Lecture 12 — The Virtue Concerned with Ordinary Honors

As we remarked in the beginning, there appears to be a virtue that deals with honor and that is compared to magnanimity as liberality is to magnificence. Neither of these virtues is in any way concerned with what is great, but both rightly dispose us in regard to mediocre and small things. [792]

Just as one can take and give small sums of money according to a mean, and also according to excess and defect, so too one can desire honor more or less than he ought, and also from the source he ought and as he ought. [793]

We blame the ambitious man because he desires honor inordinately and from the wrong sources. Likewise, we blame the unambitious man for not choosing to be honored even for the good that he does. On the other hand, it is a fact that we praise the ambitious person as noble and enamored of what is virtuous, but the unambitious person as moderate and temperate. We indicated this in our earlier discussion of the subject. [794]

Clearly, inasmuch as the term “lover of honor” (or “ambitious man”) has been used in different contexts, the expression does not always receive the same meaning. But we praise him as more concerned about honor than most people, and we blame him for desiring honor more than is right. [795]

Since the mean lacks a name, being abandoned, as it were, the extremes are not clearly distinguished. [796]

Now, where there is an excess and defect, there also is a mean. But people strive for honor more than is becoming and less than is becoming, hence also becomingly. [797]

Therefore, this unnamed habit as being a mean concerned with honor is praised. By comparison with ambition, it seems to be contempt of honor, but by comparison with lack of ambition, love of honor. But by comparison with each, the habit seems to be one as well as the other. This seems to be true in regard to other virtues also. [798]

However, here the extremes appear to be contradictory because the mean has no name. [799]

792. As we remarked in the beginning. After the Philosopher has concluded his study of magnanimity, which treats of honors on a grand scale, he now considers a certain unnamed virtue having to do with ordinary honors.

To explain it, he does three things.

First, he points out that such a virtue exists at times;

second, he proves his statement, at just as one can (1125b6; [793]);

third, he explains in what manner the mean and the extreme may be considered in this virtue, at since the mean lacks a name (1125b17; [796]).

He says first, as was stated in the second book [346–8], that there appears to be a virtue concerned with this, namely honor. That virtue seems to be related to magnanimity as liberality is to magnificence. Both these virtues (namely, liberality and the virtue under consideration) are separated from magnificence and magnanimity as from something great. The reason is that magnanimity deals with great honors and magnificence with great expenditures. But the two virtues, liberality and the virtue under consideration, dispose us in regard to small and mediocre things, either honors or riches.

793. Then, at just as one can (1125b6), he proves his statement:

first, by reasoning from similarity;

second, by the general manner of speaking, at we blame the ambitious man (1125b8; [794]).

He says that, in taking and giving of small or ordinary sums of money, there is a mean—and also an excess and defect—as was said before [679, 710–11]. Likewise, in the desire for small or mediocre honors, it happens that a man strives more or less than he ought, or for improper reasons, inasmuch as one desires to be honored for more or greater things than he ought and another for fewer and lesser things. Likewise, it happens that a man strives to be honored rightly in all things. So, clearly there is reason to hold for a mean of virtue and extremes of vice in small or mediocre honors, as in smaller sums of money.

794. Next, at we blame the ambitious man (1125b8), he explains his proposition by an ordinary use of words.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he indicates the ordinary manner of usage;

second, he argues from this to the proposition, at clearly, inasmuch (1125b14; [795])

He says first that sometimes we blame the ambitious man, that is, the lover of honor, for desiring honor more than he ought and from an improper source. Likewise, we blame at times the unambitious person for not wanting to do those good actions by reason of which he would be honored. On the other hand, we praise at times one who is a lover of honor as being manly or having a noble soul, and as a lover of the good, namely, virtuous action, to which honor is due. Again, we praise occasionally a man who does not love honor—as it were regulating and ruling himself—such that he does not exceed his ability, as was stated in book 2 [345–8].

795. At clearly, inasmuch (1125b14), he draws a conclusion from this manner of speaking, saying that at times we praise and then again blame the lover of honor. But it is obvious that one is called a lover of honor in various senses, and for this reason, we do not praise and blame him for the same thing. But we praise the lover of honor according as he is more concerned than the general run of people for the things pertaining to honor. We blame him, however, inasmuch as he desires honors more than is proper. The same line of reasoning applies to one who does not love honor. Consequently, the mean in this matter is praiseworthy according as honor and desire for honor are valued at their true worth. However, the extremes are blameworthy insofar as one desires more than he ought or less than he ought.

796. Next, at since the mean (1125b17), he treats the mean and the extreme of this virtue.

On this point, he does two things:

first, he shows the uncertainty occurring here;

second, the consequences of that uncertainty, at however, here the extremes (1125b24; [799]).

He discusses the first point under three headings.

First, he indicates the uncertainty with the observation that, since the mean concerned with desire for honor has no name—and so, because of this lack, appears as if passed over—the extremes do not seem consequently to be clearly drawn, inasmuch as they are sometimes praised, sometimes blamed.

797. Then, at now, where there is (1125b18), he explains what the truth is concerning mean and extremes. He says that, whenever we find an excess and defect, there also we must find a mean. Therefore, since some strive for honor both more and less than they ought, it follows that some strive as they ought—which belongs to the notion of a true mean.

798. Finally, at therefore, this unnamed habit (1125b20), he shows the basis for this uncertainty. Because there is reason to accept a mean in regard to honors, the habit of the medium is praised. Likewise, because unnamed, it is designated by the names of extremes, since by a comparison with one of the extremes it seems to have a likeness to the other extreme. By comparison with excessive love of honor, the medium appears to have contempt of honor; but by comparison with contempt of honor, love of honor; by comparison with each, it appears to be one as well as the other in some way. This is evident also in other virtues, for the brave man seems reckless by comparison with the timid man but timid by comparison with the reckless man. So, then, in our proposition, the extremes considered in themselves are censured, but as attributed to the mean, they are praised.

799. Then, at however, here (1125b24), he explains how it follows from this uncertainty that the extremes of vice appear to be opposed only to each other, and not to the virtuous mean, because it has no name.