Lecture 14 — Physical Pleasures

In the matter of physical pleasures, there are those who maintain that good ones are especially worthy of choice but that others, those in which a man becomes intemperate, are not so. [1516]

Why, then, are the opposite pains evil? For good is contrary to evil. [1517]

Either they are good inasmuch as they are necessary, because what is not evil is good, or they are good up to a certain point. The reason would seem to be that, if, in such habits and activities, there is not an excess of what is good, neither is such pleasure excessive. But, if this excess is present in the habits or activities, it will also be present in the pleasure. Now, a superabundance of what is good can exist in bodily goods. Moreover, a man is described as evil for pursuing not necessary goods, but an excess of them. Indeed, everybody enjoys food, wine, and sex, but not always as they should. However, it is the opposite in regard to pain, for everybody shuns not merely its excess, but absolutely all of it. In fact, pain is not opposed to the excess of physical pleasures, except to the man who pursues this excess. [1518]

Not only must the truth be explained, but the cause of error must also be exposed. This strengthens conviction; for, when it is carefully shown why the untruth seems to be true, the truth becomes more acceptable. Therefore, we must show why bodily pleasures seem more desirable. [1522]

The first reason is they drive away pain; and, since pleasure is a remedy against the excesses of pain, men seek abundant pleasures, and in general bodily pleasures. These seem vehement inasmuch as they are remedies, and for this reason are avidly sought because they appear better when placed alongside their contrary. [1523]

Likewise, it seems that pleasure is not something good for these two reasons, as has been said. First, some pleasures are naturally evil and follow from evil actions; these are desirable to certain beings either from birth—for example, dumb animals—or from habituation, like the pleasures of evil men. Second, other bodily pleasures are remedies for some defect. Now, it is better to be perfect than in the process of becoming perfect. But pleasures of this kind are taken by those who are being perfected. Therefore, they are good only incidentally. [1525]

Moreover, because bodily pleasures are vehement, they are sought by those incapable of enjoying others. Consequently, such men stimulate for themselves a thirst for these pleasures. Since people of this sort do not have other pleasures for recreation, it is not blameworthy for them to enjoy those that are not harmful; but it is wrong if the pleasures are harmful. [1528]

Certainly men encounter pain in most matters on account of nature. In fact, sensitive nature continually is afflicted, as statements of natural scientists indicate. Some even hold that hearing and seeing cause pain, and they further say we have gotten used to it. [1529]

In like manner, on account of their growth, young men are in a state similar to that of intoxicated people, and youth is exhilarating. [1531]

But the melancholic have a continual need of a restorative because of their nature, for their body incessantly undergoes a kind of corrosion due to their temperament. For this reason, they are always urged by strong desire; for pleasure drives out both the opposite pain and any other when the pleasure is intense. As a result, the melancholic frequently become intemperate and depraved. [1532]

On the other hand, pleasures that are without an opposite pain do not have an excess, for they are concerned with things that are pleasurable naturally and not incidentally. And I call those things incidentally pleasurable that are curative. The reason is that, when a cure is wrought by the action of the part that remains healthy, the activity then seems pleasurable. But those things naturally pleasurable produce an activity proper to this nature. [1533]

However, the same object is not always pleasurable to man, because our nature is not simple, but comprises more than one element, with the result that we are perishable beings. Therefore, if one element is active, this may be unnatural to the other. But when a balance is struck, the activity seems neither distressing nor pleasurable. [1534]

Therefore, if the nature of a pleasing thing is simple, the action itself will always be most delightful. Hence, God always rejoices in one simple pleasure, for activity exists not only in motion but also in immobility, and pleasure is found more in rest than in movement. [1535]

But change is the most delightful of all things, as the poet says. [Yet this happens] because of some defect. Just as a man readily changes because he is evil, so does nature, for it is neither simple nor completely good. We have discussed continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, the nature of each, and how some of these may be good and others bad. We must now go on to the discussion of friendship. [1536]

1516. In the matter of physical pleasures. After this general consideration of pleasure and pain, the Philosopher now treats in particular those pleasures with which continence and incontinence are concerned.

He discusses this point in a threefold manner.

First, he makes a statement of his intention.

Second, at why, then (1154a10; [1517]), he manifests some hesitancy.

Third, at however, the same (1154b15; [1534]), he gives his reason for some general observations on pleasures.

He says first that, after our discussions on pleasure in general [1473–1515], we must turn our attention also to bodily pleasures to say that some pleasures are especially worthy of choice, those which are naturally good. But bodily pleasures by reason of which a man becomes intemperate are not of this kind.

1517. Then, at why, then (1154a10), he raises a doubt about previous statements.

First, stating the doubt;

second, at either they are (1154a11; [1518]), resolving it;

third, at **not only **(1154a13; [1522]), he gives the argument for his position.

On the first point, we should consider that, in order to prove that pleasure is a good, the Philosopher previously [1498–99] argued from the evil of pain. Now, because he has said that bodily pleasures are not good, he uses the same argument as an objection. For, if good is contrary to evil, a doubt remains—from the fact that bodily pleasures are said not to be good— as to why the opposite pains are evil.

1518. Next, at either they are (1154a11), he gives a twofold solution to the objection.

First, he says that bodily pleasures are good in some manner, inasmuch as they are necessary to drive away the opposing pains. The reason is that, at least in this way, anything that is not evil by its nature can be called good.

1519. He gives the second solution at or they are (1154a11), saying that bodily pleasures certainly are good, not absolutely but up to this, that is, up to a certain point. And he gives the reason for this, saying that every pleasure follows some habit and movement or activity.

Hence, it is necessary that, if there cannot be in the habits and movements or activities a superabundance of the better—that is, an excess above the good—then neither can there be an excess in the pleasure that follows. Thus, there cannot be an excess of the good in that activity that is contemplation of the truth, for the more a man contemplates the truth, the better he is. Therefore, the pleasure that follows is good absolutely, and not only to a degree. But, if there is an excess of what is good in the habits or activities, so too will there be in the pleasure that follows. Now it is evident that there can be too much of a good thing in the physical area.

1520. Some indication of the fact is in this: a man is said to be bad because he wants these goods excessively even though he may injure nobody. However, he is not evil by his desire and delight in bodily goods, for everyone enjoys food, wine, and sex to some degree; on the contrary, some people are blamed for not enjoying pleasures as they should. From this, it is obvious that bodily pleasure is good up to a certain point, but its excess is bad.

1521. Pain works out in the opposite way, for the man of virtue flees not just its excess, but absolutely all pain. Pain, then, is not the contrary to excessive physical pleasure; if it were, no one would be grieved except for the maximum departure from excessive pleasure. If this were the case, pain would not be so much something to be shunned, as something to be somewhat tolerated. But the real situation is this: pain is connected with those pursuing excessive pleasure. And this happens precisely because such people are grieved by the least lack of pleasures. So it is that, as excessive physical pleasures are bad, so also is pain.

1522. At not only (1154a13), he presents his argument for the preceding statements.

First, he states his position.

Second, at the first reason (1154a22; [1523]), he gives the actual argument.

First, he says that not only must the solution to the difficulty be given, but the reason for the error in the objection must be found. This is a great help in establishing the credibility of the truth; for, when the reason why the untruth seems to be true is exposed, the student more readily accepts the truth. This is the reason we must discuss why bodily pleasures seem to the majority more desirable than other pleasures, when nevertheless these other pleasures are absolutely good while bodily pleasures are so only to a certain degree.

1523. Then, at the first reason (1154a22), he gives the actual argument.

First, he tells us just why bodily pleasures seem more desirable.

Second, at on the other hand (1154b11; [1533]), he presents an argument to show that other pleasures are in reality more desirable.

For the first point, he offers two arguments,

the second of which is given at moreover, because (1154a31; [1528]).

On the first argument he performs two operations.

First, he gives the reason why bodily pleasures seem more desirable.

Second, at likewise, it seems (1154a26; [1525]), he assigns the reason why bodily pleasures do not seem universally good.

He says at the outset that the first reason why physical pleasures seem to be more desirable is that they drive out pain and, by their very intensity, are a remedy for pain. Indeed, pain is not eliminated by every kind of pleasure but by vehement pleasure. For this reason, men seek abundant bodily pleasure to which pain is opposed. But there is no pain opposed to intellectual pleasure—like that found in contemplation—because it is not in an imperfect but a perfect state.

1524. From the very fact that bodily pleasures are remedies for pain, they seem to be vehement, as they are measured not only by their nature but even by the contrary that they banish. Consequently, they are avidly sought because they look better when placed beside their contrary, for drinking seems much more important to the thirsty. This is why people who want the pleasure of drinking stimulate their thirst by eating salty foods, thus getting more pleasure in the drink.

1525. Next, at likewise, it seems (1154a26), he points out why these pleasures may not seem universally good. He says that, on account of bodily pleasure—as was previously noted [1512]—it seemed to some people that pleasure was not a good. The explanation is that there are two kinds of bodily pleasures. Some are naturally evil, resulting from evil activities, and are desirable to certain beings as soon as they are born (for example, dumb animals and brutish men), but to others from habituation, like the pleasures of depraved men. Other bodily pleasures, however, are remedies for some defect.

1526. An indication of this is that they belong only to someone in need. A man does not enjoy food when he is not hungry. Clearly, then, the pleasure of food is a remedy for the distress of hunger. Obviously it is better for someone to be already perfect than to be in the process of becoming perfect. But pleasures of this kind, which we call medicinal, are taken by those who are being perfected but not by those who are already perfect. They are indulged in because a need of nature is satisfied through what is taken. So, then, it is clear that they are good not intrinsically, but incidentally, inasmuch as they are necessary for something.

1527. He has already touched on these two arguments in two previous solutions [1510–11]. Surely those pleasures that are involved in evil actions exceed the proper measure. Since, then, physical pleasures are not in themselves good, however more desirable they seem, some thought pleasures are universally not good.

1528. At moreover, because (1154a31), he gives the second reason.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he presents the reason.

Second, at certainly men (1154b2; [1529]), he explains something that he had taken for granted.

He says first that, since bodily pleasures are vehement, they are sought by those who cannot enjoy other pleasures, by those who, since they know nothing of intellectual delights, incline only to physical pleasures. Consequently, people artificially arouse in themselves a thirst for such pleasures, on their own volition stimulating themselves to their desires. Remember [1524] those who eat salty foods to induce thirst for drink. Therefore, since such people do not have other pleasures for recreation, for them to enjoy such pleasures is not too bad, providing they do not hurt themselves or others. But if the pleasures are harmful they will be wrong and reprehensible; obviously so in adultery and poisonous food.

1529. Next, at certainly men (1154b2), he assigns the reason for something he had taken for granted, that all men need some pleasure for recreation.

First, he gives the kind of reason that applies to all in general;

second, at in like manner (1154b6; [1531]), a reason applicable to young men;

third, at but the melancholic (1154b9; [1532]), a reason applicable to the melancholic.

He says first that it is not to be considered a fault for some people to enjoy bodily pleasures when they do not have others, because they need pleasures as a remedy for pain. Men encounter pain in many matters on account of natural movements and activities. In fact sensitive nature is always under tension while at work, and work is wearisome, as the statements of the natural scientists attest.

1530. Some say that continual seeing and hearing cause pain inasmuch as they cause strain; because of this, an animal needs the relaxation of sleep, as is explained in De somno et vigilia. (De somno and vigilia 1.454a26–33; see Aquinas In de som., lec. 2.) But we are unaware of this sort of hurt because we are accustomed to endure it continually. However, even though seeing and hearing naturally fatigue and strain the bodily organs, nevertheless they give physical pleasure by reason of sense knowledge.

1531. Then, at in like manner (1154b6), he tells why young men especially need pleasure. Because of their growth, young men have many disturbances of spirits and humors, such as occur in intoxicated persons. So, on account of activity of this sort, young men especially seek pleasure.

1532. At but the melancholic (1154b9), he assigns the reason on the part of the depressed. He says that the melancholic, by reason of their natural disposition, have a continual need of a remedy for pain because their body undergoes a kind of corrosion due to dryness of temperament. Hence, they have a vehement desire for pleasure as a means of dispelling this pain, for pleasure drives out not only the opposite pain—the pleasure of food banishes the pain of hunger—but, if the pleasure is intense, it sometimes drives out other pain. The reason is that it is contrary to all pain according to genus, but not according to species. And because the melancholic vehemently desire pleasures, as a result, they frequently become intemperate and depraved.

1533. Next, at on the other hand (1154b11), he gives the reason why intellectual pleasures are really better. He says that such pleasures lack an opposite pain that they drive out; they have, consequently, no excess to render them vicious. These pleasures deal with things that are pleasurable according to their nature, and not incidentally.

Here he explains two things.

First, the nature of what is incidentally pleasurable. He asserts that those things are pleasurable incidentally that give pleasure inasmuch as they are curative. The reason is that, when a man obtains a cure, it happens that a healthy condition is brought about and the activity seems pleasurable. Hence, when pleasures of this kind are sought outside the need for a remedy, they are immoderate.

Subsequently, he explains that those things are naturally pleasurable that produce an activity of this nature, for the activity proper to a nature, since it is its perfection, is pleasurable to every nature. For this reason, the activity of the intellect is pleasurable to man.

1534. Then, at however, the same (1154b15), he assigns the reason for two observations on human pleasures.

The first observation is that the same object is not always pleasurable to man. He says that the reason is that our nature is not simple, but composite, and is changeable from one thing to another inasmuch as it is subject to deterioration. For this reason, if man performs an action pleasurable to him according to one element, this pleasure is unnatural to him according to a different element. Thus, contemplation is natural to man by reason of his intellect, but beyond the natural scope of the powers of imagination, which try to take an active part in the work of contemplation. Therefore, contemplation is not always delightful to man. It is the same with the taking of food, which is natural to a man who needs it but not natural to a body already surfeited. But when a man approaches the opposite condition, then what was pleasurable in his previous condition seems to be neither distressing, because the opposite condition has not yet been reached, nor still pleasurable, since the other condition has now almost been passed.

1535. From this he concludes, at therefore, if (1154b20), that, if the nature of any being that is capable of delight were simple and unchangeable, the same action would be most delightful for it. Thus, if man were only intellect, he would always take pleasure in contemplating. Hence, since God is simple and unchangeable, he rejoices always in one simple pleasure that he takes in the contemplation of himself; for the activity that produces pleasure consists not in motion alone, but even in immobility, as is evident in the activity of the intellect. That pleasure that is without motion is greater than pleasure with motion, because what is in motion is on the way to being, but what is at rest has complete being, as is obvious from previous discussions [1523].

1536. At but change (1154b24), he gives the reason for the second observation on pleasure, that change is most delightful to men according to the saying of a certain poet. Aristotle adds that this happens because of some evil or defect of nature that is not capable of remaining in the same condition. Just as it is with an evil man who is easily changed and does not have his mind fixed on one thing, so it is with a nature that needs change because it is neither simple nor completely good; for motion is the act of what is imperfect, as is stated in Physics 3. (Physics 3.2.201b27–202a2; see Aquinas, In III phys., lec. 3, n. 296.)

1537. He concludes in summary that in book 7, he has discussed continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, the nature of each of these subjects, and how they may be good or bad. Therefore, he must now go on to a discussion of friendship. Thus he completes the teaching of book 7.