Lecture 11 — Vices Opposed to Magnanimity

But the man who fails by defect is pusillanimous, and the man who fails by excess is conceited. These people, however, do not seem to be criminals, although they do sin. [784]

The pusillanimous person, although indeed worthy of excellent things, deprives himself of them. [785]

There seems something bad in such a man, because he does not consider himself deserving of good. Besides, he does not really know himself; otherwise, he would want the goods of which he is worthy. However, men of this kind are more lazy than stupid. [786]

This opinion [of themselves] seems to make them worse, for everybody strives after the things they deserve. But, thinking themselves unfitted, they forsake good works and undertakings, and even external goods. [787]

Conceited people are silly and obviously ignorant of their capability, for they set about those things to which honor is attached, and thereupon they are discredited. [788]

They adorn themselves with clothing and outward show and such like. They want these goods of fortune to be indicative of themselves. They even talk about themselves in order to receive honor from their conversation. [789]

But pusillanimity is more opposed to magnanimity than presumption is. As more opposed, it is also worse. Magnanimity, then, is concerned with great honor, as was said. [790]

784. But the man who fails by defect. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on magnanimity, he now begins to treat the opposite vices.

Here he does three things.

First, he determines what is common to each vice.

Second, he considers each in itself, at the pusillanimous person (1125a19; [785]).

Third, he compares the one vice with the other, at but pusillanimity (1125a32; [790]).

He says first that the man who falls short of the mean of magnanimity is called pusillanimous. But he who exceeds the mean is said to be conceited, that is, puffed up—what we call inflated or presumptuous. These persons are not said to be evil to the extent of being criminals, for they injure no one and do nothing disgraceful. However, they do sin in this: they depart from the mean of reason.

785. At the pusillanimous person (1125a19), he considers each vice:

first, that which is according to defect;

second, that according to excess, at conceited people (1125a27; [788]).

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he states the act proper to the pusillanimous man, saying that, although such a man is worthy of good things, he deprives himself of those he deserves by not attempting to work or obtain things due to him.

786. Second, at there seems (1125a20), he shows the cause of pusillanimity,

pointing out that, in this cause, three things must be taken by turns.

First, that a man deprives himself of goods he is deserving of happens from the fact that he does not think himself worthy of such goods, when in fact he is worthy.

This occurs because he is ignorant of his ability. If the pusillanimous man knew himself, he would strive for the things he deserves because they are good and desirable, since one’s own good is desirable to everyone.

Ignorance of this kind does not come from stupidity—for the stupid are not worthy of great things—but rather from a certain laziness by reason of which they are unwilling to engage in great things according to their dignity. This is the third source from which the other two arise.

787. Third, at this opinion (1125a24), he explains the effect of pusillanimity. A person’s opinion that he is unworthy of the goods he really deserves appears to make him worse. Individual men strive for the things befitting their own worth. Hence, when they are ignorant of their worth, they suffer a twofold damage to their goodness.

First, they abandon works of virtue and the pursuit of speculative truths, as if they were unfitted for and unequal to things of this kind. From this omission of great and good works, they become worse, since it is such actions that make men more virtuous.

Second, by reason of this opinion, they shirk certain external good works of which they are capable and that instrumentally serve for the performance of virtue.

788. Then, at conceited people (1125a27), he discusses the vice of excess.

About this he does two things.

First, he gives the cause of this vice, saying that the conceited or presumptuous are both stupid and ignorant of their ability not because of laziness, like the pusillanimous, but because of stupidity. This is obvious, because they attempt to do or attain certain honorable things utterly beyond their ability. So, when they fail in the action or accomplishment, they manifestly appear to be discredited.

789. Second, at they adorn themselves (1125a30), he introduces the act of this vice, which consists in a kind of external glorification, inasmuch as the presumptuous greatly exalt themselves.

First, they do this by certain external signs; that is, they wear elegant clothing and set off their figure by walking pompously. Likewise, they do other things to show their excellence in the external goods of fortune.

Second, they manifest things of this sort by words, as if wishing to achieve honor in this way.

790. At but pusillanimity (1125a32), he compares these two vices with one another, stating that pusillanimity is more opposed to magnanimity than conceit is.

He assigns two reasons for this.

The first reason, given in book 2 [368], is that vice, which occurs more frequently because of a stronger inclination of human nature toward it, is more opposed to virtue, whose chief purpose is to restrain man’s inclination to evil. But some men are obviously more inclined to be pusillanimous (that is, to omit the virtuous deeds possible to them) than to extend themselves in the performance of laudable feats beyond them. Hence, pusillanimity is more opposed to virtue.

The other reason is that pusillanimity is worse from the aspect of making men less virtuous, as was just stated [787]. But what is worse is more opposed to virtue. Therefore, it is evident that pusillanimity is more opposed to virtue.

791. He summarily concludes that magnanimity is concerned with great honor, as has been pointed out [346, 742–4, 750, 754].