Lecture 15 — Veracity

Likewise, the mean opposed to boasting treats of almost the same subject, and it too is nameless. [831]

It is not a loss to examine these matters, for in making the investigation, we will learn more about particular habits. [832]

Observing what is so in all cases, we are assured that virtues are certain median states. [833]

We have already discussed the people who cause pleasure or pain in their association with others. In like manner, we will now investigate those persons who manifest truth and falsehood by words, operations, and pretense. [834]

The boaster simulates non-existent qualities or claims a greater distinction than he really has. On the contrary, the dissembler denies or minimizes the qualities he has. But the man who observes the mean is admirable, being truthful both in life and speech, acknowledging that his own qualities are neither more nor less excellent than they really are. [835]

Each of these acts may be done both for the sake of something else and for nothing other than itself. As a man is, so he speaks, acts, and lives, unless some other cause affects him. [836]

A lie is intrinsically evil and to be avoided, but the truth is both good and to be praised. So, the man who speaks the truth is worthy of praise as being better, while the above two who do not tell the truth are worthy of blame, more especially the boaster. [837]

We will discuss both, but first the truthful man. We are not going to investigate the person who speaks the truth in his agreements or on any subject pertaining to right or its violation, for this belongs to another virtue. But we do intend to study the person who manifests the truth by his conversation and way of living (insofar as he does this from habit) in matters not touching justice and injustice. [838]

Such a man seems to observe moderation, for he is a lover of the truth and, being truthful where it makes little difference, he will speak the truth all the more where it does matter. He will fear a lie as disgraceful because he feared it in itself. Such a man is worthy of praise. [839]

He turns aside from the truth more by understatement, for this seems rather prudent since overstatements are irritating. [840]

The person who boasts more excellent talents than he possesses for no ulterior motive has a semblance of evil; otherwise, he would not find pleasure in lying. He is really, though, more vain than evil, and one who boasts for something else, like glory or honor, does not deserve great blame. However, the man who boasts for the sake of money or objects valued in money is more vicious. [841]

A boaster is constituted not by capability, but by choice. He is such in accordance with a habit, as is the case with the liar, who finds pleasure in lying itself, or the one who lies because he desires glory or profit. [843]

Therefore, people who boast for the sake of fame simulate qualities that win praise and admiration. Those who boast for the sake of gain pretend things more closely connected with profit and things whose absence is not clearly apparent. For this reason, many braggarts pretend to be doctors, soothsayers, or wise men, for the qualities mentioned are verified in them. [844]

Dissemblers, however, who say less than what is true, seem to be more gracious. For they apparently speak not to acquire gain, but to avoid offense and vanity. [846]

Some people especially deny qualities about themselves that bring renown, as Socrates did. Others who disclaim insignificant and obvious things are called “blato-panurgi,” or affected humbugs. They are readily despised, and at times, they seem guilty of ostentation, like the Spartans by their clothing. For this reason, excess and immoderate deficiency seem characteristic of the boastful. Still others who moderately employ dissimulation, even dissembling about things obvious and ready at hand, seem rather agreeable. [847]

As being more vicious, the boaster seems more opposed to the truthful man. [849]

831. Likewise, the mean opposed to boasting. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on the virtue possessing the mean in human actions in regard to amiability, he now treats a virtue called veracity, which possesses a mean in the same human actions.

About this, he does two things.

First, he explains his intention;

second, he defines his proposition, at the boaster simulates (1127a20; [835]).

He develops the first point in three ways.

First, he discloses that a certain virtue is a mean opposed to boasting.

Second, at it is not a loss (1127a14; [832]), he shows that we must treat this virtue.

Third, at we have already discussed (1127a17; [834]), he explains the difference between this and the preceding virtue.

He says first that the mean opposed to boasting treats about nearly the same subject as the previous virtue. The reason is that it is concerned with human actions, but not in relation to the same thing, since it does not regard pleasantness, but another topic to be discussed shortly [838]. As in the case of the previous virtue, this mean is also nameless.

832. Then, at it is not a loss (1127a14), he explains why it is necessary to investigate this virtue.

About this, he gives two reasons.

First, he says that it is not profitless to moral science to treat the virtues as we go along, but in fact useful. In this way, we will learn better what pertains to morals if, as we proceed, we treat the material pertaining to individual habits. The reason is that the science of moral matters is completed by a knowledge of particulars.

833. At observing what (1127a16), he presents the second reason. We shall be assured that the virtues are kinds of median states by seeing how this is the case in the individual virtues.

834. Next, at we have already (1127a17), he defines the difference between this and the preceding virtue. He states that we have already considered [816–30] the people who in some way give pleasure or pain in their association and conversation with others. But we must still discuss those people who are truthful or deceitful in their words and actions or who simulate these qualities by their deeds.

835. Then, at the boaster simulates (1127a20), he treats the virtues and vices.

First, he presents the virtue and the opposite vices;

second, at we will discuss both (1127a32; [838]), he investigates them.

He handles the first point from three aspects.

First, he shows what belongs to the mean and extremes in this matter.

Second, at each of these (1127a26; [836]), he explains how the things that were discussed pertain to the median habit and the extremes.

Third, at a lie is intrinsically (1127a28; [837]), he reveals that the mean habit is praiseworthy but the extremes are vicious.

He says first that the boaster, who sins by excess, pretends certain praiseworthy qualities, and this in two ways.

In one way, he pretends to have some distinctions that he does not possess.

In the other way, he claims distinctions greater than they really are.

But the person who sins by defect is called a dissembler, and this in two ways.

In one way, he denies some distinctions that he does possess.

In the other way he portrays them as being less than they are.

However, the man who possesses the mean is said to be “autocastos,” or admirable in himself, because he does not seek to be admired more than becomes him. He is also said to be “autophastos,” or essentially sincere, manifesting himself to be what he is. He is truthful, inasmuch as the things he divulges about himself are true. He does this not only by word but also by his manner of living, according as his exterior conduct and his speech conform to his nature.

836. At each of these (1127a26), he explains how these things pertain to the three specified habits, saying that each of the above-mentioned acts may happen in two ways.

In one way, it may be done for the sake of something else—for instance, a man denies that he is what he is because of fear.

In the other way, it may be done not for the sake of something else, but because he takes delight in the act itself. This property belongs to a habit, since everyone speaks, acts, and lives according to the quality of his habit. Of course, at times, he may act differently because something else arises.

837. Then, at a lie is intrinsically (1127a28), he discloses what deserves praise and what blame in the habits mentioned, saying that a lie is essentially evil and to be avoided, but truth is good and to be praised. Signs were instituted to represent things as they are. Therefore, if a person represents a thing otherwise than it is by lying, he acts in an inordinate and vicious manner. But, if he speaks the truth, he acts in an orderly and virtuous manner. Now, it is clear that the man who speaks the truth possesses the mean, because he designates a thing as it is. The truth consists in an equality that is a mean between great and small. But the person who lies stands in an extreme either by excess, because he affirms more than really is, or by defect, because less than really is. Hence, it is evident that both are blameworthy. But the boaster who sins by excess deserves more blame, since he departs farther from the truth; for the less, not the more, is found in the mean.

838. Next, at we will discuss both (1127a32), he investigates the previously mentioned habits:

first, he treats the virtue;

second, the opposite vices, at the person who boasts (1127b9; [841]).

He treats the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he determines what truthful person we are discussing.

Second, at such a man (1127b3; [839]), he shows what is especially characteristic of this person.

Third, at he turns aside (1127b7; [840), he explains to what extreme the person is more inclined.

He says first that we must talk about these habits, but first about the truthful man. However, we do not have in mind now the person who speaks the truth in judicial testimony, such as a witness who reveals the truth when questioned by a judge, nor the person who speaks the truth in any matter touching right—this pertains to another virtue, namely, justice. But we are directing our attention to that truthful man who manifests the truth in his life and conversation in matters not having distinction between justice and injustice. However, he manifests the truth only by reason of the disposition of the habit, as was said before about a previous virtue [821], that it aims at living pleasantly with others not by reason of love, but by reason of its habit. So, too, this virtue shows the truth not on account of the observance of justice, but on account of the inclination it has to manifest the truth.

839. At such a man (1127b3), Aristotle explains what particularly pertains to the truthful man we have in mind, saying he is one who apparently observes moderation in his actions, avoiding excess and defect. He loves truthfulness and tells the truth even where damage or profit is of little importance, and all the more in those things for which to say are true or false makes some difference in the harming or helping of another. The reason is that he hates a lie as something shameful in itself, and not only because it injures another. A person of this kind is to be commended.

840. Then, at he turns aside (1127b7), he explains to what extreme the truthful man more inclines, affirming that, since sometimes it is quite difficult to tell the exact truth, he wishes to lean toward understatement rather than overstatement. This seems to pertain more to prudence, since men tend to excess, and when speaking about themselves, they become tiresome to others. The reason for annoyance is that they seem in this to prefer themselves to others.

841. Next, at the person who boasts (1127b9), he examines the opposite vices.

He considers this point under three aspects.

First, he investigates the vice pertaining to excess;

second, the vice pertaining to defect, at dissemblers, however (1127b22; [846]);

third, the opposition of vices among themselves, at as being more vicious (1127b31; [849]).

He treats the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he shows in how many ways we may commit the vice of boasting, which is an extreme by excess.

Second, at a boaster is constituted (1127b14; [843]), he explains in what respect we may especially take into account the vice of boasting.

Third, at therefore, people who (1127b17; [844]), he shows in what things we may principally commit the vice of boasting.

842. He states first that sometimes a man says boastfully about himself things that are untrue or exaggerated not for some other purpose, but for the enjoyment he gets out of it. Such a man is said to have a semblance of evil; otherwise, he would not find pleasure in lying, for this arises from a disordered soul. However, he is not at all evil, since he does not intend any malice; he is only vain for taking pleasure in a thing that is really neither good nor useful.

In a second way, a person speaks boastfully about himself because he wants glory or honor. This person really ought not to be blamed, since glory and honor have a certain relationship to honorable things for which people are praised and honored.

In a third way, people brag about themselves for the sake of money or some other thing that can be valued in money. An individual belonging to this class is more vicious because he lies for an inferior good.

843. At a boaster is constituted (1127b14), he explains in what respect we may take boasting into account, saying that a man is not considered a boaster from the fact that he has or has not the capability, but from the fact that he chooses to boast. He is called a boaster according to the habit that this choice follows. It is the same with any liar who is such in choosing to lie, who finds pleasure in lying, or who lies out of his desire for fame or profit.

844. Then, at therefore, people who (1127b17), he explains the things that people usually boast about. Obviously, persons who find enjoyment in boasting boast indiscriminately. But those who boast for the sake of fame pretend things that seem worthy of praise, like virtuous works, or that have reference to good fortune, like the dignity of wealth and so on. Those, however, who boast for the sake of profit pretend things in which others find pleasure, otherwise it would profit them nothing. Again, when the things they boast about are not true, they take care that this fact can be hidden so their lie may not be discovered.

845. He takes an example from two fields:

first, from things belonging to medicine, since everyone wants health and no one can find out whether the doctor makes a mistake;

second, from divination, about which men are naturally solicitous and in which they cannot easily discover a lie.

For this reason, people who boast for profit especially pretend to be doctors or men wise in foretelling the future. Perhaps his use of the word “wise” can be referred to this, that these men boast that they have a a desirable or hidden knowledge of divine things.

846. Next, at dissemblers, however (1127b22), he considers the vice belonging to the defect.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he compares this vice with boasting;

second, he points out its difference, at some people especially (1127b25; [847]).

He says first that dissemblers, who minimize the truth about themselves, seem to have more pleasing ways than boasters, because they apparently do not speak this way for the sake of gain, but as if fleeing from vanity.

847. At some people especially (1127b25), he explains how this vice is practiced in different ways, saying there are some who especially deny about themselves things pertaining to great renown, such as when Socrates denied that he was wise.

There are others who want to show by certain insignificant and obvious things that they do not pretend more excellent things about themselves than they possess. Such are called “blatopanurgi,” men who have their delight in a certain cunning pretense. “Panurgi” is a Greek word for “cunning fellow,” while “blaton” means something done amusingly. These, he says, are readily despised because their pretense is too obvious. A defect of this nature in external things sometimes seems to pertain to boasting, when in this way they want to appear better and more observant of moderation, like the Spartans, who wore clothing humbler than became their state. For this reason, an excess and an immoderate deficiency in externals seem to pertain to boasting precisely because a certain singularity in a man is displayed in case of each.

848. Still others exercise this vice in a mitigated form, since neither do they altogether deny famous deeds done by themselves nor do they even attribute to themselves negligible qualities, practicing the vice in matters obvious and at hand. People like this seem to be pleasing, as was just said [846].

849. Then, at as being more vicious (1127b31), he considers the opposition between the vice and the virtue, saying that the boaster is more in opposition to the truthful man because more vicious, as we have already noted [837]. The worse vice is always more opposed to virtue.