Lecture 9 — The Acts of Magnanimity

For the most part, the magnanimous man deals with honors and dishonors. [750]

He takes moderate delight in great and desirable honors, receiving good things as his own or less than his due. In his opinion, honor is not an appropriate tribute to perfect virtue, but still he accepts it from men who have nothing greater to bestow on him. [751]

Honors given him by transitory things and for insufficient reasons he values very little and as unworthy of him. [752]

He likewise counts of little value any dishonor that will be imputed to him unjustly. As we have said, then, the magnanimous man for the most part will be concerned with honors. [753]

Moreover, he will observe moderation about wealth, power, good fortune, and adversity, no matter what may happen. He will not be exalted by prosperity or cast down by misfortune, nor does he even regard honor as if it were a very great thing. Power and wealth should be desirable for the sake of honor; and those who possess them seek to be honored by reason of them. But a man to whom honor is a trifle will place little value on the other things. For this reason, the magnanimous seem to be disdainful. [754]

The goods of fortune seem to contribute something to magnanimity, for the noble, the powerful, and the rich are thought to be worthy of honor as possessing goods of great excellence. But anything that excels in goodness is held in greater honor. For this reason, such things make men more magnanimous, since they are honored by some people, but in fact the good or virtuous man alone is to be honored. However, he who possesses both (virtue and goods of fortune) becomes more worthy of honor. [756]

Men who possess goods of this kind without virtue are not justified in thinking themselves worthy of great things, nor are they rightly called magnanimous, for this supposes perfect virtue. But those having such things become evil by disdaining and harming others, since it is not easy to bear the goods of fortune with moderation. They are not able to endure good fortune gracefully, but thinking themselves more excellent, they look down on others, and do as they please. Although not similar to the magnanimous man, they imitate him in the way they can, not by acting according to virtue, but by disdaining others. The magnanimous person justly disdains and properly glorifies others, but many do not always act in this manner. [757]

750. For the most part, the magnanimous man. After the Philosopher has investigated the matter of magnanimity and the opposite vices, he now studies their acts and properties:

first, as touching magnanimity;

second, the opposite vices, at but the man who fails (1125a17; [784]).

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he shows how the magnanimous person should work on matter proper to him.

Second, he defines the traits of the magnanimous person, at the magnanimous man does not run risks foolishly (1124b6; [759]).

He explains the first point by a twofold procedure.

First, he shows how the magnanimous man should conduct himself toward honors, the matter of magnanimity;

second, toward other things, at moreover, he will (1124a13; [754]).

He treats the first in two ways.

First, he resumes the previous discussion [735–49] about the matter of magnanimity, reaffirming what was clear from the premises, that someone is called magnanimous especially and principally from the fact that he conducts himself well in regard to honors and the opposites, dishonors. The same virtue is concerned with opposites; fortitude, for instance, deals with fear and rashness.

751. Then, at he takes moderate delight (1124a5), he shows how the magnanimous man deals with matter of this kind.

First, he shows the nature and mode of this man’s reaction to great honors, saying that great and desirable honors bestowed on the magnanimous for virtuous activity are a source of moderate delight to them. A man might take inordinate pleasure in goods acquired because they come to him unexpectedly and value them far above their worth. But, when the magnanimous person acquires things, he looks upon them as goods peculiarly suitable to him and, besides, less than his due. He judges that no honor outwardly shown to men is a sufficient reward of virtue. The reason is that the good of reason, for which virtue is praised, exceeds all external goods. Nevertheless, he is not displeased because lesser honors are bestowed on him than he deserves. But he accepts them with equanimity, considering that men have nothing better to give him.

752. Second, at honors given him (1124a10), he sets forth the way in which the magnanimous person should regard trifling honors. If honors are given him by transitory things and for any other reason than virtue (for example, if he is extolled for riches or the like, or by some insignificant honors), he will despise such honors because he considers himself undeserving of this type of thing. It is not enough for the virtuous to be honored like the rich.

753. Last, at he likewise counts (1124a11), he explains in what manner the magnanimous man should deal with dishonor, saying that here also he shows moderation. As his mind is not exalted by great honors, so it is not cast down by insults that he considers imputed to him unjustly. Hence, it is obvious that the magnanimous person is especially praised in regard to honors.

754. Then, at moreover, he will observe (1124a13), he shows in what way the magnanimous person should deal with secondary matters such as riches and so forth.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he explains how the magnanimous man should act in regard to such objects;

second, how the objects benefit magnanimity, at the goods of fortune (1124a20; [756]).

He says first that, although the magnanimous person is concerned with honors principally, nevertheless secondarily he has to do with riches, power, and everything belonging to good fortune, inasmuch as someone is honored for these reasons. Likewise, he will show moderation about such things and about misfortune, whatever may be the turn of events, so that he will neither rejoice exceedingly in prosperity nor grieve unduly in adversity.

755. He proves the point by the argument given before [741–2] that the magnanimous man conducts himself with moderation in regard to honors, which are the greatest of all external goods. This is clear from the fact that both power and riches are desired for the sake of honor, according as men who have such things want to be honored for them. If, then, the magnanimous person thinks honor itself of little account, such that he does not rejoice in it exceedingly, for a greater reason he will judge the other things of small moment, so that he will not rejoice in them immoderately. As a consequence, some judge the magnanimous to be disdainful, since they despise external goods and value only the internal goods of virtue.

756. Next, at the goods of fortune (1124a20), he shows how external goods of fortune do confer something on magnanimity.

He explains first that they increase it when accompanying virtue;

second, that they cannot make a man magnanimous without virtue, at men who possess (1124a26; [757]).

He says that all external goods of fortune seem to add something to magnanimity, inasmuch as, for these very things, some are judged worthy of honor—namely, the noble, the powerful, and the rich. All such goods consist of a certain great excellence, just as the noble surpass the baseborn in excellence, and so on. Everything that is surpassing in goodness is honorable in a high degree, for honor is a kind of reverence due to a very excellent good. Since the magnanimous person is worthy of honor, such goods consequently make men more magnanimous accordingly as they are honored by some people who recognize only these goods. But, really, only the good or virtuous man should be honored, because honor is the proper reward for virtue. If someone should possess both at the same time—namely, virtue and the goods of fortune—he will become worthier of honor inasmuch as each matter is honorable. According to truth and opinion, even the goods of fortune are a help to virtuous operations after the manner of instruments.

757. Then, at men who possess (1124a26), he establishes that goods of fortune without virtue cannot make a man magnanimous. He says that those who have goods of this kind without virtue cannot rightly esteem themselves deserving of great honors. Hence, they are not correctly called magnanimous, because it cannot happen that a man deserves great things and is magnanimous without perfect virtue, as was pointed out before [749]. But, because of the excellence of external goods, men who lack virtue look down on others, do them injury, and fall into similar evils, since it is not easy without virtue for someone reasonably to bear the goods of fortune. To conduct oneself with moderation among the goods of fortune is a great work of virtue. Those who lack virtue cannot bear good fortune gracefully. Consequently, thinking themselves better absolutely, they despise those whom they exceed in riches. Since they do not consider that any excellence is acquired by virtue, they take no pains to do anything good, but do whatever comes to mind.

758. They want to imitate the magnanimous person, when in fact they are not like him. They imitate him in the way they can, not, I grant, in operating according to virtue—a thing the magnanimous man does especially—but in despising others, although not in the same way as he does. The magnanimous person justly despises the wicked and properly glorifies the virtuous. But many who are without virtue manifest disdain and honor indiscriminately; that is, they sometimes despise the virtuous and honor the wicked.