Lecture 2 — Doubts Concerning Continence

Someone can raise a doubt as to how a man who judges correctly is incontinent. [1310]

Certain philosophers, therefore, say this is not possible for a man with knowledge. It is strange, as Socrates thought, that something else should control and enslave a man’s knowledge. Indeed, Socrates defended this line of reasoning so completely that, for him, incontinence did not exist, for he maintained that no one rightly judging does anything but the best, except out of ignorance. [1313]

This teaching of Socrates casts doubt on much that is clearly evident. So it will be best to examine passion and, if man sins only through ignorance, the kind of ignorance operating here. Obviously, before the onslaught of passion, an incontinent man knows he ought not to do what he actually does. [1314]

Some accept one saying of Socrates and reject another. They admit that nothing is more powerful than knowledge, but they do not admit that man can do nothing other than what he thinks is better. For this reason, they say that the incontinent man, who is overcome by lust, does not have knowledge, but only opinion. [1315]

But if it is opinion and not knowledge, nor a strong supposition tending to the contrary, but an ineffective belief held by people who are uncertain, it deserves tolerance, for a man does not adhere to weak opinions in the fact of vigorous concupiscence. However, tolerance is not extended either to vice or to any other of the censurable dispositions. [1316]

Therefore, he has prudence contending against desire, and prudence is the strongest of opinions. [1317]

This, however, is unreasonable, for a man will be prudent and incontinent at the same time. But no one will maintain that it pertains to a prudent man willingly to perform the basest acts. [1318]

In this connection, it was explained previously that a prudent man not only is concerned with ultimates but also has the other virtues. [1319]

Besides, if the continent man is so called from the fact that he has vehement evil desires, the temperate man will not be continent, nor the continent man temperate; for one who is completely temperate does not have evil desires. However, it is necessary for the continent man to have evil desires, for if his desires are good, the habit forbidding him to follow them is evil. Therefore, not every kind of continence is desirable. But, if the desires are weak and not evil, then to be continent is not something worthy of respect; if they are weak and evil, [to resist them] will not be remarkable either. [1320]

Moreover, if continence makes a man hold all opinions, then a kind of continence can be evil, if the opinions are also false. [1321]

Likewise, if incontinence disposes a man to abandon any and every opinion, it will follow that a kind of incontinence is desirable. Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes is an example of this. For, he is to be praised for not retaining the opinion of which he had been persuaded by Ulysses, because lying saddened him. [1322]

Further, the sophistic argument is a cause of doubt. Some men want to argue to indubitable conclusions so that they may appear wise when they attain them, but the syllogism they devised gives rise to doubt. As a result, the mind remains in suspense, since it does not want to admit the conclusion because it is not acceptable, but neither can it rest in the opposite conclusion, because it is not able to solve the argument. [1323]

It would appear from this, then, that imprudence joined with incontinence is a virtue. That a man performs actions contrary to what he judges is due to incontinence. But he judges that good actions are bad and ought not to be done. Therefore, he will be doing good and not bad actions. [1324]

Furthermore, the man who pursues pleasures from persuasion and personal choice will appear better than one who acts from incontinence rather than reasoning. The persuaded man is more corrigible because he can be dissuaded. On the other hand, to the incontinent man is applicable the proverb “When water chokes, what can we drink?” If a person performs evil actions because of conviction, he will cease from them when dissuaded; but the incontinent person will do them notwithstanding. [1325]

In addition, if continence and incontinence are concerned with all dispositions, who will be continent without qualification? No one really has all the species of incontinence, but we do say that some are absolutely incontinent. [1326]

Such, then, are the doubts occurring in this matter; some of them should be solved and some allowed to remain, for the solution of a doubt is found in the truth. [1327]

1310. Someone can raise a doubt as to how a man. After the Philosopher has stated the conclusions that seem probable concerning continence and incontinence, he now brings up doubts about all that he has said, although not in the same order in which he has presented them. In fact, he proposed the doubts in that order in which they first fall under consideration.

But on any subject, a man first considers the general aspect—for example, whether it is good or bad.

Second, he considers the peculiar nature of the thing.

Third, he considers its operation.

Fourth, he compares it to other things with which it agrees.

Fifth, he compares it with those things from which it differs.

Finally, he considers its external surroundings.

1311. But, in presenting the doubts, he first submits what is more doubtful. So, then, contrary to these six considerations, he places six doubts.

The first doubt concerns the third probable statement about the act of the continent and the incontinent man.

Second, at therefore, he has prudence (1146a4; [1317]), he places the second doubt, which is concerned with the fifth probable statement, which referred to a comparison with prudence.

The third doubt, at besides, if the continent (1146a9; [1320]), deals with the fourth probable statement, which relates to a comparison with temperance.

The fourth doubt, at moreover, if continence (1146a16; [1321]), concerns the second probable statement, which had to do with the definition of continence and incontinence.

The fifth doubt, at furthermore, the man who (1146a31; [1325]), is concerned with the first probable statement, which treated the goodness and badness of continence and incontinence.

The sixth doubt, at in addition, if continence (1146b2; [1326]), regards the sixth probable statement dealing with the matter of continence and incontinence.

1312. About the first, he does two things.

First, he proposes the doubt. On this, he remarks that someone can doubt how a man who judges correctly is incontinent in doing the contrary.

1313. Then, at certain philosophers (1145b22), he pursues the doubt.

First, he objects to one part.

Second, at this teaching (1145b27; [1314]), he objects to the other part.

Third, at some accept (1145b31; [1315]), he rejects the solution of certain philosophers.

He says first that some hold that it is impossible for a man to be incontinent when he judges correctly as a result of knowledge, because the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Since, then, knowledge is a very powerful principle in man, it seems difficult that, with knowledge present, something other would command knowledge and drag it along as a slave, although reason—of which knowledge is a perfection—should rather be in control and command the sensitive part as a slave (so the objection runs). This was the argument of Socrates. So rigidly did Socrates follow his own argument that incontinence might seem impossible. Indeed, he thought that no one who judges correctly does anything except what is best, but that all sin occurs through ignorance.

1314. Next, at this teaching (1145b27), he objects on the contrary that Socrates’ doctrine on this point calls into question matters that are evident. Obviously some people do what they know is wrong. If they really sin through ignorance, which happens while they are under passion’s influence, whether concupiscence or anger, an investigation of the kind of ignorance involved is highly desirable. Obviously, before passion supervenes, the incontinent man does not judge that he should do what he later actually does in the heat of passion.

1315. At some accept (1145b31), he rejects the solution of certain philosophers.

First, he proposes their solution: some accept Socrates’ saying that knowledge is not influenced but reject his saying that the only cause of sin is ignorance. They admit nothing can conquer knowledge, as being better and more powerful. However, they do not admit that man can do nothing other than what he thinks is better. Consequently, their position is that the incontinent person overcome by sensual pleasures does not have knowledge, but opinion.

1316. Second, at but if it is opinion (1145b36), he rejects this solution by saying that such an incontinent person has either a firm or a weak opinion. If firm, then the same argument seems valid for it and for knowledge, because we do not adhere to one less than to the other—more on this later [1337]. On the other hand, if the opinion against concupiscence is not firm, but irresolute, or remiss and weak, happening to people who are dubious, it seems this should not be imputed as a fault, but rather deserves tolerance. The reason is that, in the face of vigorous concupiscence, a man does not cling to opinions feebly held. However, tolerance is not extended to vice or to any of the other censurable dispositions. Incontinence is one of these, but fault is not entirely imputed to it.

1317. Next, at therefore, he has (1146a4), he raises a doubt about the comparison of continence to prudence, which was the fifth probable statement.

First, he objects to one part, concluding from the premises that a man can be incontinent although he has prudence directing him to virtue. If the incontinent man has an opinion contending against evil desires—and the opinion is not weak, since in this way they would not be charged as a fault—it remains, then, that he has a strong opinion maintaining the contrary. But prudence is the strongest of opinions. Therefore, the incontinent person in a special way has prudence contending contrary to desire.

1318. Second, at this, however (1146a5), he shows that this argument is not tenable for two reasons.

First, according to these lines of thought, it will follow that a man may be prudent and incontinent at the same time. This seems impossible, for no one holds that to perform the basest actions willingly is an act of prudence. It was noted previously in book 6 [1173] that a person who voluntarily sins in the matter of prudence is more blameworthy.

1319. He presents the second reason at in this connection (1146a7). It was explained previously [1208–12] that the prudent man not only is cognizant that a particular is an ultimate—that is, has a correct evaluation of individual practicables that he called ultimates in book 6 [1214]—but also has the other virtues, namely, the moral, as was likewise indicated in the sixth book 6 [1172]. Consequently, it does not seem possible for any prudent person to act contrary to the virtues.

1320. After this, at besides, if the continent man (1146a9), he gives advice on the comparison between continence and temperance, which was the fourth probable statement. To make this clear, he must discuss three other observations he has made.

The first is that a man is called continent from the fact that he has vehement evil desires and, notwithstanding these, is not led astray contrary to reason. If this is true, the temperate man will not be continent, nor the continent man temperate, for the man who is completely temperate does not have evil desires in any vehemence. So, to have vehement evil desires is inconsistent with being temperate. However, once the preceding supposition is made, it would be necessary that the temperate man have evil desires if he were continent.

The second of the three is that the continent man may have not evil desires, but good ones. This being the case, it would follow that whatever habit forbids the pursuit of these is evil. But such a habit is continence. Therefore, not every kind of continence is desirable.

The third of the three is that the desires the continent man has might not be vehement, but weak and feeble. Then, if the desires are evil, to be continent will be worthy of beither respect nor praise; if they are evil and nevertheless weak, it will not be remarkable to resist them. Yet continence is looked upon as something great and worthy of respect. Therefore, something unreasonable seems to follow whatever one of the three positions be maintained.

1321. Then, at moreover, if continence (1146a16), he raises a doubt about the very definition of continence, which was the second probable statement.

First, he presents a difficulty about the nature of continence, as stated above [1306]: the continent person is also the man who lives by reason. He says that, if continence makes a man embrace every opinion, that is, persuades him to abide by every opinion and not depart from any, it will follow that some kind of continence is evil, for an opinion can be false. And it is good to reject such a view. Hence, it is evil to be governed by it, although continence should be praised as something good.

1322. Second, at likewise, if (1146a18), he makes three objections to the notion of incontinence he has already given [1306], namely, that the incontinent man is inclined to abandon reason.

The first is that, if incontinence abandons every opinion or reason, it will follow that some kind of incontinence is good; nevertheless, incontinence should always be censured as an evil thing. This is so because a conjectural reason may prompt the doing of an evil action, which it is good to avoid. He gives an illustration. The poet Sophocles narrates that Neoptolemus, who fought in the Trojan war, was persuaded by Ulysses to lie to Philoctetes for a reason that seemed honorable. Afterwards, however, he did not retain the opinion, of which he had been persuaded, because lying was grievous and painful to him; in this, there is something praiseworthy.

1323. He presents the second objection, at further, the sophistic (1146a21), stating that the sophistic argument, because misleading (that is, concluding falsely), is itself a doubt, or rather a cause of doubt. The explanation is that the sophists, in order to appear wise, want to infer indubitable conclusions. But, when they succeed by argument, the syllogism they devise causes doubt. For, the mind of the hearer remains in suspense, since, on the one hand, the mind does not wish to abide by what reason infers, because the conclusion is not acceptable, and on the other hand, it cannot proceed to the opposite because it does not have the solution of the argument within its power. Nevertheless, the mind is not to be blamed because it did not abide by the reasoning that it did not know how to resolve. Therefore, it does not seem there is incontinence in abandoning any reason whatsoever.

1324. He gives the third objection at it would appear (1146a27). If to abandon any reason whatever is incontinent, it follows from this argument that imprudence joined to incontinence is a virtue. Thus, virtue will be composed of two vices, which is impossible; and it seems that what was said will follow, that incontinence is the reason why someone performs actions contrary to his judgment. But the judgment he makes—that good actions are bad and that he ought not to do them—is the fruit of imprudence. Hence, it will follow that he performs good and not evil actions, which seems to belong to virtue.

1325. Then, at furthermore, he who does evil (1146a31), he raises a doubt about the goodness and badness of continence and incontinence. It seems that one who performs evil actions because he is persuaded they are good and consequently pursues and chooses pleasures as good in themselves (as the intemperate man does) is better than another who performs evil actions, not because of reasoning by which he is deceived, but because of incontinence. The man who has been persuaded seems to be more corrigible, because he can easily be dissuaded from his present view. But the incontinent man does not seem to be helped by any good advice. Nay, he seems rather to be indicated in the proverb that, if water, whose drinking refreshes the thirsty, chokes the drinker, what can he drink? In a similar way, if a man performs evil actions as a result of conviction or deception, he will cease to do them when dissuaded, that is, when the persuasion is withdrawn, as thirst ceases when a drink of water is taken. But, in the present case, the counselled incontinent man even believes some actions are right, and notwithstanding does different things. Hence, the good water of advice does not help, but chokes him.

1326. At in addition, if incontinence (1146b2), he raises a doubt about the matter of continence and incontinence, which was the sixth probable statement. He affirms that, if continence and incontinence concern not only concupiscence but also anger, wealth, and everything of this kind, he will be unable to determine who is incontinent without qualification. Indeed, no one can be found who will have all the varieties of incontinence. But we do say that some are absolutely incontinent. Therefore, the assertion previously made [1225] that continence and incontinence concern everything does not seem to be true.

1327. Last, at such then (1146b6), he sums up in conclusion by indicating that such are the doubts occurring in the matter under discussion. We must solve some of these doubts by showing that they tend to falsehood; others we can leave, inasmuch as they are quasi-conclusions. When we find the truth about a doubtful point, then we have a genuine solution to a doubt.