This happens for two reasons.

701. The first reason is that they pass up these opportunities out of moral consideration and fear of turpitude. They seem to keep what is theirs—they even say so expressly—lest, if they give what they have, they may be forced sometimes to a shameful act because of need. Likewise, they are unwilling to accept the goods of others, since they think it dishonorable. They even hesitate lest they be induced to something unseemly by those who gave to them. Among these seem to be the skinflint or the cumin-splitter, so named because he has an aversion to giving anyone even a tiny seed. The same reason holds in all similar cases.

702. The second reason is that some refrain from taking other people’s goods because they fear they may have to give, as if it were not easy for men to take the things that belong to others and others not to take the things that are theirs. On this account, they are content neither to give nor to take.

703. Then, at again, others (1121b31), he mentions the species of illiberality:

first, in regard to those who take in a disgraceful way;

second, to those who take in an unjust way, at among the illiberal (1122a7; [704]).

He says first that certain illiberal persons are immoderate in taking, not caring what or from where they take or profit. Some benefit from cheap and servile operations. Others, like pimps, make profit from sordid and unlawful dealing, such as prostitution and the like. Still others enrich themselves by unjust exaction, such as usurers and those who want at least a little gain from a large gift or loan. All these receive from reprehensible sources, from mean or shameful works, or they receive more than they should, like usurers who take more than the interest. All have profit in common, and this paltry. Those who make enormous profits and make them by shameful means—they are considered disgraceful for this reason—are not called illiberal, but rather wicked, unjust, and impious against God, as if they were criminals. Men of this caliber are not so designated, even though they take when they ought not and what they ought not, such as usurpers who despoil cities and temples.

704. Next, at among the illiberal (1122a7), he mentions those who take unjustly, like the gambler who makes money by throwing dice, the fellow who steals from the dead (formerly buried in rich apparel), and the robber who plunders the living. All these are enriched by shameful means, inasmuch as they engage in certain occupations considered disgraceful for the sake of gain. This agrees with what was said about those persons just mentioned [703]. But in these there is a special reason for turpitude. Some, such as the despoiler of the dead and the robber, expose themselves to great danger in doing things punishable by law. Others such as gamblers want to take something from their friends with whom they play, although it is more appropriate to liberality to give something to friends. It is obvious, then, that both types, by wanting to enrich themselves from improper sources, are makers of shameful profits. It is necessary, therefore, to say that all the previously mentioned taking or accepting is opposed to liberality.

705. Then, at appropriately, then (1122a13), he explains illiberality by comparison with the opposite vice,

saying that illiberality is fittingly named from the contrast with liberality. It always happens that the worse vice is more opposed to the virtue. But illiberality is worse than extravagance, as was shown before [686–90]. Consequently, it remains that illiberality is more opposed to liberality.

A second reason is that men commit graver sins by the vice of illiberality than by the vice of extravagance. Therefore, illiberality gets its name from the privation of liberality, because liberality is frequently destroyed by this vice.

706. Finally, he sums up what has been said, stating that, so far, we have discussed liberality and the opposite vices.