Lecture 8 — Magnanimity

Judging by the name, magnanimity seems to be concerned with great things the nature of which we should first understand. However, it does not matter whether we consider the habit or the man who operates according to the habit. [735]

A person seems to be magnanimous in thinking himself worthy of great things when he is worthy. [736]

But he who presumes this when it is not really so is foolish; yet the man who operates according to virtue in these matters is not unwise or foolish. Consequently, the magnanimous person is such as we have described. [737]

He who is worthy of small things and considers himself so is temperate, although he is not magnanimous. Magnanimity consists in greatness, as beauty consists in being tall. Short people may be fair and well-proportioned, but hardly handsome. [738]

The person who judges himself worthy of great things and is in fact unworthy is conceited. But one who judges himself worthy of greater things than he merits is not always said to be conceited. [739]

On the other hand, the man who thinks he deserves lesser things than he deserves—whether the things be great, ordinary, or little—is pusillanimous. This will be especially evident in one capable of splendid achievements. What would he have done if he had not this capability? [740]

However, the magnanimous man holds an extreme in extension but a mean in appropriateness, for he thinks himself deserving in accord with his worth. Others exceed and fall short of this mean. [741]

If a man deems himself deserving of great things, and especially of the greatest things, when he deserves them, then he will be concerned with one particular object. He is said to be deserving in reference to external goods. But we place that external good highest that we attribute to the gods, which is desired most of all by prominent men and is the reward for virtuous action. Such a good is honor, for it is the best of all external goods. Therefore, the magnanimous man will manage honors and dishonors in a manner that is fitting. [742]

Even independent of reasoning, the magnanimous seem to be concerned about honors, for the great exalt themselves in dignity principally by honor. [743]

The pusillanimous person is deficient in regard both to his own merit and to the worthiness of the magnanimous man. But one who is presumptuous is excessive respecting his own merit even though he does not exceed the merit of the magnanimous person. [744]

But the magnanimous man, as worthy of the greatest goods, will be best. Since the better person is worthy of greater things, the best will be worthy of the greatest. Therefore, the magnanimous person must be truly good. [745]

What is great in every virtue pertains to magnanimity. [746]

It is never becoming for a magnanimous man to flee one about to give unsought advice, nor to practice injustice. Will not the man who considers nothing great be the one to do disgraceful deeds for gain? [747]

To an observer of what happens in individual cases, that person will seem altogether ludicrous who thinks himself magnanimous when he is not really virtuous. One who is in fact evil will be neither magnanimous nor deserving of honor, for honor is a reward of virtue and is attributed to the virtuous. [748]

Therefore, it seems that magnanimity is an embellishment of the virtues, since it makes them more excellent and does not exist without them. It is difficult to be truly magnanimous, since this is not possible without goodness. [749]

735. Judging by the name, magnanimity seems to be. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on the virtues concerning money, he treats here the virtues having to do with honors.

First, he considers magnanimity, which regards great honors;

second, a nameless virtue concerned with ordinary honors, at as we remarked in the beginning (1125b1; [792]).

In the first consideration, he does two things.

First, he investigates the matter of magnanimity and the opposite vices;

second, their acts and properties, at for the most part (1124a4; [750]).

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he sets forth his proposition;

second, he explains it, at a person seems to be (1123b1; [736]).

He says first that, from its name, magnanimity apparently is concerned with great things. But, at the beginning, we must understand the nature of the things with which it deals.

Then he designates the manner of consideration, namely, that it does not matter whether we speak of the habit of magnanimity or of the man who is disposed by the habit, the magnanimous person.

736. Next, at a person seems (1123b1), he explains his proposition.

About this he does two things.

First, he exposes the matter of magnanimity generally;

second, specifically, at if a man (1123b15; [742]).

On the first point, he does three things:

first, he shows that magnanimity refers to great things;

second, at the person who judges (1123b8; [739]), how the opposite vices occur in regard to the same matter;

third, he explains how the virtue consists in the mean, at however, the magnanimous (1123b13; [741]).

He treats the first point under three aspects.

First, he exposes his viewpoint, saying that a person seems to be magnanimous who thinks himself worthy of great things—namely, that he may perform great deeds and that great things should happen to him—when he is in fact worthy.

737. Second, at but he who presumes (1123b2), he teaches that the magnanimous person must be worthy of great things. One who thinks himself worthy of great things contrary to truth, things of which he is not really worthy, is foolish. It is characteristic of a wise man to keep everything in proper order. But the virtuous man is neither unwise nor foolish, because virtue operates according to right reason, as was affirmed in book 2 [257, 322, 335]. Consequently, it is clear that the magnanimous man is the person just described, that is, one worthy of great things who thinks himself worthy.

738. Third, at he who is worthy (1123b5), he shows that the magnanimous man should think himself worthy of great things. One who is worthy of small things and considers himself so can be called temperate because temperance is taken for any moderation whatsoever. However, he cannot be called magnanimous, for magnanimity consists in a certain greatness, just as beauty properly consists in being tall. Hence, those who are short can be called pretty by reason of complexion or well-proportioned members, but not beautiful, for they lack size.

739. Next, at the person who judges (1123b8), he shows in what manner the opposite vices should be concerned with great things:

first, regarding the vice of excess;

second, the vice of defect, at on the other hand (1123b9; [740]).

Aristotle says first that the man who thinks himself worthy of great things when he is really unworthy is called conceited, meaning puffed up—we can call him inflated or presumptuous. But the person who is really worthy of great things and thinks himself worthy of still greater things is not always called conceited, because it is difficult to find an exact norm such that someone may judge himself not worthy of great things.

740. Then, at on the other hand (1123b9), he explains how the vice of defect is concerned with great things, saying that the man who thinks himself worthy of lesser things than he is in fact worthy is called pusillanimous. This is so, whether in fact he is worthy of great, mediocre, or small things. However, the pusillanimous person is one who refuses to strive after great accomplishments and aims at certain petty undertakings when he is truly capable of what is great. He would bring himself down to affairs more trifling still, except for the fact that he is capable of great things.

741. Next, at however, the magnanimous man (1123b13), he shows how magnanimity is in the mean, for treating as it does of great things, magnanimity seems to consist in the extreme. Since the average is the mean between the large and the small, the great has the nature of an extreme. Hence, he says that the magnanimous person holds an extreme in reference to great things of which he deems himself worthy. But he holds the mean inasmuch as he does this in an appropriate manner in considering himself deserving according to his worth. The mean of virtue is not judged according to the quantity of the thing, but according to right reason. Hence, a man is not placed outside the mean of virtue by a work, no matter what its size, provided he does not depart from reason. But the opposite vices exceed and fall short of what should be.

742. Then, at if a man deems (1123b15), he explains the matter of magnanimity specifically.

About this he does three things:

first, he shows that magnanimity is concerned with honor;

second, how the opposite vices should deal with this matter, at the pusillanimous person (1123b24; [744]);

third, in what manner magnanimity is related to other virtues, at but the magnanimous man (1123b26; [745]).

He explains the first point in two ways.

First, he reasons that, if the magnanimous man deems himself worthy of great things when he is worthy of them, he consequently should deem himself deserving of the greatest things when he is deserving of the greatest. He says further that magnanimity is concerned with one object in particular, for what is predicated by excellence is attributed to one. When someone is said to be worthy of certain things, the worthiness refers to external goods that come to a man as a reward. But that must be placed highest that is attributed to God, is desired especially by those in eminent positions, and is the reward of the most noble deeds. Such is honor, for honor is shown to God. Honor is also sought by the prominent and is the reward of virtuous action. Obviously, then, honor is the best of all external goods. Consequently, magnanimity should give the greatest consideration to honors and dishonors, inasmuch as the magnanimous person manages things of this kind in the proper manner.

743. Second, at even independent of reasoning (1123b22), he manifests his proposition by experience, saying that, even without discussion, it is clear that magnanimity has to do with honor for the most part, because experience shows the magnanimous deem themselves worthy of honor, but not above their deserts.

744. Next, at the pusillanimous (1123b24), he explains in what manner the opposite vices should be concerned with the previously mentioned matter. He says that the pusillanimous person is deficient in regard to himself because he considers himself deserving of lesser things than he deserves, and also in regard to the worthiness of the magnanimous man because he considers himself deserving of lesser things than a magnanimous man deserves. But the conceited or presumptuous person is excessive in regard to himself, because he makes himself greater than his worth; however, this is not in regard to the magnanimous man, because he does not consider himself deserving of greater things than the magnanimous man deserves.

745. Then, at but the magnanimous (1123b26), he compares magnanimity with other virtues.

About this, he does two things.

First, he shows that magnanimity is related to the other virtues,

and second he draws certain conclusions from what has been said, at therefore it seems (1124a1; [749]).

On the first point, he does two things:

first, he shows that magnanimity is related to the other virtues by a general argument;

second, that it is so by the things appearing in individual cases, at to an observer (1123b33; [748]).

Regarding the first, he does three things.

First, he shows that magnanimity does not exist without the other virtues;

second, he explains what makes magnanimity a special virtue, at what is great (1123b29; [746]);

third, he rejects an error, at it is never becoming (1123b31; [747]).

Aristotle says first that, when the magnanimous person deems himself worthy of the greatest goods and is really worthy of them, it follows that he is best. The better man is always deserving of greater things, and consequently he who is deserving of the greatest must be best. Therefore, the magnanimous man must be truly good; otherwise, he would not be deserving of the highest honors.

746. Then, at what is great (1123b29), he shows how magnanimity is a special virtue when it accompanies other virtues. He says that what is great in any virtue seems to pertain to magnanimity, because one who does not perform a great act of virtue is not worthy of great honor. So, when that virtue strives for what is proper to itself, it performs an act of another virtue: for example, fortitude intends a courageous action and magnanimity strives for a great deed in the courageous action. Since moral acts take their species from the end to which they tend, it is clear that magnanimity and fortitude differ in species (although they operate in the same matter), because neither virtue follows the same motive.

747. Next, at it is never becoming (1123b31), he rejects an error. Some seem to think that the magnanimous man should rely upon his own opinion and follow the advice of no one, and likewise that he should not hesitate to do injustice to anyone. The Philosopher, however, says this is false, for no one does a shameful deed except for the desire of something. But the magnanimous person does not place so great a value on any external thing that he would wish to do a shameful action for it.

748. Then, at to the observer (1123b33), he explains the clause of what happens in individual cases. He says that, to someone willing to observe individual cases, that man will seem altogether ridiculous who judges himself magnanimous without being virtuous. The reason is that, if a man is evil, he is not deserving of honor, for honor is the reward of virtue. Hence, the magnanimous man thinks himself worthy of great honors. Consequently, no evil person is able to be magnanimous.

749. Then, at therefore, it seems (1124a1), he draws two conclusions from the premises.

The first is that magnanimity seems to be an ornament of all the virtues, because they are made more excellent by magnanimity, which seeks to perform a great work in all the virtues. In this way, the virtues increase. Likewise, magnanimity accompanies the other virtues, and so seems to be added to them as their ornament.

The second conclusion is that it is difficult to be magnanimous because magnanimity cannot exist without the goodness of virtue, and even without great virtue to which honor is due. But it is difficult to attain this. Consequently, it is difficult for a man to be magnanimous.