Lecture 12 — Refutation of Previous Arguments

From what follows, it will be clear that these previous arguments do not prove that pleasure is not a good, nor that it is not the highest good. [1483]

First of all, good can be distinguished into the absolute and relative good. This distinction is verified of nature and habits, and consequently of movements and processes. Some of these (processes) seem depraved; indeed, some are absolutely wicked. However, to a particular person, they may not seem so, but instead desirable. And again, some such processes, ordinarily undesirable, appear desirable at times (even though the times be few). Some of these are not pleasures at all, but merely appear to be, such as those that are painful yet taken by the sick as medicine. [1484]

Besides, one good is an activity and another is a habit. Now, those actions producing a natural habit are pleasurable only incidentally. But a pleasurable activity in the appetites indicates an undeveloped and imperfect state and proceeds from some dispositional or natural principle. For, there are pleasures without pain and desire, such as that which has to do with contemplative activity, and in these, nature is not deficient. An indication of this is that delight is not taken in the same pleasurable objects when nature is normal as when it is surfeited. But a normal nature finds pleasure in things essentially enjoyable, while a surfeited nature enjoys pleasures opposed to those that are naturally enjoyable, such as pungent and bitter foods, none of which are pleasant either by nature or without some qualification. Therefore, the pleasures they produce are not—simply speaking—pleasant; for, as pleasant things are compared, so are the pleasures they cause. [1486]

There is no need for some other thing to be better than pleasure because of the opinion of some that the result is better than the process. Indeed, not all pleasures are processes, or even involve them; in fact, some are activities, and consequently ends. Nor do such pleasures come from something achieved, but rather from use. Not all pleasures have an end extrinsic to themselves—only pleasures connected with things leading to the perfection of our nature. Likewise, for this reason, it is not correct to define pleasure as an experienced process; rather, it should be called an activity of a natural habit. In place of “experienced.” we should put “unimpeded.” But pleasure seemed to some a process because it is concerned with what is principally good (an activity), which they consider a process, although it is really something consequent to it. [1490]

But to prove that pleasures are evil because some pleasurable things cause sickness is about the same as to argue that remedies are bad because expensive. Such pleasure and sickness are of course bad, but not for this reason, since even contemplation may occasionally injure health. [1494]

However, neither prudence nor any other habit is hindered by its own pleasure, although every habit is impeded by alien pleasures. On the other hand, the pleasures connected with investigation and learning make a man investigate and learn more. [1495]

It seems reasonable to say that no pleasure is the product of art, because art does not have the power to bring about any activity, but only capacity to act. However, the arts of perfumery and of cookery do seem ordered to pleasure. [1496]

The arguments that the temperate man avoids pleasures, that the prudent man seeks a life free from pain, and that children and brutes seek pleasures all have the same solution; for, we have shown how some pleasures are good in the absolute sense and how not all pleasures are of this nature. The non-absolute pleasures are pursued by children and animals and cause the grief that the prudent man avoids. The reference is to physical pleasures accompanied by both desire and pain. These are the kind just mentioned, and excesses in them make a man intemperate. The temperate man avoids these pleasures, for he has other pleasures distinctively his own. [1497]

1483. From what follows, it will be clear. Now that Aristotle has stated the arguments for these previous opinions, he begins their refutation.

First, he outlines his discussion that will show that the arguments advanced do not really prove that pleasure is not good, nor that it is not the very best thing.

He begins with the second opinion that not all pleasures are good because, in a way, this is true.

The other two he deals with together, because their arguments are so much alike that they can be answered simultaneously.

1484. Then, at first of all (1152b26), he makes the actual rebuttal.

First, he introduces distinctions to be made, by which we can know how pleasure is good or bad.

Second, at there is no need (1153a7; [1490]), he refutes arguments already presented.

On the first point, he makes two distinctions, both taken according to the distinct good that is the object of pleasure.

First, something is good in two ways:

first, absolutely;

second, relative to some individual.

Because all things tend to good, so do both natures and habits that are ordered either to good absolutely or to the good of an individual. And because movements and generations proceed from particular natures and habits, they too must be consequently related to these things in the same way: some are good absolutely, and others for a particular individual. Hence, on the supposition that pleasures are movements and processes, as our opponent contends, four kinds of pleasure must be distinguished.

1485. Some of these are good absolutely, as pleasures in virtuous works.

Contrarily, others seem absolutely bad, although in a way desirable to a particular person by reason of some necessity, like medicine to a sick man.

A third class are not consistently chosen by anyone, but only at times and for a short period, such as the stealing of food in the case of extreme necessity.

A fourth class of pleasures comprise counterfeit pleasures because of the perverse disposition of the one who delights in them: such are pleasures accompanied by sadness or pain and those taken to relieve that pain. This is evident of diversions resorted to by the feverish or the weak, for sometimes it seems a relief to a sick man to twist and turn in bed and take bitter foods and so forth.

1486. At besides, one (1152b33), he makes the other distinction, that good is twofold.

One is an activity, such as contemplation;

the other is a habit, such as science.

But of these, activity seems to be the perfect good, because it is an additional perfection, while habit seems to be the imperfect good because it is an initial perfection. Consequently, genuine and perfect pleasure is found in the good that consists in an activity. Nevertheless, those actions or movements that produce a natural habit in man—that is, which are formative natural habits—are indeed pleasurable, but only incidentally. They do not yet have the nature of good, because they precede even the habit itself, which is the initial perfection. But, by reason of a relation to this good, they have the nature of goodness and pleasure.

1487. Obviously, a pleasurable activity accompanied by desire is not the activity of a perfect habit, since there is nothing left to desire that belongs to the habit when it is perfect. Therefore, an activity of this kind must proceed from some dispositional or natural principle, which is accompanied by pain; it is not without pain that a man covets a natural perfection that he does not yet possess.

1488. However, it is evident that not all pleasurable activities are of this kind, because some pleasures are without pain and desire, as obviously is the pleasure that has to do with contemplative activity. Such pleasure is not associated with any need in nature, but rather proceeds from its perfection, that is, from reason perfected by the habit of science. So, then, the pleasures connected with activities proceeding from habits—that is, natures and forms already existing—are pleasures in the true and perfect sense. But those producing habits and natures are not pleasures in the true and perfect sense, but only in an imperfect manner.

1489. An indication of this is that, if pleasures of this kind were really and completely enjoyable, they would be so under any condition. This is patently false, because a gorged nature (present when a man has eaten too much) and a temperate or well regulated nature do not enjoy the same pleasure. Nature properly controlled finds delight in things essentially enjoyable and in keeping with human nature. But a gorged nature enjoys pleasures just the opposite of those that are unconditionally enjoyable. In fact, well-fed people enjoy pungent and bitter foods as a help to digestion, although nothing in them is naturally pleasant, not being akin to human nature, but excessive. From this it follows that the pleasures produced by them are not pleasures in the unqualified sense. The reason is that, as enjoyable things are compared, so are the pleasures they cause.

1490. Next, at there is no need (1153a7), he refutes these arguments [1473–81]:

first, the refutation of the argument for opinion number three;

second, at but to prove (1153a17; [1494]), the dismissal of the argument for opinion number two;

third, at however, neither (1153a20; [1495]), the refutation of the argument behind the first opinion.

He says first that there is no need to exclude pleasure entirely as the highest good so that something else must be better than pleasure. Some hold this for the reason that the result is more excellent than the process. But they consider pleasure a kind of process.

1491. Certainly there is a false supposition here, because not all pleasures are kinds of processes, nor are they accompanied by some process, as is evident from the premises [1487–89]. Only those pleasures that create habits with pain and desire are so. But some pleasures are activities and have the nature of end because an activity is the second perfection, as has been pointed out [1486]. Such pleasures do not come from production—that is, from things that are being formed—but from use. What Aristotle means is that these pleasures do not consist in the formation of habits, but in the exercise of already existing habits. Obviously, then, it is not necessary that the purpose of all pleasures be something other than the pleasures themselves; this is verified only in pleasures following operations that lead to the perfection of a nature and accompany desire.

1492. Likewise, by reason of this, we must reject the definition of pleasure introduced with the first argument, for it is not good to define pleasure as an experienced process (which is proper to imperfect pleasures). Rather, we must make the definition that harmonizes with perfect pleasures: pleasure is the connatural activity of a habit already existing.

1493. In place of the word “experienced” they used, let us substitute “unimpeded” so that, accordingly, the definition of pleasure will be an unimpeded activity of a habit that is natural, harmonizing with the nature of the one having it. Now, the impediment to the operation causes difficulty in operating, and this prevents pleasure. For this reason, it seemed to some that pleasure is a kind of process, because pleasure is concerned with what is principally good, namely, an activity that they consider to be the same as generation, although it is not the same, but something consequent to it. In fact, generation is a process toward a nature, but activity is the use of a natural form or habit.

1494. Then, at but to prove (1153a17), he disproves the reason for the second opinion. He says that to conclude that some pleasures are evil because some pleasurable objects lead to sickness is the same as to infer that some remedies are evil because they are expensive. We must say then that both pleasurable and healthful things are evil from one angle, inasmuch as pleasurable objects are injurious to health and remedies cost money, but they are not evil in this, that they are curative or delightful. Such logic leads to a conclusion that contemplation is bad, for at times, it injures health.

1495. At however, neither prudence (1153a20), he refutes the arguments supporting the first opinion—the first argument has already been resolved [1490–94].

Hence, he first answers the fourth argument.

Second, at it seems reasonable (1153a23; [1496]), he replies to the fifth argument.

Third, at the arguments that (1153a27; [1497]), he disproves the second, third, and sixth arguments together.

He says first that neither prudence nor any other habit is impeded by its own pleasure arising from the habit itself, but by pleasure alien to it. Nay, rather, proper pleasures are a help to every habit. Thus, the pleasure that a man takes in investigating and learning causes him to investigate and learn more. So it does not follow that pleasure must be an evil to everyone.

1496. Next, at it seems reasonable (1153a23), he replies to the fifth argument, saying that it is reasonable to maintain that no pleasure is a product of art. The reason is that what is truly and properly pleasure follows activity, and not a process. But art has the power to bring about some process, because it is the right plan of things to be made, as was explained in book 6 [1153, 1160, 1166]; however, it does not have the power to bring about activity, but only the capacity from which activity springs. Still a rebuttal could be offered that the arts of perfumery and cookery seem ordered to pleasures. Just the same, these arts cannot give pleasure; they more precisely manufacture things that may give pleasure.

1497. Then, at the arguments that (1153a27), he disproves the second, third, and sixth arguments. He says that the facts that the temperate man avoids pleasures (the second reason), that the prudent man seeks a life free from pain (the third reason), and that children and dumb animals seek pleasures (the sixth reason) all have the same solution. We have shown [1485] how some pleasures are good in the absolute sense, but also how not all pleasures are of this kind. Such pleasures (the non-absolute kind) children and brutes seek, and it is the pain in these that the prudent man avoids. The question here concerns physical pleasures accompanied by desire and pain. These pleasures are not good in an unqualified way. And, from their excesses, a man becomes intemperate. Consequently, a temperate man avoids these same pleasure. But still others are characteristic of the temperate man precisely as he enjoys his own activity, and these he does not avoid, but rather seeks.