Lecture 8 — The Intemperate Are Worse Than the Incontinent

But the intemperate man, as was pointed out before, is not inclined to be penitent, for he is tenacious of his choice. On the other hand, every incontinent man is given to repentance. For this reason, we are not here dealing with our original problem. Consequently, one is incurable and the other is curable. [1422]

Now vice resembles diseases like dropsy and tuberculosis, while incontinence is like epilepsy. Vice is chronic, while incontinence is a kind of intermittent badness. [1424]

Generally speaking, incontinence and vice are different in kind, for vice is unconscious of itself, but incontinence is not. [1425]

Among the incontinent, the impulsive sort are not as bad as those who, having the advice of reason, do not abide by it. These people give in to a milder passion and do not, like the impulsive, lack deliberation. In fact, incontinent people (namely, the weak) are like those who become quickly intoxicated by a little wine, or by less than most men. [1426]

Although incontinence is not vice in the strict sense, it is obviously so in a qualified way, for incontinence sins without deliberate choice but, vice with deliberate choice. [1428]

Besides, there is a similarity in action, as illustrated by what Demodochus said to the Milesians: “You are not foolish but you do the things foolish men do.” So too the incontinent are really not unjust, but they do unjust deeds. [1429]

One man pursues bodily pleasures excessively and contrary to right reason, and not because he is convinced that they are to be followed. But another is convinced, because of his inclination, that these pleasures are to be followed. Hence, the first is easily persuaded to change, but not the second. The reason is that virtue and vice look to a principle that is destroyed by vice and preserved by virtue. Now the principle in actions is the end on account of which we operate, like axioms in mathematics; and just as reasoning does not teach principles in mathematics, so neither does reasoning teach the end in the sphere of action. But the right evaluation regarding the principle of things to be done is derived from a habit of virtue either natural or acquired. Therefore, the man who makes this evaluation is temperate, but he who makes the opposite evaluation is intemperate. [1430]

Take the incontinent person exceeding the limits of right reason because of passion that so overcomes him that he does not act according to right reason; still he is not convinced that he should abandon himself to such pleasures without restriction. In this, he is better than the libertine, and not absolutely bad, for he retains the highest principle. Nevertheless, there is still another person, the very opposite, who keeps to right reason and does not go to excess in passion. From this, it is clear that continence is a good habit, but incontinence an evil habit. [1433]

1422. But the intemperate man. After the Philosopher has shown the difference between the incontinent and the intemperate man, he now shows which is worse. Thus, he solves the difficulty raised in the fifth place [1325] about the first probable statement. Aristotle had considered this matter before, but rather briefly and only incidentally. Now he gives it formal consideration by two operations.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at one man (1151a11; [1430]), he clarifies a matter formerly assumed.

In the first part of the discussion, he makes two points.

First, he shows that the intemperate man is worse than the incontinent man.

Second, at although incontinence (1151a5; [1428]), he shows what is common to them.

About the first, he does two things.

First, he compares the incontinent man with the intemperate man.

Second, at among the incontinent (1151a1; [1426]), he compares the two kinds of incontinence.

First of all, there are three arguments to show that the intemperate is worse than the incontinent.

1423. In the first reason, he says, as was pointed out before [1409], that the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, since he sins by a deliberate choice in which he persists, having chosen bodily pleasures as an end. But an incontinent man readily repents when the passion to which he gave in passes away. Therefore, it is evident, as previously indicated [1409], that the intemperate man is as incurable as the incontinent is curable. So, from the quality of excess, Aristotle solves the difficulty mentioned before [1409], which proceeds from this, that incontinence is more incurable than intemperance. Since the intemperate man is indeed more incurable, it is possible to conclude he is worse, just as an incurable disease is worse.

1424. He states his second reason at now vice resembles (1150b32), saying that vice, or intemperance, can be compared to long sicknesses such as dropsy and tuberculosis. But incontinence resembles those sicknesses like epilepsy, which occur at intervals. This is so because intemperance—and every real vice—is without interruption, being a lasting habit that chooses evils. But incontinence is not continual, because the incontinent man is moved to sin only by reason of passion, which quickly passes. Thus, incontinence is—so to speak—a kind of transitory vice. But a continuing evil is worse than a passing one. Therefore, intemperance is worse than incontinence.

1425. At generally speaking (1150b35), he gives his third reason: the genus of incontinence is different from that of vice, under which intemperance is contained. Real vice is hidden from the one having it and his deception consists in thinking that what he does is good. But incontinence is not concealed, for such a person in his right mind knows that the object to which he is drawn by passion is evil. But hidden evil is more dangerous than overt evil. Therefore, intemperance is worse than incontinence.

1426. Then, at among the incontinent (1151a1), he compares the kinds of incontinence. He says that, among the incontinent, impulsive or impetuous people are better or at least not as bad as the weak who still have reason’s counsel but do not follow it.

The weak are worse in two ways.

First, they are conquered by a milder passion, while the impulsive are overcome by an excessive passion either by surprise or vehemence. He has just proved [1423] by this argument that the intemperate man is worse than the incontinent. This can be considered a fourth argument connected with the preceding three.

The second reason is that the weak are not without counsel like the impetuous. The same argument was used before [1419–20] in the case of the incontinent and the intemperate man, as if the incontinent man deliberated beforehand but not the intemperate. This is not true, for the intemperate man has reflected in advance, sinning by deliberate choice. Therefore, he apparently introduces this point to show that it is really out of place there.

1427. He gives an example, comparing the incontinent person in his weakness with people who quickly or easily become intoxicated by a little wine or by less than do most men. Such persons have a poor constitution; in the same way, weak people giving in to a milder passion have a poor soul.

1428. Next, at although incontinence (1151a5), he shows an agreement between the incontinent and the intemperate man in two matters.

First, in regard to the fact that, although incontinence is not unqualified badness, it is still vice in some sense, as previously stated [1379]; it is then a quasi-vice, being but transitory. It is obviously not unqualified vice, because incontinence sins without deliberate choice but real vice with deliberate choice.

1429. The second point of agreement is given at besides, there is (1151a7). He says incontinence and vice have a similar action, illustrated by one Demodochus, an ancient of the people, who chided the Milesians thus: “Milesians, you are not foolish but you do things like the works of foolish people.” So the incontinent are not really bad (that is, unjust or intemperate) but they do unjust and evil things.

1430. Then, at one man (1151a11), he gives his reason for his previous statement that the intemperate person is, in contrast to the incontinent, unrepentant.

First, he gives the reason why the intemperate man does not repent.

Second, at take the incontinent person (1151a20; [1433]), Aristotle tells us why the incontinent man repents.

First, he says one man pursues bodily pleasures excessively and against the order of right reason not because he is convinced these pleasures are good. Such a one is incontinent. On the contrary, another, the intemperate man, is convinced that these pleasures are to be chosen as good in themselves because of an inclination he has by habit. Thus, the incontinent person who is habitually unconvinced of the goodness of evil pleasures, though actually and in passion so convinced from his false evaluation on the spot, quickly changes when passion fades. In contrast, the intemperate person, judging that physical pleasures are to be chosen in every instance, does not depart from his judgment so easily.

1431. After this, he gives his argument: in the sphere of action, virtue and vice concern a principle that vice destroys and virtue preserves. Now this principle of action is the end for the sake of which we act; in things to be done, it takes the place that axioms or first principles have in mathematical demonstrations. Just as principles in mathematics are not taught by reasoning, so neither is the end in the sphere of action taught by reasoning. But man acquires right evaluation regarding the principle of things to be done (namely, the end) by the habit of virtue either natural or learned by custom.

1432. Then the one making a right evaluation on the objective of physical pleasures, appraising the mean to be a good and an end in these matters and excesses to be an evil, is temperate. In contrast, the one making the opposite evaluation from a habit of vice is intemperate. It is clear that anyone making a mistake in principles cannot be easily recalled from error, because reasoning does not teach the principles. Hence the intemperate man, who errs about the principle of things to be done, cannot revoke his error through any persuasion, and thus he is not amenable or penitent until the habit causing the error is destroyed by a contrary practice of long standing.

1433. At take the incontinent person (1151a20), he shows that the incontinent are amenable and inclined to be penitent. He says that these people exceed the limits of right reason because of passion overcoming them to the extent that they do not act according to right reason, but still not to the extent of convincing them that they should pursue bodily pleasures as good in themselves without restriction. For this reason, such people continue in a right evaluation of the end after the cessation of passion, which passes quickly. Such is the incontinent person who, in this respect, is better than the intemperate person and not absolutely evil, because he does preserve the highest principle, which is the correct evaluation of the end. But in a sense, this man is evil in considering that something contrary to reason is to be done in a particular case. Another person, the continent, the direct opposite of the incontinent person, stays by right reason and in no way departs from it because of passion even in his actions.

1434. From this it is clear that continence is a good habit because it abides by reason. But incontinence is an evil habit because it recedes from right reason in its operation. This was the first probable statement, which he now concludes after the solution of the fifth difficulty raised concerning it.