Lecture 16 — Amusement

Since recreation should have a place in our life and our social living by means of playful conversation, this would be a suitable time for a discussion of what things are proper to say and hear. In matters of this nature, speaking and listening are different, but it is clear that we have both excess and defect in respect to the mean. [850]

People who engage in too much derision are buffoons and nuisances, wanting laughter at any cost. They try more to get a laugh than to converse politely and avoid offending the persons they mock. [852]

On the other hand, persons who say nothing funny and are disagreeable to those who do seem uncultured and rude. [853]

But men indulging in jest with good taste are called witty, like those who give a humorous turn to things. [854]

Actions of this kind seem to belong to character, for as bodies are judged from their movements, so too are characters. [855]

Since laughter is quite popular, most people take more pleasure in fun and in joking reproach of others than they should. Hence, they are pleased with buffoons who are called witty. However, from what has been said, it is obvious that buffoons are quite different from persons of wit. [856]

Tact belongs to the mean habit of this virtue. It is characteristic of a tactful person to tell and listen to such tales as become a decent and liberal man. [857]

Now, the witty person speaks and listens to what is becoming in jest. But the jesting of the liberal man differs from that of the servile man; the jesting of the cultured man from that of the uncultured. [858]

Anyone can see this in the comedies of the ancient and modern authors. In the earlier plays, obscene language appears and is an object of laughter; in the later it is rather implied. This difference toward obscenities is of no small importance for decency. [859]

We must determine, then, whether a man is good at raillery because he says what becomes a liberal man, or because he does not offend his listener, or because he even delights him. [860]

This norm is indefinite to the extent that what is hateful to one person is pleasing to another. But each will listen to the things that give him pleasure, while he seems to encourage the things that he permits. [861]

The virtuous person will not employ every kind of jest, for some jokes are in fact an insult. But legislators forbid the making of some insulting remarks. Actually, they should forbid all reviling. Here the pleasing and liberal man will be, as it were, a law unto himself. Therefore, either the witty or the tactful person possesses the mean in this matter. [862]

However, the buffoon, less vicious than the derider, spares neither himself nor others for the sake of a laugh. Likewise, he says such things as the polite person would never think of saying—would not in fact listen to. [864]

But the lout is useless at these conversations, contributing nothing and making everyone uncomfortable. Nevertheless, recreation and jest seem to be necessary for human life. [865]

In human living there are three median courses, all of which regard communication in speech and action. They differ, however, for one deals with truthfulness and the others with what is pleasing. Of this second class, one concerns pleasure taken in amusements while the other concerns pleasure in things according to another aspect of life, namely, conversations. [866]

850. Since recreation should have a place. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the virtues dealing with human actions of a serious nature, he now considers a certain virtue that deals with amusement.

He develops this point in three ways.

First, he shows there can be virtue and vice having to do with amusement.

Second, at people who engage in too much (1128a4; [852]), he treats the virtue and the opposite vices concerned with amusement.

Third, at in human living there are (1128b4; [866]), he explains the difference between this and those virtues already considered.

In regard to the first, we must consider that, as has been shown [329], there can be no corresponding virtue and vice concerned with what is intrinsically evil and incapable of having an aspect of good. Consequently, if no aspect of good can be found in amusement, there will be no virtue connected with it.

851. But amusement does have an aspect of good, inasmuch as it is useful for human living. As man sometimes needs to give his body rest from labors, so also he sometimes needs to rest his soul from the mental strain that ensues from his application to serious affairs. This is done by amusement. For this reason, Aristotle says that, since there should be some relaxation for man from the anxieties and cares of human living and social intercourse by means of amusement—thus amusement has the aspect of useful good—it follows that, in amusement, there can be a certain agreeable association of men with one another, so they may say and hear such things as are proper and in the proper way. Yet, in matters of this kind, talking and listening are very different, for a man properly listens to things he could not properly say. But wherever difference exists between the things that ought to be done and those that ought not to done, there is found not only a mean but also excess and defect in regard to this mean. Hence, we have a virtuous mean and extremes concerned with amusement.

852. At people who engage (1128a4), he considers the mean and the extremes.

First, he speaks about the nature of each habit;

second, at tact belongs (1128a16; [857]), he shows what is proper to each habit.

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner:

first, he explains what the mean and the extremes in amusement are;

second, at actions of this kind (1128a10; [855]), he shows that they belong to a difference of character;

third, at since laughter is quite (1128a12; [856]), he discloses that the extreme is sometimes taken for the mean.

He treats this first point from three aspects.

In the beginning, he shows what belongs to excess, saying that those who indulge excessively in playful derision are bomolochi, or temple plunderers, because of a resemblance to birds of prey who used to fly over the temple to pounce upon the entrails of sacrificed animals. In that way, these people lie in wait so they can pounce upon something to turn into a laugh. On this account, persons of this kind are a nuisance because they want to make laughter out of everything. They make more effort to do this than to engage in becoming or polite conversation and avoid disturbing the man they heap with playful reproach. They would rather tell scandalous stories, even at the risk of offending others, than not cause men to laugh.

853. Second, at on the other hand (1128a7), he explains the nature of the vice by defect, stating that men who never want to say anything funny and are disagreeable to the people who do (these being reasonably disturbed) seem to be uncultured or boorish and coarse, like those who are not mellowed by amusing recreation.

854. Third, at but men indulging (1128a9), he explains the nature of the mean in amusement, saying that men who devote themselves to amusement in moderation are called witty (eutrapeli), or good at turning (as it were), because they becomingly give an amusing turn to what is said and done.

855. Then, at actions of this kind (1128a10), he shows that the actions just mentioned belong to different habits. He says that these movements by which a person wishes to amuse others too much, or too little, or in a moderate way are indications of internal dispositions of habit. As external movements of bodies clearly indicate their internal dispositions, so external actions manifest internal characters.

856. At since laughter is quite (1128a12), he explains how the extreme sometimes is taken for the mean. He says that many people bubble over with laughter and take more pleasure than they should in jest and in joking reproach of others. Hence, they give the name witty to buffoons who please them by excessive indulgence in jest, which the majority of men love immoderately. Nevertheless, as is clear from what was said before [852–4], buffoons are quite different from witty people.

857. Next, at tact belongs (1128a16), he shows what properly belongs to the preceding habits.

First, he explains what is peculiar to the mean of the virtue;

second, at however, the buffoon (1128a33; [864]), what is proper to the extreme by excess;

third, at but the lout (1128b1; [865]), he discloses what pertains to the extreme by defect.

He handles the initial point from two aspects.

First, he shows how the witty person conducts himself in general with reference to fun;

second, at we must determine (1128a25; [860]), how he acts especially in friendly banter.

He considers this first in a threefold way.

In the beginning, he brings out that the use of clean fun pertains to the mean habit. He affirms that what is characteristic of a tactful person (epydexiotis)—that is, of a man well-fitted and prepared to engage in conversation with others—belongs to the mean habit of this virtue. It is proper to men of this sort to narrate and listen to such amusing incidents as become a decent and liberal man who possesses a soul free from slavish passions.

858. Second, at now, the witty person (1128a19), he gives a reason as proof for what he has said: wherever something is found that can be done in a becoming manner, there is a thing that belongs to virtue. But it happens that a witty person says and listens to what is becoming. This is obvious from the different kinds of jest. The jesting of the liberal man who spontaneously strives to act virtuously differs from the jesting of the servile man who is engaged in disreputable activities. The jesting of the cultured man who has been instructed how he should recreate differs from the jesting of the uncultured man who has not been trained by any instruction in jesting. Hence, it is clear that it pertains to the mean habit of virtue to speak and listen to what is becoming in jesting.

859. Third, at anyone can see (1128a22), he introduces a proof for the previous statement that the jesting of the cultured and the uncultured person differs. This, he says, is particularly evident in considering the conversation of the players with one another in the old and new comedies or plays. The evidence is that, where these narratives in places contain obscene language, some create derision when they turn the obscene words into laughter; but others create a suspicion when they imply that those who were speaking in an obscene manner had evil in their hearts. However, it is obviously of great importance to human decency whether a man in playful conversation speaks obscenely or chastely.

860. At we must determine (1128a25), he explains how the virtuous man conducts himself regarding jesting insults.

On this point, Aristotle does three things.

First, he asks the question whether we must decide that a person does well at raillery by reason of the things that he says, namely, because he says what is becomingly said by a liberal man who is virtuous and decent; or decide that he is not determined according to this, but rather by reason of the end or effect, namely, because he aims not to offend his listener (or, what is more, aims to give him pleasure).

861. Then, at this norm is indefinite, he answers the second part of the question, saying that it is indeterminate what may offend or please the listener, because different things are odious and pleasant to different people. Everyone will gladly listen to what pleases him. And, as long as no offense is intended, a man seems to promote those things that he patiently hears by cooperating in them with others.

862. Third, at the virtuous person (1128a28), he shows that something is settled as to the first part, namely, as to affronts that are offered. It is clear that the virtuous man does not make use of every reproach, since reproach is a kind of insult. Besides, legislators forbid the hurling of any insult that defames a man. They do not forbid reproachful remarks that are fittingly uttered for amusement or for a man’s correction (a thing to be managed without loss of good name). That man who acts in a pleasing and polite manner in raillery seems to be a law unto himself, provided that, by his own choice, he avoids the things forbidden by the law and makes use of the things sanctioned by the law.

863. Finally, he comes to the conclusion that the man possessing the mean is such as was described, whether he is called “epidexios,” meaning tactful, or “eutrapelos,” meaning witty.

864. Next, at however, the buffoon (1128a33), he explains the viciousness of the excess, saying that the buffoon is less vicious than the mocker because the mocker tries to put another to shame while the buffoon does not aim at this, but only at getting a laugh. The latter spares neither himself nor others in attempting to create laughter, since he makes fun both of his own tales and of the sayings and deeds of others. Besides, he says things that a polite and virtuous person would not say, and some that he should not say and should not even listen to.

865. Then, at but the lout (1128b1), he treats the vice by defect, saying that the man who is uncultured or boorish is useless at these witty conversations. He contributes nothing to them, but is disagreeable to everyone. He is vicious in that he completely abhors jest, which is necessary for human living as a kind of recreation.

866. Next, at in human living (1128b4), he deduces the difference between this virtue and the two previously discussed, stating that, in human life, there are the three median states mentioned, all of which regard communication in words and works. But they differ among themselves, since one of them deals with truthfulness in speech and action while the others pertain to what is pleasing. One of these concerns pleasure taken in amusement; the other concerns pleasure taken in conversation according to our usual way of living, that is, in serious matters.