Lecture 9 — The Continent and the Obstinate Man

Can a man be called continent who abides by any principle whatsoever and by any choice whatsoever? Or can only he be called continent who abides by right principle and choice? Can a man be called incontinent who does not abide by any principle or choice whatsoever? Can he be called incontinent who does not abide by a principle that is false and by a choice that is wrong—a point that was previously discussed? [1435]

A man who abides or does not abide by any principle at all is called continent or incontinent only incidentally; but a man who abides or does not abide by a true principle and a correct choice is said to be absolutely continent or incontinent. Certainly, if someone chooses and pursues this for the sake of that, he essentially chooses and pursues the latter but incidentally the former. But what is essential we predicate in an absolute sense. Therefore, he who adheres to any opinion whatsoever is continent or incontinent in some way; but he who adheres or does not adhere to a true opinion is called continent or incontinent in the complete sense. [1437]

Some people, however, are tenacious in their opinions; they are called obstinate because they are difficult to convince, and once convinced, do not easily change. [1440]

They resemble the continent as the spendthrift resembles the generous man, and the rash the courageous man. [1441]

But they differ in many respects, for the continent man is not changed by the passion of sensual desire, because he is easily convinced by a reason offered and remains continent. On the contrary, the obstinate man is not changed by reason, because such people follow passion and are often led from reason by pleasures. [1442]

The word “obstinacy” refers to the headstrong, since these people are both undisciplined and rude. Opinionated by pleasure and pain, they are glad to win an argument and to remain convinced in their opinion. But they grieve if their judgments seem weak and only opinions. Therefore, they bear more resemblance to the incontinent than the continent man. [1444]

There are others who do not stand by the things that seem good, but not because of incontinence. Thus, in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, Neoptolemus did not abide by what seemed good although he did this by reason of a pleasure that was good, for telling the truth was pleasing to him. He had been persuaded by Odysseus to lie. Surely not everyone who does something for pleasure is intemperate or evil or incontinent, but only he who acts for shameful pleasure. [1445]

Sometimes a man is disposed to enjoy bodily pleasures less than he ought, not abiding by the judgment of reason. Hence, between such a person and the incontinent man there is a mean, the continent man. The idea here is that the incontinent man forsakes reason by enjoying physical pleasures too much but the other by enjoying them too little. But the continent man adheres to reason and is not diverted by either extreme. [1446]

Since, indeed, continence is something good, the two contrary habits are evil, as is obvious. [1448]

Because one extreme rarely happens and is not so evident, it seems that, just as temperance is opposed only to intemperance, so in the same way, continence is opposed to incontinence. [1449]

Since language is often used in a metaphorical sense, we have come to speak metaphorically of the continence of the temperate man. [1451]

Indeed, the continent man has the ability to do nothing against principle for the sake of carnal pleasures. And the temperate man has the same ability. [1452]

But the first has evil desires while the other, the temperate man, does not; and the second is so disposed that he does not take pleasure contrary to reason. But the continent man is disposed to take pleasure, although he is not seduced by passion. [1453]

Although the incontinent and the intemperate man do resemble one another, they nevertheless are different. Both seek bodily pleasures; but the intemperate man thinks he should pursue them, while the incontinent man does not. [1454]

1435. Can a man be called continent. After the Philosopher has settled the question of the existence of continence and incontinence and has explained their objects, he now settles the question of the precise species of continence.

About this, he does two things.

First, he discusses in what sense the continent man abides by every principle and the incontinent man forsakes every principle. Thus, the fourth difficulty [1321] against his second probable argument is solved.

Second, at nor can the same man (1152a6; [1455]), he raises the question of a prudent person being incontinent. By this he solves the second difficulty raised against the fifth probable statement.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows how continence is related to the right principle, which is understood as abiding by reason.

Second, at sometimes a man (1151b23; [1446]), he shows how continence is related to the general nature of virtue, which consists in following a middle course.

He develops the first point in a threefold manner.

1436. First, he shows to what principle the continent man laudably adheres and from what principle the incontinent man blamably departs.

Second, at some people, however (1151b4; [1440]), he shows how some men wrongly hold to a principle.

Third, at there are others (1151b17; [1445]), he shows how others commendably forsake a principle.

There are two considerations of the first point.

First, he raises the question whether a man who abides by any principle whatsoever, either true or false, or by any choice whatsoever (1151a29), either good or bad, may be called continent, or whether only he who abides by the right principle and choice is called continent.

There is a similar question: whether a man who does not abide by any principle or choice at all may be called incontinent, or only the one who does not abide by a right principle or choice.

Or the question can be framed in this way: can a man who does not abide by a wrong principle or choice be called incontinent, as was stated in the preceding difficulties?

1437. Second, at a man who abides (1151a33; [1437]), he solves the question raised, saying that a man who abides or does not abide by any principle at all is said to be continent or incontinent incidentally, but a man who does or does not abide by a true principle and a correct choice is said to be continent or incontinent essentially speaking. He explains it in this way. If someone chooses or pursues—that is, acquires this for the sake of or instead of that, for example, if he chooses gall in place of honey because he thinks it is honey from the resemblance in color—it is obvious that, speaking formally, he really chooses and seeks a different thing, namely, honey. But incidentally he chooses what is harmful, that which he chooses instead, namely, gall.

1438. The supporting argument runs this way. In desirable things, that to which the intention of the agent is referred is essentially desired. Good, insofar as it is known, is the proper object of the appetitive faculty. But that which is beside the intention is only incidentally desired. Hence, the man who means to choose honey and chooses gall instead is essentially choosing honey but only incidentally gall. Therefore, there may be people considering a false argument as true; for example, someone believing as true this statement: “It is good to commit fornication.” If, then, he sticks by this false conclusion, really believing it to be true, he is essentially standing by a true reason, but incidentally by a false reason. He intended to abide by a true reason. This same argument holds for the continent man who departs from a false reason that he considers to be true.

1439. So, it is evident that a man is essentially continent (or incontinent) who adheres (or does not adhere) to a true reason but incidentally to a false reason. Now, what is essential is predicated absolutely, but what is incidental we predicate in a limited way. Consequently, he who adheres to any opinion whatsoever, even a false one, is called continent or incontinent in some measure; but he who adheres or does not adhere to a true reason or opinion is called continent or incontinent in the absolute sense.

1440. Then, at some people, however (1151b4), he shows how some men wrongly hold to a principle.

First, he identifies them.

Second, at they resemble (1151b6; [1441]), he shows how such people compare with the continent man.

Third, at but they differ (1151b8; [1442]), he shows the difference.

Fourth, at the word "obstinacy" (1151b12; [1444]), he shows how they compare with the incontinent man.

He says first that there are some who unreasonably stand by their own opinion. These are the people called ischyrognomones—that is, opinionated or obstinate—because it is hard to persuade them of anything. And if they have been convinced of something, they are not easily changed from that opinion. This seems to happen especially to the melancholic. who admit a thing reluctantly but hold to what they do accept with great firmness.

1441. At they resemble (1151b6), he compares these obstinate persons to the continent man. He says that they apparently have some likeness to the continent because they have in excess what the continent have, just as the spendthrift resembles a generous soul and the rash are like the self-reliant or brave. Such people maintain their opinion more than they should, but the continent man as he should.

1442. Second, at but they differ (1151b8), he points out the many differences of the obstinate from the continent. For evidence of this, we must consider that a person’s opinion can be changed in two ways.

In one way, it can changes on the part of reason itself, such as when a better reason follows.

In the other way, opinion can change on the part of passion perverting the judgment of the reason, particularly in an individual practical case.

1443. This, then, is the difference, that the continent man is not changed from his principle by the passion of sensual desire, but nevertheless, when it is expedient, he will be rightly convinced when presented with another and better reason. Consequently, he is to be praised, because he is not overcome by sensual desire, but by reason. But the other, the obstinate, is not changed from opinion by a new reason, but rather follows passion. And many obstinate persons are seduced by pleasures outside reason. They, then, are censurable in this way because they are overcome by passion rather than prevailed upon by reason.

1444. Next, at the word (1151b12), he shows what relation the obstinate have to the incontinent man. Those called obstinate, he says, are also known as idiognomones, that is, self-opinionated or headstrong men. They are undisciplined because, unwilling to be taught by anyone, they are rude in this way; always wanting to follow their own view, they cannot adjust to others. So they are opinionated in their excessive quest for pleasure and avoidance of pain. They are glad when they triumph in conversation with others, that is, if they are not changed from their opinion by some argument. They are grieved if their judgments or opinions seem so weak that it is necessary to abandon them. Now, it is proper to the incontinent and effeminate man to desire pleasures and to avoid pains excessively. Obviously, then, the obstinate are more like the incontinent than the continent man.

1445. At there are others (1151b17), he shows in what way some commendably forsake a principle. He says that there are still others who do not abide by the things that seem good to them, not from incontinence, but from a love of virtue. Thus, in Sophocles’ drama on Philoctetes, Neoptolemus did not adhere to the things seeming good to him, not from incontinence, because he had done what he did for pleasure that was not really bad but rather good. He was seeking a good in a sense, in speaking the truth, and this was pleasing to him. But he had been persuaded by Ulysses to tell a lie for the good of his country; he did not keep his resolution out of love for the truth. This did not make him guilty of incontinence. For, not everyone who acts for pleasure is intemperate and evil or incontinent, but only those who yield to shameful pleasure.

1446. Then, at sometimes a man (1151b23), he shows how continence is related to the notion of virtue, to which it pertains to follow the mean.

On this point he does two things.

First, he shows that continence like temperance consists in a mean.

Second, at since language is (1151b32; [1451]), he shows that continence, because of its similarity, is sometimes called temperance.

He discusses this initial point under three aspects.

First, he shows in what things continence is a mean, saying that occasionally someone enjoys physical pleasures less than he should, not for a virtuous purpose, but out of disgust. This state is not in accord with a correct and reasonable judgment thath indicates some necessity for these pleasures. The incontinent man is quite otherwise, we know [1444]—not reasonable in enjoying such pleasures more than he should.

1447. So the mean between these two extremes is represented by the continent man. For the incontinent man forsakes reason because of excess, and the insensible man does so because of deficiency. The reason is that the first wants to enjoy pleasures more than he ought and the other less than he ought. But the continent man perseveres in reason and is not diverted from it by either extreme, namely, too much or too little.

1448. Second, at since, indeed (1151b28), he shows how they are related to good and evil. It is evident from our discussions [1433–34] that continence is something good. So it necessarily follows that the two habits opposed to it (by excess and defect) are bad, as is obvious from the very fact that they do not adhere to reason, but take either too much or too little.

1449. At because one extreme (1151b30; [1449]), he responds to a foreseen question: why is incontinence alone apparently opposed to continence, which should have two contrary habits? This happens because one extreme—departure from reason by defect—is rare, and consequently not so evident as the opposite extreme. Indeed, the departure from right reason by excess is quite frequent in bodily pleasure. By the same reason, temperance seems to be opposed only to intemperance, since insensibility is not conspicuous, because it happens in few cases.

1450. Here, we should consider that the extremes are opposed to continence in two different respects.

The first is from the point of view of reason, to which continence adheres, and under this aspect, an analogy has already been presented [1441–43]: what prodigality is to generosity, obstinacy is to continence. The opposite extreme relating to the defect is the vice of instability.

Second, from the point of view of restraining desire, there are extremes. And under this aspect, continence is a medium between these extremes—our present problem.

1451. Next, at since language is (1151b32), he shows that continence is at times called temperance for its similarity.

First, in this similarity, he compares continence with temperance.

Second, at although the incontinent (1152a4; [1454]), he compares incontinence with intemperance.

He discusses the first point under three subheadings.

First, he states his intention: continence is sometimes called temperance metaphorically, since similar things permit metaphor.

1452. Second, at indeed the continent (1151b34), he points up the resemblance. The continent person has the ability to do nothing against principle for the sake of carnal pleasures, and the temperate person has the same ability.

1453. Third, at but the first (1152a1), he shows several differences. The temperate man does not have the evil desires of the continent, because his sensual desire is well ordered by his habit of temperance.

The second difference, stated at and the second, is that the temperate man, by his habit of temperance, is not delighted contrary to reason, while the continent man is disposed to take unreasonable pleasure, though he is not seduced by his passion.

1454. Then, at although the incontinent (1152a4), he compares incontinence with intemperance: though the incontinent and the intemperate man seem alike, they do differ. Hence, by resemblance, incontinence is called intemperance. The resemblance is that both pursue carnal delights, but they differ because the intemperate man thinks he should follow such pleasures by perverse judgment on his goal. Quite otherwise, the incontinent man has no such idea, because his judgment remains unimpaired, as stated previously [1312, 1426, 1428–30].