Lecture 14 — Amiability

Some men seem to be obsequious in association with others and in interchange of words and deeds. They praise everything for the sake of pleasantness and never contradict anyone, being of the opinion that unpleasantness ought to be avoided. [816]

Others, on the contrary, always find fault, taking care to emphasize anything unpleasant. They are called perverse and quarrelsome. [817]

These habits being reprehensible, obviously the mean habit is laudable—that habit according to which a person approves what he should and also disapproves what he should. [818]

This mean habit has not been given a name. [819]

But it has a remarkable resemblance to friendship, for the man who is disposed according to the mean habit is a man worthy of friendship, assuming that he loves us. [820]

However, since this virtue is without passion or affection for people with whom we associate, it differs from friendship. A man does not take particular things as becoming because he is influenced by love or hatred, but because he is disposed in this way. He will act similarly with strangers, intimates, and outsiders. [821]

Nevertheless, in particular cases, he does the proper thing; it is not becoming to treat intimates and strangers in the same way, nor similarly to show displeasure toward them. [822]

Therefore, as has been pointed out, he always communicates with others in an amiable manner. [823]

Considering it honorable and useful, he aims to cause no offense, and even to give pleasure, for he is concerned with pleasure and sadness, which occur in social intercourse. [824]

Any virtuous man of this type will refuse to give pleasure and will choose to cause pain over what is dishonorable and harmful to himself or to the person doing an injury or a great wrong. Although his opposition brings not a little offense, he will disregard it. [825]

He converses differently with persons in high places and with others, with friends, and with acquaintances. Likewise, according to other differences, he attributes what is becoming to each. [826]

He primarily strives to give pleasure and declines to inflict pain, considering that future events may be of greater importance. (I speak of what is honorable and useful.) But he will cause grief especially in a slight degree for the sake of a pleasure in a good that is to come. The mean, then, is of this nature, but is nameless. [827]

Of those who are agreeable, the man who aims at being pleasant without personal profit is called affable, but he who does so for money and things valued in terms of money is called a flatterer. [828]

But the individual who is a trial to everyone is called quarrelsome and perverse, as has been stated. [829]

However, the extremes seem to be mutually opposed, because the mean is nameless. [830]

816. Some men seem to be obsequious. After the Philosopher has considered virtues relating to external things, now he considers the virtues that relate to human actions.

First, he treats the serious actions;

second, the humorous actions, at since recreation should have a place (1127b33; [850]).

In the investigation of the serious actions, he examines pleasantness and veracity.

First, he investigates the virtue concerned with pleasantness and sadness arising from the serious actions of men;

second, the virtue concerned with veracity, at likewise, the mean opposed to boasting (1127a13; [831]).

He develops the first point in a twofold fashion.

First, he shows that a mean and extremes are found in regard to pleasantness and sadness in human acts;

second, he examines these, at this mean habit has not (1126b19; [819]).

He discusses the first from three aspects.

First, he presents the vice pertaining to the excess of pleasantness. He says that, in human conversation (by which men especially associate with one another according to a natural tendency) and generally in all human companionships (made possible by the fact that men communicate with one another in words and deeds), some seem to be obsequious, straining, as it were, to please men. Therefore, they praise everything that others say and do for the purpose of making themselves agreeable. They never contradict people for fear of giving offense, thinking they must live without causing pain to anyone.

817. Second, at others, on the contrary (1126b14), he introduces the vice that pertains to the defect in such matters. He states that people who are cross-grained wish to be contrary to everything said or done, as if trying to make others sad and taking care to emphasize anything that will make life unpleasant for others. These persons are called perverse or quarrelsome.

818. Third, at these habits (1126b16), he draws the conclusion that the mean is praiseworthy, saying that these habits, which consist in an extreme, are unworthy of praise. Obviously, then, the mean habit is worthy of praise—that habit by which a man accepts what others say or do or rightly rejects and contradicts it.

819. Next, at this mean habit (1126b19), he defines the previous matter.

And first, the mean;

second, the extremes, at of those who are (1127a7; [828]).

He handles the initial point in a twofold manner.

First, he treats the name of the mean habit;

second, its properties, at therefore, as has been pointed out (1126b28; [823]).

He considers the name under three headings.

First, he states that the mean habit has no name.

820. Second, at but it has (1126b20), he gives the habit a name from a resemblance to friendship. This virtue, he says, is very much like friendship, because there is an agreement in the external act that is especially proper to friendship, namely, to live amicably with friends. That person who is disposed according to the mean habit of this virtue conducts himself in agreeable association with others in a manner becoming to a friend whose friendship is moderated by reason—a thing that pertains to honorable friendship. Not every friendship is virtuous, as will be pointed out later [1574–7]. If the man who has this virtue should love those with whom he lives, his friendship will be entirely virtuous.

821. Third, at however, since (1126b22), he shows how this virtue differs from friendship.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he presents the difference;

second, rejects a false understanding of it, at nevertheless, in particular cases (1126b26; [822]).

He says first that, since this virtue is without love (which is a passion of the sensitive appetite) and without affection (which pertains to the intellective appetite) for those with whom we associate, it differs from true friendship. A man does not take the particular things said or done by others as becoming because he is influenced by hatred or love of them, but because he is disposed in this way by habit. This is proved by the fact that he observes the same not only with friends but generally with all acquaintances and strangers, intimates and outsiders. Liberality is like this. A friend gives gifts to his friends because he loves them; the liberal man, however, gives not because he loves, but because his nature is to spend money readily.

822. Then, at nevertheless, in particular cases (1126b26), he rejects a false understanding of these things. Since he just stated [821] that this virtue is practiced alike toward strangers and acquaintances, a man might consider this likeness as extending to everything. But the previously mentioned likeness must be taken as referring to this common characteristic, which is to live agreeably with others. There is a difference in regard to the special ways of living with others. The reason is that the virtue affects the proper actions in particular cases, for a person should not delight or displease intimates and outsiders in the same way.

823. At therefore, as has been (1126b28), he enumerates the five properties of this virtue.

The first is taken from the manner of communicating with others. As has been noted [821], one having this virtue always communicates with others in a becoming way.

824. At considering (1126b28), Aristotle gives the second property, which is understood on the part of the end, saying that one having this virtue aims at living with others without offense or even with pleasure. This end pertains to a good that is honorable and advantageous—that is, useful—because it is concerned with pleasure and sadness occurring in associations in which human companionship principally and fittingly consists. This is proper to men in contrast to animals who share food and the like in common.

825. At any virtuous man (1126b31), he introduces the third property, which is understood by comparison with pain, saying that the man who possesses this virtue sometimes refuses to give pleasure to another—in fact, he sometimes chooses to cause pain.

This may take place in two ways.

In one way, it can happen on his part, such as if a thing is not honorable to him, as when another uses indecent language; or if a thing is harmful to him, as when another injures him in word.

In the other way, it can happen on the part of the person he lives with. This person may say or do something pertaining to his own great disgrace, or he may be greatly harmed. By reason of the fact that he is contradicted, he is grieved to some extent. So the virtuous man will not take what is said by others, or if he does, he will nonetheless reprove them.

826. At he converses differently (1126b36), he introduces the fourth property, which is understood by comparison with different persons. He says that a virtuous man speaks and converses in different ways with persons in high places and with private persons, with friends and with acquaintances, and so on according to other distinctions of persons, ascribing to each individual what is appropriate.

827. At he primarily strives (1127a2), he presents the fifth property that is taken by comparison of pleasure with pain. He affirms that the virtuous man primarily strives to give pleasure and declines to inflict pain. However, he causes some grief at times, considering that future events will outweigh the existing affliction in what concerns decency and utility, or even a future important consideration, the evidence for which is provided by the present distress. He concludes that the mean habit is like this but is without a name, although we can call it affability.

828. Then, at of those who (1127a7), he defines the opposite vices.

About this, he does three things.

First, he treats the vice belonging to the excess of pleasantness. He says that the man who is immoderate in being pleasant—if he does not act for something else—is called obsequious. But if he acts to acquire money or any other thing computable in money, he is called a sycophant or a flatterer.

829. Second, at but the individual (1127a10), he refers to the opposite vice, saying that the individual who is a trial to everyone is called contentious and perverse, as has been stated previously [817].

830. Third, at however, the extremes (1127a11), he compares the two vices one with the other, saying that the extremes seem to be opposed to one another but not to the virtue, because the mean of the virtue is nameless.