Lecture 1 — Liberality

Let us next discuss liberality, which seems to be a mean in regard to wealth. [649]

No one is praised as liberal for exploits in war, or for conduct in matters with which the temperate man is concerned, or again for pronouncing judgments. But

a man is praised as liberal for his giving and taking of wealth. [651]

Wealth here means whatever can be evaluated in terms of money. [653]

In the use of wealth, extravagance is the excess and miserliness the defect. [654]

Miserliness is always attributed to people who are more careful about money than they should be. [655]

But the intemperate are sometimes accused of extravagance by inference, for the incontinent and the intemperate are notorious as extravagant wasters. For this reason, too, they seem to be very depraved; indeed, they have many vices. However, they are not properly called prodigal, for a spendthrift is a man who has acquired one vice, that of wasting his substance (he is ruined by his own fault). The dissipation of one’s substance seems to be a kind of ruin of one’s being, since a man lives by means of riches. It is in this sense that extravagance is treated here. [656]

Things that have utility—among which are riches—can be used well or badly. And the man who possesses the virtue concerned with particular objects uses each one best. Therefore, he who has the virtue dealing with wealth will use riches to the best advantage. This man is the liberal man. [658] The spending and distribution of wealth seem to be the use of it; the acceptance and saving of wealth more properly are the possession. [659]

For this reason, liberality is rather the bestowal of wealth on the right persons than the acceptance of wealth from proper sources or the refusal from improper sources. [660]

Virtue consists more in bestowing benefits than in receiving them, more in performing good actions than in refraining from disgraceful ones. But it is obvious that the conferring of benefits and the performance of good deeds accompany disbursements. [661]

Thanks and, in a special way, praise are due the giver, and not the recipient. [662]

Likewise, it is easier not to take from another than to give, for people prefer not to accept what belongs to others rather than give what is theirs. [663]

People who give donations are called liberal, but not so those who receive gifts even honorably—such persons are praised for justice rather than liberality; those who simply accept gifts, however, are praised very little. [664]

Of all virtuous men, the liberal person is particularly loved, since he is useful because of his benefactions. [665]

649. Let us next discuss liberality. Having completed the study of fortitude and temperance, which deals with means preservative of human life itself, he now begins to examine other mediums that concern certain subsidiary goods and evils.

First, he defines the laudable mediums that are the virtues.

Second, at shame is not properly spoken of (1128b10; [867]), he defines the mediums that are not virtues, but passions.

On the first point he does two things.

First, he considers the virtues that regard external things.

Second, at some men seem to be (1126b11; [816]), he considers the virtues pertaining to human actions.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he considers the virtues that regard exterior goods;

second, the virtue of meekness, which regards exterior evils, at meekness is a kind of moderation (1125b26; [800]).

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he considers the virtues relating to riches.

Second, at judging by the name (1123a34; [735]), he considers the virtues having to do with honors.

He handles the initial point in two ways.

First, he considers liberality.

Second, at it seems logical (1122a18; [707]), he investigates magnificence.

The first point he subdivides in a twofold manner.

First, he examines the matter of liberality and the opposite vices.

Second, at things that have utility (1120a4; [658]), he defines their acts concerned with the proper matter.

He discusses the initial point from two aspects.

First, he shows that liberality has to do with wealth.

Second, at in the use of wealth (1119b28; [654]), he shows that there are opposite vices dealing with this matter.

The first point is developed in two ways.

First, he says what his intention is.

Second, at no one is praised as liberal (1119b22; [651]), he shows the matter of liberality.

Third, at wealth here (1119b27; [653]), he explains what he had said.

650. After the treatise on temperance, he says first that we must take up the study of liberality because of the likeness between liberality and temperance. As temperance moderates the desires of tactile pleasures, so liberality moderates the desire of acquiring or possessing external goods.

651. At no one is praised as liberal** (1119b22), he defines the matter of liberality, saying that it is a certain mean in regard to wealth. This is obvious from the fact that a man is praised as liberal not in military affairs (with which fortitude is concerned), nor in tactile pleasures (temperance has to do with these), nor in judgments (which are matters for justice). But he is praised for the giving and taking, that is, the acceptance of wealth—more in giving than in taking, as will be shown afterwards [660–61, 665–6, 683).

652. We must consider that something can be called the matter of moral virtue in two ways:

in one way as the proximate matter (thus the passions are the matter of many moral virtues);

in the other way as the remote matter (thus the objects of the passions are called their matter).

Accordingly, the proximate matter of fortitude is fear and recklessness and the remote matter is the fear of death; the proximate matter of temperance is desires and pleasures but the remote matter is food, drink, and sexual acts. Hence, we find that the proximate matter of liberality is desire or love of wealth and the remote matter is wealth itself.

653. Then, at wealth here (1119b27), he explains what is understood by the name “wealth,” saying that the term signifies everything the value of which can be computed in dollars and cents, like a horse, a coat, a house, or whatever can be evaluated in cash. The reason is that to give or take these objects is the same as to give or take wealth.

654. At in the use of wealth (1119b28), he shows in what manner there are vices contrary to liberality.

Here he makes three points.

First, he states his general intention, saying that extravagance and miserliness in the use of wealth are denominated such by excess and defect. For the mean and the extremes are about the same thing. Hence, since extravagance and miserliness are the extremes of generosity, they must themselves be concerned with money.

655. Next, at miserliness is always (1119b28), he mentions particularly that we always attribute or charge with miserliness people who are more diligent, that is, solicitous, about making or keeping wealth than they ought to be.

656. Finally, at but the intemperate (1119b31), he explains in what manner extravagance may be concerned with wealth. By extension, the term “extravagance” is applied occasionally to the intemperate, for men who live riotously and dissipate their riches by overindulgence in food and sex are sometimes called spendthrifts. Hence, they seem very depraved in the sense that they also possess many vices, like intemperance and extravagance. Although such men at times may be called extravagant, nevertheless they do not strictly deserve the name that is used to signify a vice consisting in inordinate waste or consumption of one’s substance or riches. He proves the statement by the name “extravagance.” The extravagant person is spoken of as ruined inasmuch as dissipation of his own riches, by which he ought to live, seems to destroy his existence—a thing sustained by riches.

657. This name should be predicated of a man in relation to himself, because each thing receives its species and name from what pertains to it essentially. Therefore, a man is truly called extravagant who dissipates his riches precisely because he does not have proper care of them. On the other hand, he who wastes his substance for some other reason—for example, intemperance—is not essentially a spendthrift, but an intemperate person. It happens now and then that even the covetous and grasping waste their goods because of the influence of concupiscence. For the present, then, we are treating extravagance according as some squander riches themselves and do not waste them in some other way.

658. Then, at things that have (1120a4), he explains in what way liberality and the opposite vices function in this matter.

Here he takes up three points:

first, he considers the liberal man;

second, the spendthrift, at but the spendthrift (1120b24; [678]);

third, the miser, at illiberality, however (1121b12; [697]).

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he examines the act of liberality;

second, he states certain characteristics of it, at the liberal person however (1120b4; [672]).

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows what the principal act of liberality is;

second, what qualities this act should have, at since virtuous actions (1120a23; [666]).

He handles the initial point under two headings.

First, he makes clear that the act of liberality is the proper use of wealth, by the following argument. Whatever has any utility can be used well or badly. But riches are sought because they have some utility. Therefore, they can be used well or badly. Now the proper use of things pertains to that virtue that deals with those things. Consequently, the proper use of wealth belongs to liberality, which is concerned with wealth, as we proved before [651–3].

659. Next, at the spending (1120a8; [659]), he explains what the use of wealth is, indicating that it consists in spending, which takes place by disbursements and gifts. To accept or save wealth is not to use it, for acceptance brings about possession and saving is the preservation of wealth; acceptance is a kind of production, and saving is a habitual retention. Use, however, does not signify production or habit, but act.

660. Finally, at for this reason (1120a9), he draws a conclusion from what has been said.

First, he states it, inferring from the premises that it is more characteristic of a liberal man to distribute wealth to the right persons than it is to accept wealth from the proper sources (this pertains to a lawful increase of wealth) or to refuse wealth from improper sources (this pertains to removal of the contrary).

661. Then, at virtue consists (1120a11), he substantiates the conclusion by five reasons.

The first reason is that it is more characteristic of virtue to bestow than to receive benefits, because the act of benefiting is better and more difficult. Likewise, it is more characteristic of virtue to perform a good action than to refrain from an evil one, because departure from a terminus is the principle of motion to which the avoidance of an evil action is likened. But the performance of a good action is likened to the arrival at the goal that perfects motion. It is obvious when someone gives gifts that he bestows a benefit and performs a good action. On the other hand, it pertains to taking or acceptance to receive benefits worthily (inasmuch as a man acquires them from proper sources) and not to act unworthily (inasmuch as a man refuses them from improper sources). Consequently, it belongs to the virtue of liberality to give well rather than to receive worthily or refrain from reprehensible acceptance of gifts.

662. The second reason, at thanks, and, in a special (1120a15), follows thus. Praise and thanks are due in return for a good act. But each one of these is ascribed with better reason to the giver than to the receiver, worthy or unworthy. Therefore, the virtue of liberality consists rather in giving than receiving.

663. The third reason is presented at likewise it is easier (1120a17). Virtue is concerned with the difficult. But it is easier not to receive what belongs to others than to give what is one’s own, because a person giving what is his cuts himself away, so to speak, from what was a part of him. Therefore, the virtue of liberality has more properly to do with giving than with receiving.

664. The fourth reason, beginning at people who (1120a18), is taken from common usage. Men who give gifts are said to be liberal in a marked degree; those who do not accept dishonest gifts are commended not so much for liberality as for justice, and those who simply accept presents are praised very little. Therefore, the virtue of liberality seems to be concerned in a special way with giving gifts.

665. The fifth reason is given at of all virtuous men (1120a21). Among all virtuous men, the liberal person is especially loved not by an honorable friendship—as if liberality was a most excellent virtue—but by a friendship of utility, precisely as he is useful to others. The liberal are indeed useful in this that they make disbursements. Therefore, liberality deals especially with giving gifts.