Lecture 11 — Pleasure and Pain

The investigation of pleasure and pain pertains to the philosopher of political science, for it is to pleasure and pain as an architectonic end that we refer everything in calling this good and that bad in the absolute sense. [1469–70]

Besides, it is necessary for the moralist to study these passions, since we have already shown that virtue and vice are concerned with pains and pleasures. [1471]

Moreover, many people maintain that happiness is connected with pleasure. For this reason, they call the happy man by a name derived from a verb meaning “to enjoy.” [1472]

Some philosophers held that pleasure could be called good neither intrinsically nor incidentally, for goodness and pleasure are not identical. Others were of the opinion that some pleasures are good but most are evil. Still others maintain that, even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless no pleasure can be the highest good. [1473]

According to them, then, pleasure is not a good at all, because it is a sensate process to a natural term, and no process belongs to the classification of ends; for example, the act of building is never a house. [1474]

Moreover, the temperate man shuns pleasure. [1475]

Again, the prudent man seeks not pleasure, but freedom from pain. [1476]

Besides, pleasure hinders a man from being prudent; and delectable, such as sexual pleasure, the more it so hinders. In fact, while it is being experienced, no one is capable of turning his mind to anything. [1477]

Then, too, there is no art of pleasure, although every good is the product of some art. [1478]

Finally, children and dumb animals seek pleasure. [1479]

But not all pleasures of this kind are good, because some are shameful and dishonorable; while others are harmful, causing sickness. [1480]

Furthermore, no pleasure can be the highest good, because pleasure is not an end, but a kind of generative process. These, then, are the things usually discussed about pleasure. [1481]

1469. The investigation of pleasure and pain. After the Philosopher has finished his investigation of continence and incontinence, showing that they are concerned with pleasures and pains, now he intends to investigate pleasures and pains themselves.

First, he states that this consideration fits in with his present intention.

Second, at some philosophers (1152b8; [1473]), he proceeds with his intention.

He discusses the first point from three aspects.

First, he states his objective, saying that a consideration of pleasure and pain pertains to the philosopher who applies himself to political science, to which the whole of moral doctrine is reducible as to a principal science, as was pointed out in the beginning [26–30].

1470. Second, at for it is (1152b1), he demonstrates his proposition by three arguments.

First, as the end of a master art is the measure to which all affairs of the art are referred, so is pleasure in the matter of moral study. It is relevant to pleasure that one thing is called bad and another, in like fashion, good. A good man is said to be one who is pleased by good things. A bad man is one delighted by evil things. The same judgment is passed on actions: something proceeding from wicked pleasure is judged wicked, and something proceeding from good pleasure judged good. In any science, the principal consideration is that which is taken as a rule. Therefore, the moral philosopher in a very special way concerns himself with pleasure.

1471. At besides, it is (1152b4), his second argument proceeds: it is not only proper but also necessary for the moral philosopher to investigate pleasure, because his duty is to study virtues and vices. As explained in book 2 [266–72], moral virtue and vice are concerned with pleasures and pains. Therefore, it is necessary for the moralist to consider pleasure and pain.

1472. Then the third argument begins at moreover, many people (1152b6): the moral philosopher must consider happiness as the ultimate end. But the majority, including Aristotle himself, maintain that happiness is connected with pleasure. Hence, among the Greeks, the term “happy” is derived from the verb “to rejoice exceedingly.” Therefore, it is the business of the moral philosopher to investigate pleasure.

1473. Then, at some philosophers (1152b8), he investigates pleasure and pain themselves:

he does so first in general;

second, at in the matter of (1154a8; [1516]), he particularly treats physical pleasures, with which, as he has already said, continence and incontinence are concerned.

He discusses his first point from a double point of view.

First, he takes up the opinions of philosophers opposing pleasure.

Second, at but it is obvious (1153b1; [1498]), he determines that the truth is the opposite.

On this first point, he has three operations:

first, he gives opinions opposed to pleasure;

second, at according to them (1152b12; [1474]), he presents supporting arguments;

third, at from what follows (1152b25; [1483]), he refutes them.

First, then, three opinions.

Some philosophers held that no pleasure could be good either intrinsically or incidentally, and that, if a pleasurable thing is good, pleasure and good will not be identical.

Others were of the opinion that some pleasures are good but most are evil.

Still others maintained that, even if all pleasures are good, nevertheless no pleasure can be the highest good.

1474. At according to them (1152b12), he presents the arguments in favor of these opinions.

First, he gives the arguments for the first opinion.

Second, at but not all (1152b20; [1480]), he gives the argument for the second opinion.

Third, at furthermore, no pleasure (1152b22; [1481]), he argues for the third opinion.

Relative to the first point, he offers six reasons.

The first is taken from the definition of pleasure given by those who say that pleasure is a kind of process of the senses to a natural term. When something connatural to us, as it were, is consciously produced in our nature, we delight in it, such as eating and drinking. Now, no such process belongs to the class of ends (building something is not the thing built), but is rather a means to the end. But good has the nature of end. Therefore, no process is good, and consequently no pleasure.

1475. The second reason, at moreover, the temperate (1152b15), is this. No one is praised as virtuous for avoiding good; yet a temperate man is praised for avoiding pleasures. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.

1476. He gives the third reason at again, the prudent (1152b15). It is this: as the prudent man seeks freedom from pain, so he seeks freedom from pleasure. But pain is not good, and by the same token, neither is pleasure.

1477. The fourth reason, at besides, pleasure (1152b16), follows. Prudence is not impeded by any good. But prudence is impeded by pleasure, and all the more as the pleasures are greater. From this, it seems that, of themselves and not merely incidentally, they are obstacles. Thus, sexual pleasure, obviously very intense, impedes the mind to such an extent that no one is capable of exercising the act of understanding at the time of the act of pleasure, for the whole attention of the mind is drawn to it. Consequently, pleasure is not something good.

1478. The fifth reason, at then, too (1152b18), is the following. Every human good seems to be the work of some art, because man’s good comes from reason. But pleasure is not the product of any art, since no art is merely for pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.

1479. He gives the sixth reason at finally, children (1152b19), and it is this. What is childish and animal in man is blamable. But children and dumb animals pursue pleasures. Therefore, pleasure is not something good.

1480. Next, at but not all (1152b20), he shows that not all pleasures are good. He says that this is proved by the fact that some pleasures are shameful, that is, dishonorable, opprobrious, notoriously evil, and so on. And over and above this, other pleasures are evidently harmful because some cause sickness. So, it is clear that not all pleasures are good.

1481. Then, at furthermore (1152b22), he proves that no pleasure is the highest good, even if all pleasures are good, for the end is what is best. But pleasure is not an end, but rather a kind of process. Consequently, pleasure is not the highest good.

1482. He concludes by way of summary: for all practical purposes, these approximate the points raised against pleasure.