Lecture 13 — Meekness and Its Opposed Vices

Meekness is a kind of moderation concerned with anger. The mean in the strict sense being without a name (and the extremes nearly so), we refer to meekness as the mean, although it inclines to the defect, which is also nameless. However, the excess can be called irascibility. [800]

Anger is a passion arising from many and various causes. Hence, a man who is angry over the right things, with the right persons, and moreover in the right way, at the right time, and for the right interval is praised. He is a meek man. But if meekness is an object of praise, the meek man seeks to be undisturbed and not controlled by passion, but to be angry at the things and for the length of time that reason directs. [801]

However, he seems to sin more on the side of defect, for the meek person is not vindictive, but rather forgiving. [802]

But the defect—either a certain apathy or something of the kind—is censured, [803]

for a man seems to be foolish who does not get angry at the things he should in regard to the manner, the time, and the persons. Such a one appears neither to feel things nor to be pained at them. [804]

Moreover, he who does not get angry will not stand up for himself; [805]

and it is considered slavish to endure insults to oneself and to suffer one’s associates to be insulted. [806]

The excess can happen in all likely ways, for a man can be angry with the wrong people, at the wrong things, more than he should, more readily than he should, and for a longer time than he should. However, all these excesses do not belong to the same man, who certainly would not be able to survive, for evil that is complete destroys itself and would be unendurable. [807]

Those persons are hot-tempered who become angry too readily, with the wrong people, at the wrong things, and more than they should. They do quiet down quickly—a very commendable trait that belongs to them because they do not retain anger, but rather, in accord with their openness, retaliate in a flare-up of temper, and then become tranquil. But the irascible (acrocholi) are intense in their excess, and get angry on every occasion and at every turn. It is from this that the name is derived. [809]

However, the sullen are angry for a long time and are mollified with difficulty, for they do not relinquish their anger. But they are appeased when they have taken vengeance. The infliction of punishment calms the surge of anger and brings delight in place of sadness. When this is not done, they are glum because they do not externally express their anger, and no one can prevail upon them. In this case, time is needed to absorb the anger. Such persons are burdensome to themselves and especially to their friends. [810]

We call those persons ill-tempered who are angry at the wrong things, more than they should be, for too long a time, and who are not appeased until they inflict vengeance and punishment. [811]

Excess is more opposed to meekness, for it happens more frequently, since man is prone to take vengeance, and it makes the ill-tempered worse to live with. [812]

As was observed in previous discussions and made plain, it is not easy to determine how, at what, and how long one ought to be angry, or when one acts rightly or makes a mistake. Persons who transgress slightly, either in great or lesser things, are not blamed. In fact, sometimes we praise men as meek who are wanting in anger, or call those who abou in anger manly and competent to rule. However, it is not readily ascertainable by reason to what extent and in what manner a transgressor is blameworthy, for judgment is to be made according to sense perception in individual cases. [813]

But it is evident in these matters that the mean habit is praiseworthy according to which we are angry with the right people, about the right things, in the right manner, and so on in other circumstances. Likewise, it is evident that excess and defect are blameworthy, in such a way however that, if they are slight, they can be tolerated; if greater, then more blameworthy; and if very great, then very blameworthy. But obviously one must adhere to the mean habit. We have now discussed the habits concerned with anger. [814]

800. Meekness is a kind of moderation. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the virtues dealing with external goods, riches, and honors, he now considers meekness, which deals with the external evils that provoke people to anger.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he treats meekness and its opposed vices;

second, he answers an implied question, at as was observed (1126a31; [813]).

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he shows how the mean and the extreme are discovered for anger;

second, he discusses them, at anger is a passion (1125b30; [801]).

He says first that meekness is a certain mean for anger. However, in this matter, the mean taken in the proper sense has received no name. The same can almost be said about the extremes. since they are not distinguished by explicit names. The name “meekness” is taken to signify a mean, although the word implies a lack of anger. People are called meek because they are not violent, but as it were like domesticated animals who lose their irascibility. Even the disordered lack of anger has not been given a name. Someone is said to be meek who is not angry for any reason whatsoever, either good or bad. However, the excess is called rage or irascibility.

801. Then, at anger is a passion (1125b30), he treats meekness and the opposite vices.

And first he treats of meekness;

second, of the vices opposed to it, at but the defect (1126a3; [803]).

About the first, he does two things.

First, he explains what belongs to meekness as it is considered as a virtue;

second, what belongs to it according to the real meaning of the word, at however, he seems to sin (1126a1; [802]).

He says first that irascibility is considered the vice of the extreme because it implies an excess of anger, which is a passion arising from many and various causes. So, according to the diversity of these things, a mean and an extreme are found in anger. Consequently, the praiseworthy man is the one who is angry about the right things, at the right people, and in due moderation (since he is angry as he should be, when he should be, and as long as he should be). And this person is the meek man, if the word meekness is used as a compliment. This is the disposition of the meek man:

first, he is not disturbed internally in the judgment of reason by anger;

second, he is not led by anger in external choice, for reason determines the objects of anger and the length of time within which anger should react.

802. Next, at however, he seems to sin (1126a1), he explains, in accord with the true meaning of the word, the character of the meek man who (he says) seems to err more in this respect in approaching the defect. When we call a person meek, we signify that he is not inclined to punish but to forgive and remit punishments. This is a thing belonging to a lack of anger that is a desire for vengeance achieved by punishment.

803. At but the defect (1126a3), he treats the opposite vices:

first, he treats the vices of defect;

second, he treats those of excess, at the excess (1126a8; [807]);

third, he compares these two vices with one another, at excess is more opposed (1126a29; [812]).

He says that the defect of the mean in anger is censured, whether we call it “apathy” or any other name whatsoever.

804. Since the Stoics were of the opinion that all anger is censurable, he consequently shows that the defect of anger sometimes is censurable for three reasons.

He proposes the first reason at a man seems to be foolish (1126a4). Whatever indicates a lack of wisdom is blameworthy, because virtue is praised for working in accord with the right understanding of prudence. But for a man to fail to be angry at the things, in the manner, at the time, and with the persons with whom he should be angry seems to denote a lack of wisdom. It is evident that anger is caused by sadness. But sadness is a feeling of injury. If, then, someone fails to be angry at the things he should, he does not grieve for them, and so does not feel they are evil. This pertains to a lack of wisdom. Therefore, it is clear that a defect of anger is blameworthy.

805. He gives the second reason at moreover, he who does not get angry (1126a6). Anger is a desire for vengeance. Hence, one who is not angry at the things at which he should be accordingly does not punish the actions he ought to punish. This is blameworthy. However, this explanation is not to be understood as if another vengeance cannot be taken according to the judgment of the reason without anger, but as if the movement of anger stirred up by the judgment of the reason makes one more prompt to take vengeance in the right way. If the sensitive appetite did not help to carry out the judgment of the reason, it would be useless in human nature.

806. He introduces the third reason at and it is considered (1126a7), saying that only a cringing man suffers his household to be insulted and permits others to injure him without repelling the injury with due force. This follows from a defect of anger that renders a man slothful and remiss in warding off injury. Hence, it is evident that the defect of anger is blameworthy.

807. Then, at the excess can happen (1126a8), he treats the excess of anger.

First, he shows that this vice takes place in many ways;

second, he considers its species, at these persons are hot-tempered (1126a13; [809]).

He says first that excess of anger can occur according to all the circumstances. It happens that someone is angry with the wrong people and in the wrong things, that he is provoked too much and too easily angered, or that he is angry too long. However, all these excesses are not found in one man, both because of the trouble he himself would suffer from his own anger and also because, being burdensome to all, he could not live with others.

808. This is universally true of evil: if it were complete, it would destroy itself. It could not continue to exist in taking away the subject by which it must be sustained if it is to continue to be. What does not exist can hardly be called evil, because evil is a privation of good. But every being is good precisely as existing. Obviously then, evil does not take away good entirely, but some particular good of which evil is a privation. In such a way, blindness takes away sight but does not destroy the animal. If the animal were destroyed, blindness would cease to exist. Manifestly, then, evil cannot be complete, for in so taking away the good entirely, it would destroy itself.

809. Next, at those persons (1126a13), he presents three kinds of excess in anger.

The first is that of those called hot-tempered, those easily aroused to wrath, readily becoming angry with the wrong persons, and at the wrong things, and too vehemently. However, their anger does not last long but quickly subsides. This is very fortunate in a way for them that anger is not retained internally in their heart, but immediately bursts forth externally, because they either take vengeance at the time or show their anger in some other way by clear indications with a burst of temper. In this way, when their anger is expressed, they quiet down. So, also, heat that is shut up is kept at a higher degree, but when dispersed in vapor it disappears rather quickly. To this kind of anger the choleric seem disposed most readily by reason of the subtlety or speed of the bile. It is from this speed that excess is acquired by the irascible or acrocholi, that is, those excessive in anger—from “acros,” meaning extreme, and “cholos,” meaning anger, because they are intense and quick in anger.

810. He presents the second kind, at however, the sullen (1126a19), saying that some are called sullen whose anger is dispelled with difficulty and lasts a long time because they keep it pent up in their hearts. They cease to be angry only when they have satisfaction for the injury inflicted. Punishment calms the surge of passion when the previous sadness is replaced by delight, inasmuch as a man takes pleasure in vengeance. But if this does not happen—that is, if punishment is not inflicted—they are sorely grieved inwardly, since they do not show their anger. No one can persuade them to moderate this wrath that is not indulged. But the dissolution of anger requires a long time in which the fire of wrath may cool off gradually and be extinguished. Such persons who retain anger for a long time are a trial to themselves and especially their friends, with whom they cannot live pleasantly. For this reason, they are called sullen. To this kind of excess, the melancholic seem particularly inclined, because the influence received from the coarseness of the humor lasts a long time in them.

811. He introduces the third kind at we call those persons (1126a26), saying that some are called ill-tempered or morose who are angry at improper things, in an improper degree, or for an improper length of time and do not leave anger until they wreak vengeance on or punish those with whom they are angry. Indeed, their anger lasts long not because of a retention alone that can be dissolved in time, but because of a firm resolve to inflict punishment.

812. Then, at excess is more opposed (1126a29), he compares the things just treated with one another, stating that the excess of anger is more opposed to meekness than the defect is.

He proves this by two arguments.

First, it is the usual occurrence. Man is inclined more naturally to inflict punishment after suffering an injury to himself, while he is naturally inclined to meekness when he has not suffered any injury.

The second reason is that the excessive in anger are more difficult to live with, and to this extent are worse. Hence, they are more in opposition to the good of virtue.

813. Next, at as was observed (1126a31), he answers an implied question, namely, at what things and in what manner a man ought to be angry.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he affirms that this cannot be determined with certitude;

second, he states what is clear in this matter, at but it is evident (1126b4; [814]).

He says first that, as was observed in book 2 [379] and there made clear, it is not easy to determine in what manner one should be angry—that is, at things of what nature, for how long a time, and up to what point one acts correctly or errs in becoming angry. One who departs a little from the mean, either in great or small matters, is not blamed. In fact, at times we praise those who are somewhat deficient in anger and call them meek, but those who are a little excessive we call manly, as if able and qualified to rule by reason of their promptness for vengeance, which is appropriate to rulers. It is not easy to determine by reason the extent and kind of deviation from the mean for which a man should or should not be blamed. The reason is that judgment in this case depends on particulars and on sense perception, which is more an interior than an exterior evaluation.

814. At but it is evident (1126b4), he shows what is obvious in these matters, saying it is evident that the mean is praiseworthy according to which we are angry with the right persons, at the right things, and so on with regard to the other circumstances. Likewise, it is evident that excess and defect are blameworthy, in such a way however that, if they are slight, they can be tolerated; if they are greater, they are more blameworthy; and if very great, they are blameworthy in the highest degree. Hence, a man ought to draw himself toward the mean.

815. Last, he says in the epilogue that we have discussed the habits that deal with anger.