Lecture 7 — Continence and Perseverance

Continence and incontinence deal with pleasures and pains, with desires and aversions—things pertaining to touch and taste about which temperance and intemperance are concerned, as determined previously. In regard to these passions, some people act in such a way that they are overcome by the passions that most men master; others overcome the passions against which most men are rather weak. [1404]

Of those who contend with pleasures, one is incontinent and another is continent; of those who contend with sorrows one is called effeminate and another persevering. In between are the habits of most men, who, however, are more inclined to the worse habits. [1406]

But some pleasures are necessary, while others are not; some are necessary up to a point, while excesses and defects are not at all necessary. So it is in the matter of desires and pains. Hence, a man is called intemperate who pursues excesses in pleasures by desiring them beyond measure or by deliberately choosing them for their own sake and not for the sake of something else. Since such a one is not sorry for his actions, he cannot be cured. But the man who is deficient in things of this nature is the very opposite (that is, insensible). And he who follows a middle course is temperate. Similarly, someone may shun bodily pains not because he is overcome, but because he deliberately chooses. Of those who yield but not from deliberate choice, one is drawn by the force of pleasure and another by aversion to the pain of unsatisfied desire. Therefore, these persons differ one from the other. [1408]

Generally speaking, someone doing a shameful act without any passion at all, or with only mild passion, is worse than another who sins with violent passion. Likewise, he who strikes another in cold blood is worse than one acting in anger. What would a man who sins without passion do under the influence of passion? For this reason, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent person. In the latter, there is rather a kind of effeminacy, while the intemperate man is opposed to the temperate. [1412]

The continent man is set opposite the incontinent, and the persevering man is opposite the effeminate. In fact, one is said to be persevering in this, that he holds fast, while continence consists in conquering. But holding fast differs from conquering, as not being conquered differs from conquering. For this reason, continence is more desirable than perseverance. [1413]

The man, however, who fails in resisting those pleasures that most people successfully resist is called effeminate and delicate. Indeed, delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. Such is the man who trails his clothing to avoid the wearisome trouble of lifting it and imitates an invalid, not considering himself wretched in resembling a person who is. Likewise, this applies to continence and incontinence, for it is not surprising for somebody to be overcome by the more intense and more extreme pleasures or pains; rather, his action is excusable if he resists as Philoctetes did when bitten by a snake in the play of Theodectus, and Carcinus Cercyon in the Alope. The same can be said of those who try to keep from laughing but suddenly burst out like Xenophantus did. But a person is called incontinent and effeminate if he succumbs to those pleasures and pains that most people overcome, being unable to resist not because of a disposition of his nature (but because of a sickness of soul) as, for instance, effeminacy among the Scythian kings. The same goes for women who differ in this from the masculine sex. [1414]

Although it might seem that one fond of amusement is intemperate, he is really effeminate, because play is relaxation and rest, which the lover of amusement seeks excessively. [1417]

One kind of incontinence is impetuosity and the other, weakness. [1418]

Some incontinent persons after taking counsel do not abide by the advice they received, because of passion. Others do not take counsel and, as a result, succumb to passion. Still others are like people who excite themselves but are not stirred up by others. This is the way with those who, experiencing the movement of passion beforehand and arousing themselves and their reasoning powers in advance, are not overwhelmed either by the passion of pleasure or of pain. [1419]

It is especially the choleric and the depressed who are victims of unbridled incontinence. Neither of these awaits reason’s decision, but rather follows the imagination, the former by the quickness of their reaction and the latter by the vehemence of their passions. [1421]

1404. Continence and incontinence deal. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of the matter about which continence and incontinence in the unqualified sense are concerned, he now compares them to other habits that share the same matter.

He discusses this point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows how the continent and incontinent man differ from the persevering and the effeminate man and the temperate and the intemperate man. Here he solves the third difficulty that was raised against the fourth probable statement [1321–24].

Second, at but the intemperate man (1150b29; [1422]), he shows who is worse, the incontinent or the intemperate man, and by this he solves the fifth difficulty, which was raised against the first probable statement.

He treats the initial point under two aspects.

First, he shows how incontinence differs from other habits.

Second, at one kind of incontinence (1150b19; [1418]), he distinguishes the different species of incontinence.

He considers the first point in two ways.

First, he distinguishes continence and incontinence from temperance and intemperance and from perseverance and effeminacy.

Second, at generally speaking (1150a27; [1412]), he compares these according to goodness and badness.

He handles the first point in a twofold fashion.

First, he distinguishes continence and incontinence from perseverance and effeminacy.

Second, at but some pleasures (1150a16; [1408]), he distinguishes both (incontinence and continence) from temperance and intemperance.

He discusses the first point from a double aspect.

First, he shows the agreement;

second, at of those who (1150a13; [1406]), he shows the difference.

On the first, he notes two points of agreement.

1405. The first is according to the matter which continence and incontinence share with temperance. They deal with pleasures and pains, with desires and aversions—things pertaining to touch and taste about which temperance and intemperance are also concerned, as determined previously in book 2 [339, 342], book 3 [616, 618], and book 4 [651].

The second point of agreement touches the manner of conducting oneself in regard to the passions. Some people act in such a way that they are overcome by passions in which most men are better disciplined or strong, that is to say, passions that they overcome; still others conquer those passions in which most men are less disciplined or weaker, that is to say, by which the majority are conquered.

1406. Next, at of those who (1150a13), he explains the difference. Men win and lose, he says, in contending with these pleasures and pains; and he who is overcome by those pleasures of touch where most people are victorious is called incontinent, but he who overcomes the pleasures of touch in which most people are overcome is called continent. In connection with the opposite pains, one overwhelmed by those that the majority endure is called effeminate, while another who triumphs over those to which many men succumb is called persevering.

1407. Because there are different degrees of pleasures and pains, and so of men who control and are controlled by them, it is evident that these habits can be for the most part in-between. However, those habits signifying evil incline more easily to the lower pleasures, for people are said to be more incontinent and effeminate who are overcome by minor pleasures or pains; just as good habits incline more to the higher pleasures, for they are called more continent and persevering who master the greater pleasures and pains. Likewise, it can be understood that men may be inclined toward the worse habits, namely, incontinence and effeminacy.

1408. Then, at but some (1150a16), he shows how these habits differ from temperance. He says some pleasures of taste and touch, such as food and drink, are necessary; other pleasures, like different seasonings, are unnecessary. Those that are necessary are so up to a certain point, for there is a quantity of food and drink necessary for man. But excesses are unnecessary, and so are deficiencies. The same is true for desires and pains.

1409. Therefore, someone who intentionally pursues excesses immoderately in desiring them above measure, or even seeks them by deliberate choice for their own sake and not for the sake of something else, considering them as an end, is called intemperate. Because a man cleaves immovably to that which he intentionally seeks for itself, the intemperate man is necessarily not sorry about pleasures he has sought. Consequently, his vice is incurable, for no one is cured except by being displeased, since virtue and vice are in the will. As the intemperate man abounds in his quest for pleasures, so the insensible man—his counterpart—is deficient in the same affairs, as noted in book 3 [630–31]. But one following a middle course in these matters is temperate. And, as the intemperate person seeks bodily pleasures by deliberate choice, so he shuns bodily pain, not by being overcome by them but out of deliberate choice.

1410. Still, of those who do not sin from deliberate choice, the incontinent is drawn by the pleasure’s power while the soft is conquered by dread of pain following the desire, that is, the deprivation of the thing desired. Hence, it is clear that the incontinent, the effeminate, and the intemperate man are each different.

1411. We should note here that previously [1361–62], in determining the matter of continence and incontinence—lest error creep in—the Philosopher incidentally touched on the difference between the intemperate and the incontinent man, a matter he now makes his prime concern.

1412. At generally speaking (1150a27), he compares these habits according to goodness and evil.

First, he compares the incontinent and the effeminate man with the intemperate.

Second, at the continent man (1150a32; [1413]), he compares the incontinent man with the effeminate.

He says first that, generally speaking, one who does something shameful without any passion at all, or under the influence of what is only ineffectual or mild passion, is worse than one doing something shameful with violent passion. Likewise, striking another in cold blood is worse than striking in anger. What might a man sinning without passion do if he was passionate? Consequently, the intemperate man, not overcome by passion but sinning by deliberate choice, is worse than the incontinent man who is mastered by passion. Likewise, one of these two conditions, being mastered by passion in running away from pain, belongs rather to a kind of effeminacy, while the other, sinning by deliberate choice, belongs to intemperance. Hence, the intemperate person is worse than the soft one.

1413. Next, at the continent man (1150a32), he compares the soft man to the incontinent, and the persevering man to the continent.

He considers these points in three ways.

First, he shows which is better.

Second, at the man, however (1150b1; [1414]), he explains a likeness previously mentioned.

Third, at although it might seem (1150b16; [1417]), he refutes an error.

He says first that the continent man is contrasted with the incontinent, and the persevering man is contrasted with the effeminate. One is called persevering in that he maintains his ground when another urges him to the contrary. But continence is designated from that it conquers, for what we contain we have in our power. It is necessary that we should stand firm against pain because pleasure must be bridled or kept in check. Hence, the persevering man is compared to the continent man as the unconquered is compared to the conqueror, who is obviously more perfect. Consequently, continence is more perfect than perseverance. Effeminacy, however, seems worse than incontinence: each consists in defeat, but the incontinent person is beaten by a stronger passion.

1414. Then, at the man, however (1150b1), he makes clear a likeness mentioned previously [1413] between the effeminate and the incontinent person: both are beaten by passions that many other people master. He says that the man failing in these pleasures against which even the majority fight to resist and can overcome is called effeminate and delicate. The effeminate and the delicate belong in the same class, for delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. Effeminacy inordinately shuns all weariness, but in the strict, delicacy sense shuns the weariness of toil. An individual who trails his clothing after him on the ground to avoid the labor of carrying it—which pertains to delicacy—is overcome by that weariness he thinks is at hand from tucking up his clothes. Although he acts like an invalid in dragging his clothes, and in this he seems not to be wretched, nevertheless he resembles a wretched person, inasmuch as he shuns fatigue only to meet it.

1415. What was said about effeminacy holds true for continence and incontinence. It is not surprising if a person is overcome by the more intense and more extreme pleasures and pains, such that he ought to be called incontinent or effeminate for this reason, but he should be pardoned if he attempts to resist and does not yield at once. Aristotle gives the example of Philoctetes who (as Theodectus the poet narrates), when bitten by a snake and, suffering great pain, tried to contain his anguish but could not. Something like this is told about a woman named Melopes who was struck by a man called Carcinus. So also it happens to those who try to keep from laughing yet are not successful and suddenly burst out, as did Xenophantus.

1416. But a man is then called incontinent and effeminate when he succumbs to such pains and pleasures as most people can overcome. Yet his inability to resist passions of this sort does not arise from his type of nature—by reason of which a thing serious for him would be slight for others—but from a debility of mind caused by evil habit. Thus, effeminacy from an innate tendency is found in the kings of Scythia, who cannot bear labors and pains because of their delicate rearing. The same thing is true of women in comparison with men by the weakness of their nature.

1417. At although it might seem (1150b1), he refutes an error. It seems possible that the playful type—namely, one too much in love with amusement—is intemperate, because there is a kind of pleasure in amusement, but the Philosopher says that such a person more properly is effeminate. Amusement is a quieting and relaxation of the mind, which the lover of amusement seeks to an excessive degree. Hence, he comes in the classification of effeminate, whose characteristic is to shun difficulties and labors.

1418. Next, at one kind of incontinence (1150b19), he distinguishes the species of incontinence. He treats this point under three headings.

First, he gives the division, saying that incontinence has a twofold division: impetuosity and weakness.

1419. Second, at some incontinent (1150b19), he explains the members of the division. He says that some incontinent people do deliberate when passion arises, but they do not abide by the results of deliberation because of the passion that overcomes them. Incontinence of this kind is called weakness. Other incontinent persons are led by passion because they do not deliberate but immediately follow a passion when it arises. This incontinence is called impetuosity because of its quickness which forestalls deliberation. However, if they had deliberated they would not have been led astray by passion.

1420. Still others excite themselves in advance and afterward are not moved when excited by others. This is the way also with those who, feeling the movement of passion beforehand and having previous knowledge of that to which passion inclines, arouse themselves in advance—that is, provoke themselves and their powers of deduction to resist sensual desire—and consequently are not changed either by the passion of pleasure that overwhelms the incontinent man or by the pain that overwhelms the effeminate man.

1421. Third, at it is especially (1150b25), he shows to whom the second kind of incontinence, called impetuosity, is attributable. He says that the highly sensitive or the choleric and the depressed are especially incontinent according to the incontinence that is not restrained by counsel, called impetuosity. Neither of these awaits the advice of reason, but they follow the first sensual image: the choleric on account of the quickness of their wrath, but the depressed on account of the vehemence of their intensified melancholy, whose impulse no man can easily endure, for a dry object when kindled burns furiously. On the contrary, we are to understand that men with sanguine and phlegmatic temperaments experience the incontinence of weakness on account of the humidity of their temperament, which is not strong enough to resist an impression.