Lecture 6 — Magnificence

It seems logical to pass now to the consideration of magnificence, which apparently is a certain virtue concerned with wealth. [707]

Unlike liberality, it does not embrace all expenditures of money, but only lavish ones. It is in wealth’s magnitude (as the name itself indicates) that magnificence exceeds liberality, although the amount expended is not out of proportion. [708]

But magnitude is a relative term, for the same expenditure is not fit for a captain of a trireme as for a leader of a solemn mission to Delphi; it is fitting according to the spender, the thing, and the purpose. [709]

The man, however, who spends small or moderate sums in a becoming manner is not called magnificent (such as if he makes frequent donations that, in the aggregate, are large); only he who gives on a grand scale. The magnificent man is indeed liberal, but one who is liberal and nothing more is not magnificent. [710]

In this matter, the habit of defect is called meanness, and that of excess is called “banausia” (ostentation); the name “apirocalia” (lack of taste) is given to all other such defects that are not excessive in the sums expended on the right projects, but in the wrong circumstances and with a certain vulgar display. We shall discuss these vices afterwards. [711]

A magnificent person is like a wise man, for he can judge rightly and spend great sums prudently. (As we said in the beginning, habit is determined by operations and is a product of them.) He makes great and dignified expenditures, and the effects are of a like nature. Thus, his expenses will be great, and also suited to the work. Therefore, the work must be worth the cost, and the cost equal to or in excess of the work. [712]

Things of this kind he spends for the sake of good, and this is common to virtues. [714]

Furthermore, he acts cheerfully and open-handedly, for closeness in reckoning is niggardly. [715]

He plans how the best and most splendid work may be achieved, rather than how he may acquire as much for a minimum cost. [716]

Likewise, the magnificent man is necessarily liberal, since the liberal person makes the right expenditures in the right manner; and it is in this that the greatness of the magnificent person lies—a greatness in these matters being a kind of grand liberality. [717]

Besides, for the same cost, he will produce a more magnificent work, for the perfection of possession and work does not reside in the same thing. But the perfect possession consists of what is most valued and honored, for example, gold. On the other hand, the perfect work consists of what is great and good, for consideration of it brings about admiration. And truly a magnificent work is a cause of admiration, and the perfection of the work, magnificence, resides in its magnitude. [718]

707. It seems logical to pass now. After the Philosopher has finished the study of liberality, he now begins to consider magnificence,

the treatment of which he divides into two parts.

In the first part, he treats the matter of magnificence and the opposite vices.

In the second, he explains in what manner magnificence and the opposite vices operate in their respective matter, at a magnificent person is like a wise man (1122a34; [712]).

On the first point he does two things.

First, he shows what the matter of magnificence is;

second, what the vices opposed to it are, at in this matter (1122a29; [711]).

To clarify the first division, he does three things.

First, he proposes the matter common to magnificence and liberality.

Second, he explains the difference between the two, at unlike liberality (1122a20; [708]).

Third, he proves his proposition, at the man, however (1122a26; [710]).

He says first that it seems appropriate that the treatise on magnificence should follow that on liberality. The reason is that magnificence, like liberality, is apparently a virtue concerned with wealth.

708. Then, at unlike liberality (1122a20), he explains the difference between the matter of magnificence and that of liberality.

He explains this point in a twofold manner.

First, he proposes the difference.

Second, he makes clear what he said, at but magnitude (1122a24; [709]).

Regarding the first, he mentions two differences.

The first is that liberality refers to all transactions concerned with money, namely, expenditures, receipts, and donations. But magnificence refers only to disbursements or expenditures.

The second difference is that, in disbursements or expenditures, magnificence exceeds liberality in the magnitude of the amount expended. Magnificence deals only in princely outlays, as the name implies, while liberality can be concerned also with moderate or excessive expenditures. Although magnitude indicates a kind of excess, we are not to understand that the magnificent person spends on such a grand scale that he exceeds the bounds of reason; his expenditures are made in amounts that are also in keeping with what is becoming. It is in keeping with both the one who spends and the projects on which the money is spent, as will be pointed out later [721–4].

709. Next, at but magnitude (1122a24), he explains what he said, namely, the manner in which the greatness of the expense is becoming to a magnificent person. Because the word “great” is predicated relatively, as stated in the Categories, (Categories 6.5b15.) it is said here that the greatness of the expenditure is judged in reference to something else, such as the thing for which the expenditures are made or the person spending. The reason is that the outlay considered large for a triarch (a commander of galleys having three rows of oars and called a trireme) is not the same as that considered large for a leader of a solemn enterprise, that is, the chief superintendent, like a master of a temple or a school. The expenditure must be suitable in comparison with the dispenser and the thing for which the money is spent. Likewise, the purpose for which the thing is used must be taken into consideration. Thus, if expenses are incurred for the building of a house, we must consider further for whom the house is intended, whether for a public official or a private person, because different expenditures are demanded for different purposes.

710. Then, at the man, however (1122a26), he proves his statement that great expenditure pertains to magnificence. The reason is that one who spends small or even moderate sums in a proper manner is not called magnificent. If he frequently makes many separate disbursements for trifling things such that all his expenditures taken together would make as great an amount as that which the magnificent man spends, he would still not be called magnificent, even though he disbursed these small sums promptly and generously. For, every magnificent person is liberal, but not every liberal person is magnificent.

711. At in this matter (1122a29), he shows what vices are contrary to magnificence. He says that the vice opposed to the habit of magnificence by defect is called “meanness”; but the vice by excess, “banausia” (ostentation)—from “baunos,” meaning “furnace,” since such men have the vice consume all their goods as in a furnace. If other terms of this kind exist, they come under the name “apirocalia” (lack of taste): offenders being, as it were, without experience of what is suitable because they do not know how to do the proper thing. Such names signify excess not because they surpass the magnificent person in the amount of disbursements on the right projects, but because they are excessive in going beyond right reason, spending great sums on the wrong things with a certain display. It is obvious from this that the mean and the extremes in moral virtues are not taken according to absolute quantity, but in relation to right reason. He adds that he will discuss these vices afterwards in this book [784–90].

712. Next, at a magnificent person (1122a34), he explains in what manner magnificence and the opposite vices are concerned with the previously mentioned matter.

First, he treats magnificence;

second, the opposite vices, at one who sins (1123a19;[732]).

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he assigns to the magnificent man certain qualities pertaining to the manner of spending.

Second, he shows on what objects the magnificent person makes expenditures, at magnificence belongs (1122b19).

In regard to the first, he attributes to the magnificent person six qualities.

The first is that he is like a wise man. The reason is that, as it belongs to a wise craftsman to know the proportion of one thing to another, so also it belongs to the magnificent man to know the proportion between expenditures and that for which the expenditures are made. In virtue of his habit, the magnificent man is able to judge what may be proper to spend. Thus, he will make grand disbursements in a prudent way because prudent operation is required for every moral virtue.

713. The Philosopher clarifies the statement by what was said in book 2 [322], that every habit is determined by the operations and objects of which it is the habit, because determined habits have their own proper operations and objects. Since the operations of magnificence are expenditures, and the objects of the operations are the things for which the expenditures are made, it is therefore the duty of the magnificent man to consider and expend large and handsome sums, which cannot be done without prudence. In this way, the vast outlay will be in keeping with the operation, such as the construction of a house or something of this sort.

So, then, the project on which the money is spent must be such that it is worthy of the cost or expense, and this ought to be worthy or in excess of the work. It is very difficult to attain the mean; hence, if a departure from the mean should occur, virtue always inclines to what has less evil, as the brave man to less fear and the liberal man to giving, and so the magnificent man to more spending.

714. He gives the second quality at things of this kind (1122b6), which is understood on the part of the end. The magnificent person, he says, consumes grand and proper amounts for an honorable good as for an end. Now, to work for a good is common to all the virtues.

715. At furthermore (1122b7), he presents the third consideration, saying that it is characteristic of the magnificent man to spend great sums cheerfully and with an open hand, dispensing them promptly and readily. The reason is that great caution in accounting or computing expenses pertains to illiberality.

716. He introduces the fourth quality at he plans (1122b8), affirming that the magnificent person plans how he may accomplish the best and most splendid work, rather than how he can spend the least in doing the desired work.

717. He enumerates the fifth quality at likewise, the magnificent (1122b10), when he says that one who is magnificent should be liberal. The reason is that the liberal person should make the right expenditures in the right manner. The magnificent man, too, acts in this way, for he makes outlays for great and noble achievements, as was just said [708]; and he does this cheerfully, generously, and for a good purpose. But it is characteristic of the magnificent person to do something on a grand scale touching this matter. In fact, magnificence is nothing other than a kind of magnified liberality concerning these things.

718. At besides, for the same cost (1122b13), he gives the sixth quality. He says that, although the magnificent person incurs great expense for some noble work, he produces a more magnificent work with equal expenditure. This is so because excellence (what is ultimate and best) is not the same in possession of money and in a work for which money is spent. Excellence (what is greatest and best) in possessions is found in the most valued object, gold, which men highly honor and prize. But excellence in a work is found in this, that a work is great and good, for the contemplation of such a work gives rise to admiration—and this is what magnificence does. So it is evident that the virtue of a work—that is, its greatest excellence—corresponds to magnificence involving expenditures on a large scale.