Lecture 5 — Kinds of Pleasure

Of natural pleasures, some are delightful to every taste, others to different classes of men and animals. But of the pleasures that are not natural, some become delightful because of sickness or privations, others because of customs or vicious natures. And to each of these pleasures there will be a corresponding habit. [1368]

I call bestial the pleasure of the man who is said to have slit pregnant women so he could devour the fetuses, or of anyone who delights in the brutish practices ascribed to certain savages near the Black Sea (some of whom eat raw meat, others human flesh, or one another’s children at their feasts), or Phalaris, according to what is related of him. Men delighting in such pleasures are like beasts. [1372]

But some people become bestial because of particular ailments, for example, insanity. Laboring under this affliction, one man sacrificed his mother and ate her, another murdered his fellow slave and ate his liver. These persons are pathological. [1373]

Others become bestial because of habit, such as certain men who take pleasure in plucking out their hair, biting their nails, eating coal and earth, and having sexual intercourse with males. People act in these ways from the condition of their bodily temperament, or from usage to which they have become accustomed since childhood. [1374]

No one would accuse of incontinence those in whom nature is the cause of these pleasures, as is the case with women who do not govern their emotions, but are governed by them. The same, too, may be said of people who are morbid because of bad habits. [1375]

To experience desires for these pleasures exceeds the limits of human vice, as brutishness was said to do. [1377]

If anyone has the desires and overcomes them or is overcome by them, he is not called continent or incontinent simply, but in virtue of a resemblance. It was in this way that we spoke about one having the passion of anger, namely, that he must be called incontinent in part. [1378]

Every excess of vice—for example, folly, timidity, intemperance, and harshness—is either brutish or caused by sickness. [1379]

Someone who is so inclined by nature that he fears everything, even the squeak of a mouse, has the timidity of a dumb beast; and the individual who was afraid of a ferret had a pathological condition. [1380]

Certain silly people are irrational by nature and, living according to the senses, become brutish like the barbarous tribes of distant regions. Others are irrational because of sickness like epilepsy or insanity and are silly by reason of disease. [1381]

Sometimes a man may experience these passions but not be overcome, such as if Phalaris had kept a boy, desiring to use him for food or unseemly sexual pleasure. At other times a man may not only experience the passions but be overcome by them. [1382]

Just as vice that is according to the human mode is called vice without qualification but that which is described as brutish or pathological is termed vice only in the qualified sense, so we may speak in the same way of incontinence in the limited sense, either brutish or pathological, or incontinence according to the human mode only, in the unqualified sense. [1383]

It is obvious, then, that only [unqualified] continence and incontinence treat the matters dealt with by temperance and intemperance, and that a different kind of incontinence in a transferred sense is concerned with other matters, and not the absolute incontinence. [1384]

1368. Of natural pleasures, some are delightful. After the Philosopher has explained that a man is called continent and incontinent in different ways according to the different human passions and pleasures, he here explains that a man is said to be continent or incontinent in different senses according as his passions and pleasures are human or brutish.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows among the different kinds of passion and pleasure which are human and which brutish.

Second, at no one would (1148b31; [1375]), he shows how continence and incontinence are attributed in a different sense to these (passions and pleasures).

He develops the first point in two stages.

First, he distinguishes pleasures.

Second, at I call bestial (1148b19; [1372]), he clarifies his statement by examples.

He says first that some pleasures are according to nature, while others are not; and each group is subdivided.

1369. Of the pleasures that are natural, some are delightful to every creature with senses—for example, sweetness is naturally pleasing to all who have the sense of taste. Others are naturally delightful to certain classes of animals and men. Some foods are by their nature pleasant to carnivorous animals, others to herbivorous animals. Likewise, among men, cold foods that moderate the temperament are delightful to the choleric, but warm foods are agreeable to the phlegmatic.

1370. Of the unnatural pleasures, some become delightful because of privation, that is, on account of some supervenient sickness of the body or sadness of soul by which the nature is changed into a different condition. Others become delightful because of an evil habit that brings about a quasi nature. Still others become delightful because of vicious natures, as happens when people have corrupt and perverse bodily temperaments; and accordingly, both the perceptions of their imagination and the affections of their sensitive appetite are most perverse. Likewise, since these powers are acts of bodily organs, they are necessarily proportionate to the temperament of the body.

1371. Because habits are diversified by a complete distinction of objects, corresponding habits will answer to these individual pleasures under discussion; thus some habits will be natural and others unnatural.

1372. Next, at I call bestial the pleasure (1148b19), he exemplifies individually the different kinds of unnatural pleasures.

First, those that are delightful because of the malignant nature of men who are, so to speak, bestial, since they are like beasts by reason of a corrupt temperament. There is a story about one man who slit the wombs of pregnant women so he could devour the fetuses. Equally horrible are those who delight in practices of the kind reported of certain savages living in the forest near the Black Sea. Some eat raw meat, others human flesh; still others offer one another their children to be food for their feasts. Similar things are narrated about one Phalaris, a most cruel tyrant, who took pleasure in torturing men. Therefore, people who delight in deeds of this kind are, as it were, like beasts.

1373. Second, at but some people (1148b25), he exemplifies things that become delightful and are contrary to nature because of particular ailments, such as insanity or madness or something of this sort. There is a story about one man who, on becoming insane, sacrificed his mother and ate her; still another who murdered his fellow slave and ate his liver.

1374. Third, at others become (1148b27), he offers examples of things contrary to nature that become delightful by reason of habit. Some enjoy unnatural pleasures because of mental unbalance or habitual perversion. For example, certain men, out of habit, take pleasure in pulling out their hair, biting their nails, eating coal and earth, and having sexual intercourse with males. All the preceding can be reduced to two classes. Some people do because of the tendency of bodily temperament that they had from the beginning, and others they do because of habit, becoming accustomed to things of this kind from childhood. Such people are like individuals who fall into this condition by reason of physical sickness, for evil habit is a kind of psychological sickness.

1375. Then, at no one would (1148b31), he shows that these unnatural pleasures do not dispose to incontinence simply, but only in a qualified sense.

He does this in two ways:

first, by a reason taken from the disposition of those who enjoy the pleasures;

second, by a reason taken from the nature of the pleasures, at to experience (1148b34; [1377]).

He says first that no one will accuse of unqualified incontinence men whose bestial nature is the reason for such pleasures. We have already said [1350] that dumb animals are not referred to as continent or incontinent, since they exercise no universal judgment, but only imagination and memory of particulars. But these men who are like wild beasts by reason of a malignant nature do indeed have some universal perception, although very little, reason in them being weighed down by bad temperament, as is obviously the case with those physically sick. But what is very little seems to be as nothing. Nor is it likely that the force of a weak argument should repel strong desires. Consequently, these individuals are not called incontinent or continent simply, but only in a restricted sense, insofar as some judgment of reason remains with them.

1376. He offers the example of women in whom, for the most part, reason flourishes very little because of the imperfect nature of their body. Because of this, they do not govern their emotions in the majority of cases by reason, but rather are governed by their emotions. Hence, wise and brave women are rarely found, and so women cannot be called continent and incontinent without qualification. The same argument seems valid for those who are ill, those who have a diseased temperament because of a bad habit that oppresses the judgment of reason after the manner of a perverse nature.

1377. Next, at to experience (1148b34), he shows from the very nature of unnatural pleasures that there is no incontinence in the unqualified sense, but only in a limited sense.

First, he states his proposition;

second, at every excess of vice (1149a4; [1379]), he explains it.

First, he proposes two things.

The first is that to experience desires for these pleasures exceeds the limits of human vice, as was previously said also about brutishness [1296, 1299].

1378. The second he proposes at if anyone (1149a1), saying that, if anyone should have these desires and overcome them, he will be called continent not simply but by reason of some resemblance to virtuous restraint. Or if he should be overcome by them, he will be called incontinent not simply but by way of a resemblance to complete incontinence. In this fashion, we spoke before on incontinence in regard to anger [1367].

1379. At every excess of vice (1149a4), he explains his statement.

First, he does so in regard to vice;

second, at sometimes a man (1149a12; [1382]), in regard to continence and incontinence.

On the first point, we must consider that such an excess of vice can concern vices opposed to all virtues, such as folly opposed to prudence, timidity opposed to fortitude, intemperance opposed to temperance, and harshness opposed to gentleness; and it can concern each one of the vices, for some of them are brutish habits arising from a malignant nature, while others are diseased habits arising from physical or psychological sickness, such as a bad habit. Since he has already given examples of intemperance and harshness, he now first exemplifies timidity.

1380. He does this at someone (1149a7), saying that temperament may be so timid as to make some afraid of anything, even the squeak of a mouse. This is the timidity of a dumb animal. One man became so fearful from a pathological condition that he was afraid of a ferret.

1381. Then, at certain silly people (1149a9), he gives examples of the folly of some individuals irrational by nature, not because they have no reason, but in fact very little, and this much concerned with particulars perceived by sense, such that they live only according to the senses. Such individuals are—so to speak—brutish by nature. This happens especially to barbarians living at the ends of the earth, where the bodies of the natives are likewise unhealthy from unhealthiness of the climate, impeding the use of reason. Other people become irrational because of some sickness like epilepsy or insanity, and these are stupid because of disease.

1382. Next, at sometimes a man (1149a12), he explains his statement in regard to incontinence.

First, he explains in what way continence and incontinence resemble the preceding vices. He remarks that a man may at times experience something of these unnatural passions and not be overcome by them, and this looks like continence. This would be the case if the tyrant Phalaris should keep a boy, wanting to use him either for food or unnatural pleasure, but nevertheless actually would not use him. At other times, a man may not only experience desires of this kind but also be overcome by them; this resembles incontinence.

1383. Second, at just as vice (1149a16), he shows that is no complete continence or incontinence in matters of this sort there. He says that, just as vice according to the human mode is called unqualified vice while that which is humanly unnatural is called brutish or pathological vice, and not in the unqualified sense, so in the same way, incontinence that is unnatural is predicated with some limitation, like bestial or pathological, but only incontinence according to the human mode is called unqualified incontinence.

1384. Finally, in summary, he concludes that it is evident from our discussion that only unqualified continence and incontinence treat those matters dealt with by temperance and intemperance, while some kind of incontinence predicated in a transferred way rather than in the absolute way is concerned with other matters.