Lecture 3 — The Solution of Doubts

First, then, we must try to find out whether or not some people can be knowingly incontinent, and if so, in what way. Next, we must determine in what kind of matter a man is continent or incontinent, whether in every form of pleasure and pain or only in some specific forms, and whether the continent man and the persevering man are identical or different. Likewise, we must give our attention to whatever matters are related to this investigation. [1328]

In the beginning of our inquiry, we ask whether the continent and the incontinent differ specifically, by reason of the matter with which they are concerned, or in the manner of dealing with the matter. We ask whether a man may be called incontinent only because he is concerned with particular matter (or also because concerned with any sort of matter), and whether from only one or the other, or from both (that is, limited manner and limited matter). Again, we ask whether or not incontinence and continence deal with all kinds of matter. [1330]

Incontinence in the unqualified sense is not predicated of a man in all matters, but only in that limited matter in which he may be intemperate. [1335]

Neither is a man said to be continent or incontinent only in this (for then continence would be the same as intemperance), but in conducting himself in a certain way. One (the intemperate man) is led as a result of choice, judging that he must always pursue the present pleasure. But the other (the incontinent man) does not so judge, but pursues the pleasure notwithstanding. [1336]

It makes no difference in the present argument to say that it is real opinion and not objectively verified knowledge against which people act incontinently, for there are some who have only opinion yet are not in doubt, for they think they know with certitude. If, then, it is said that men with opinion rather than objectively verified knowledge act contrary to conviction because they cling feebly to their views, we answer that this knowledge does not differ from opinion in this matter. There are some people who assent no less firmly to matters of opinion than others do to matters of objectively verified knowledge. Heraclitus is an example of this. [1337]

Since we say that a man knows in two ways (for he is said to know both when he uses his knowledge and when he has the habit of knowledge without using it), it makes a great deal of difference in doing what he should not whether a man has the habit of knowledge but is not using it or has the habit and is using it. His situation seems difficult in the latter case, but not if actual consideration is lacking. [1338]

Yet, since we must use two modes of propositions, there is nothing to hinder a man who knows both from operating against the knowledge he uses about the universal but not against the knowledge he has about the particular. This is so because operations concern particulars. But the universal is understood differently: in one way as it is in itself, and in another as it is in a particular case. Thus, “dry foods are good for all men” [universal] and “I am a man” or “such and such a food is dry” [particular]. But it is possible that a man may not know such a universal either habitually or in a particular case. There is so much difference in the modes of knowing that it should not seem unreasonable for one who acts incontinently to know in one manner, yet it would be astonishing for him to know in another. [1339]

In addition, a mode of knowing different from those already discussed is found in man, for we see a difference between knowing by way of habit and knowing in a particular situation. Hence, a man seems in some way to have and not to have knowledge, as is evident in one who is asleep or drunk. It is in this manner that those under the influence of the passions react. Indeed, anger, sexual desires, and certain passions of this kind clearly change the body; some even lead men to madness. Obviously, then, we must say that the incontinent are disposed in a similar way. [1342]

The use of learned terms by the v is not a sign that they operate by a habit of knowledge. In fact, men under the influence of these passions mouth demonstrations and declaim the sayings of Empedocles; and youths beginning to learn prate doctrine but do not really know what they are talking about, for doctrine must become connatural to be known, and this takes time. So, then, we must conclude that the incontinent, in speaking this way, are, as it were, pretending. [1343]

Furthermore, someone may want to consider the reason in terms of man’s nature. There is one judgment that is universal, and another concerned with particulars that are properly the objects of sense. However, since one formal reason is present in such judgments, the mind necessarily comes to a conclusion, while in the practical order, it must immediately be directed to operation. Thus, if a man must taste everything sweet, and this thing is sweet (such as wine or something of the sort), he will at the same time have to taste it when he is able, unless he be prevented from doing so. [1345]

Now, one universal judgment may say, “You must not taste,” and another, “every sweet is pleasant.” At the same time, a particular judgment may say “this is sweet.” In such a case, the sweet can be taken when appetite is present. Reason indeed declares that the particular thing is to be avoided, but the appetite leads to it because the appetite can move any part of the soul. Hence, it happens that a man may act incontinently contrary to reason and judgment. [1347]

But this contrariety is not on the part of the reason itself, but is incidental. It is appetite, not judgment, that is in opposition to right reason. Because of this, dumb animals are not said to be incontinent, since they do not have universal judgment, but only imagination and memory of particulars. [1349]

How this ignorance is dissipated and an incontinent man recovers correct knowledge is the same problem as in the case of one inebriated or asleep. This, however, is not properly our problem, but ought to be solved by physiologists. [1351]

But the ultimate proposition is a judgment according to sensible knowledge and is directive of our actions; and the man who is under the influence of passion does not have this judgment at all, or has it in such a way that he cannot know actually, but speaks in these matters in the way a drunken man repeats the words of Empedocles. Since the ultimate term is neither a universal nor—what amounts to the same thing—an object of scientific knowledge in the manner of a universal [in the practical order], what Socrates was looking for seems to follow. Indeed, passion is not present with knowledge taken in the proper sense; and it is not this knowledge that is dragged along by passion, but knowledge of the sensible. We have discussed whether a person has knowledge or not when he acts incontinently, and how it is possible for him to have knowledge. [1352]

1328. First, then, we must try to find out. After the Philosopher has stated certain probable propositions and raised doubts about each, he now comes to the solutions. We should note he does not present the solutions in the same order in which he previously either stated the propositions or introduced the doubts, but according as the plan of the discussion requires, that is, as the solution of one doubt depends on another.

First, he states his intention;

second, at in the beginning (1146b14; [1330]), he carries out his intention.

He says first that, in order to solve these doubts, we must consider at the outset whether or not some people can be incontinent knowingly; and if so, in what way they know.

This doubt is solved first because its solution belongs to the question of whether or not there is incontinence. We stated previously [1315] that Socrates’ contention seemed to be that there was no incontinence.

But first we must consider whether each exists.

1329. Second, we must consider in what kinds of matter we ought to say a man is continent or incontinent; whether in every form of pleasure and pain or only in some specific forms. This doubt is solved in the second place, although it was proposed in the sixth place [1325], because the beginning of an investigation of the nature of any habit is the consideration of its matter, as is obvious in the manner of procedure followed by Aristotle in the preceding discussions. Since the continent man and the persevering man differ materially, we must ask at the same time whether they differ conceptually. Likewise, we must give our attention to all other matters having a connection and agreement with this consideration.

1330. Next, at in the beginning (1146b14), he begins to solve the doubts previously raised.

First, he settles the question on the existence of continence and incontinence by solving the first doubt that was raised about the third probable statement.

Second, he determines the matter of continence and incontinence by solving the sixth doubt that was raised about the sixth probable statement. Then, because temperance and continence agree in matter, he here explains at the same time the difference between temperance and continence in solving the third doubt that was raised about the fourth probable statement. Likewise, he shows whether the intemperate or the incontinent man is worse in solving the fifth doubt that was raised about the first probable statement. This second part begins at now, we must consider (1147b20; [1354]).

1331. Third, he explains the nature of continence and incontinence in solving the fourth doubt that was raised against the second probable statement. Likewise, with this he answers the second question that was asked about the fifth probable statement, showing that a prudent man cannot be incontinent. This third part begins at can a man be called (1151a29; [1435]).

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he presents in advance certain notions that are necessary for a solution.

Second, at it makes no difference (1146b24; [1337]), he rejects a false solution.

Third, at since we say (1146b31; [1338]), he gives the true solution.

In regard to the first point, he does two things.

First, he states his intention;

second, at neither is a man (1146b20; [1336]), he carries it out.

1332. He says first that, to determine these questions, our primary effort must be directed toward the knowledge of two points.

The first point is whether the continent and the incontinent differ specifically in their subject—that is, in having limited matter with which they are concerned, as meekness differs specifically from the fact that it has to do with anger—or also in the manner, that is, in the way of dealing with any matter, as prudence deals with all moral matter but not in the same way as [other] moral virtues.

1333. In explanation of his inquiry, he adds that we must consider whether a man may be called incontinent only because he is concerned with a particular matter, or even only because he is concerned about the whole of some matter without distinction, or whether a man may be called continent or incontinent not only from the one or the other but also from both, that is, from a limited manner and a limited matter.

1334. Another thing that we ought to consider beforehand is whether or not continence and incontinence deal with all kinds of matter, or with a limited matter.

1335. Then, at incontinence in the unqualified sense (1146b19), he determines his statements.

He first determines the second statement, saying that continent and incontinent in the unqualified sense are not applied to anyone in all matters, but in that limited matter in which he is temperate or intemperate, namely, in concupiscence and pleasures of touch.

1336. Second, at neither is a man (1146b20), he determines the first statement, saying that someone is said to be continent or incontinent not only in respect of some limited matter—for, thus he would be identified with the temperate or intemperate man, since they deal with the same matter—but in conducting himself in such a manner, namely, concerned with limited matter in a certain way. The reason is that the intemperate man is led to commit sin by choice, in a manner judging that a pleasurable object presented to him always is to be pursued or accepted. But the incontinent man does not engage in this reasoning process; nevertheless, he pursues the pleasurable object when it is present to him.

1337. Next, at it makes no difference (1146b24), he rejects a false solution that he has already treated [1316]. He states that it does not make any difference in the present argument to say that the cognition contrary to which some act incontinently is real opinion but not knowledge. The fact is clear that some who act incontinently do not have a weak conviction, like people hesitating, but judge themselves to know certainly that against which they act. If, then, someone means that they are men with opinion rather than knowledge, acting contrary to their convictions because their adherence to their judgments is ineffectual and feeble, our observation is that, in the present instance, knowledge does not differ from opinion. Some people are not less tenacious of even false opinions than others are of true knowledge. This can be seen in Heraclitus, who was so firmly convinced that everything is in perpetual motion and that no truth remains long in things that, at the end of his life, he was unwilling to talk lest truth should be changed in the meantime, but only wagged his finger to indicate something, as is related in Metaphysics 4. (Metaphysics 4.5.1010a12–13; see Aquinas, In IV metaph., lec. 12, nn. 683–84.)

1338. At since we say (1146b31), he gives the true solution.

First, he solves the doubt by some distinctions;

second, at furthermore (1147a24; [1345]), by the nature of practical science.

In regard to the first point, he makes two distinctions.

The first is that we say a man knows in two ways:

by having a habit he does not use (for example, the geometrician not studying questions of geometry);

or by using his knowledge in actually considering its truths.

It makes a big difference whether someone doing what he ought not has the habit but does not use it or has the habit and does use it in thinking. It certainly seems hard for a man to act contrary to what he is actually considering. But it doesn’t seem hard for someone to act contrary to what he knows in an habitual way but is not actually considering.

1339. Next, at yet, since (1146b35), he makes his second distinction. He says that, since practical reason uses two modes of propositions—the universal and the particular—there is no apparent obstacle to a man knowing both propositions in a habitual way but actually considering only the universal and not the particular, and operating contrary to the knowledge. This is so because operations are concerned with particulars. Hence, if a man does not consider the particular, it is not astonishing that he acts contrary to it.

1340. We should note, however, that the universal can be taken in two ways.

In one way, as it is in itself, as in the example “dry things are good for every man”;

in another way, as it is in a particular object, for instance, “this is a man” or “that food is dry.”

Therefore, it is possible that a man knows, both habitually and actually, the universal considered in itself but either does not grasp the universal considered in this particular object (that is, the universal is not known in an habitual way) or does not bestir himself (that is, the universal is not actually known).

1341. Therefore, what appeared impossible to Socrates according to these various modes of knowing differs so much that it does not seem unreasonable for a man who acts incontinently to have one kind of knowledge—namely, universal alone, or even particular—if it is habitual but not actual. But it would seem unreasonable for the man who acts incontinently to have another kind of knowledge, namely, actual, concerned with the particular.

1342. Then, at in addition (1147a10), he makes a third distinction.

First, he sets forth a difference.

Second, at the use of learned terms (1147a18; [1343]), he refutes an objection.

First, he speaks of another mode of knowing in man, over and above the modes discussed. That someone should know by way of habit and not by way of act seems to be understood differently. Sometimes a habit is so responsive that it can go into act immediately when a man wishes. But, at other times, the habit is so bound that it cannot go into act. Hence, in one sense, a man seems to have a habit, and in another sense not to have it, as is evident in one sleeping, a maniac, or a drunkard. Men are disposed in this way when under the influence of the passions. We see anger, sexual desires, and certain passions of this kind obviously change the body externally, such as in causing body heat. Sometimes such passions generate so much heat that they lead people to insanity. So, obviously, the incontinent are disposed somewhat like those asleep, maniacs, and drunkards, who have the habit of practical science impeded in regard to particulars.

1343. At the use of learned terms (1147a18), he refutes an objection. Someone could object against the statement made that the incontinent sometimes use terms dealing with knowledge and with the particular. So it seems they do not have a habit that is held in check. But Aristotle refutes this objection, saying that their use of scientific terminology is not a sign that they have an active habit. He illustrates this by two examples.

1344. The first is that even men who are under the influence of the passions just mentioned (such as the inebriated and demented) mouth demonstrations in geometry and declaim Empedocles’ sayings, which are difficult to understand because he wrote his philosophy in meter.

The second example is of children who, when they begin to learn, put together words that they utter without any real understanding of what they say. To understand, it is necessary that those things that a man hears become connatural to him, as it were, in order that they may be impressed perfectly on his mind. For this, a man needs time, in which his intellect may be confirmed in what it has received by much meditation. This is true also of the incontinent man, for even if he says, “it is not good for me now to pursue such a pleasure,” nevertheless, he does not think this way in his heart. So, then, we must judge the incontinent in saying these words are pretending, as it were, because they think one thing in their hearts and reveal another by their words.

1345. Next, at furthermore (1147a24), he solves the proposed doubt by the natural process of practical science in applying the preceding distinctions to what he proposed.

First, he determines the true sense of the question.

Second, at but the ultimate (1147b9; [1352]), he answers Socrates’ objection.

Regarding the first point, he does two things.

First, he sets forth the natural process of practical science in action.

Second, at now, one universal (1147a31; [1347]), he shows the obstacle that faces the incontinent man.

He says first that, if we wish to consider why the incontinent man can act contrary to his knowledge by the natural process of practical science, we must take into consideration the two judgments in this process.

One is universal, such as “every dishonorable act must be avoided”;

the other is singular and concerned with objects that properly are known by sense, such as “this act is dishonorable.”

But, since there is one formality underlying these judgments, a conclusion necessarily follows.

1346. However, in speculative matters, the mind merely draws the conclusion, while in practical matters, it goes into operation immediately. Thus, if the universal judgment is that we must taste every sweet thing but the particular judgment that “this is sweet,” the man able to taste immediately tastes if nothing prevents. So runs the syllogism of the temperate man, who does not permit concupiscence to have mastery over reason pointing out that every dishonorable act must be avoided. The same goes for the syllogism of the intemperate man. His reason does not resist the proposal of concupiscence that inclines to this: that every pleasure is to be seized.

1347. Then, at now, one universal (1147a31), he explains how fault occurs in the incontinent man.

First, he shows that there is a restraining factor in this man.

Second, at but this contrariety (1147b1; [1349]), he explains the reason.

Third, at how this ignorance (1147b6; [1351]), he explains how this restraint ceases.

On the first point, the proper consideration is this: reason in the incontinent man is not so completely overcome that he is without genuine knowledge of the universal. It can be put thus: the reason proposes a universal judgment forbidding an inordinate tasting of something sweet, that is, it says that nothing sweet should be tasted outside a certain time; but the appetite proposes that every sweet thing is pleasant, something in itself desired by concupiscence; and since, in a particular case, concupiscence may bind reason, the proposal is not accepted under universal reason so as to say also that this is outside the time; but it is taken under the universal aspect of concupiscence so as to say this is sweet. So the conclusion of the operation follows. In this syllogism of the incontinent man, there are four propositions, as already indicated [1346].

1348. That the process of practical reason sometimes occurs in this way is evident from the fact that, when concupiscence waxes strong, reason declares by a universal judgment that a particular desirable thing is to be avoided, as we just mentioned [1347]. But concupiscence inclines to the appetible object by freely proposing and accepting it without the prohibition of reason, now rendered impotent. Concupiscence can be so vehement that it can sway any part of the soul, even reason itself, if reason does not make a strong effort to resist. Thus, the term of the operation takes place: a man may act incontinently contrary to reason and universal judgment.

1349. At but this contrariety (1147b1), he explains the reason for this opposition. He states that the present contrariety does not happen from reason itself, as in uncertain people, but only incidentally so far as concupiscence is opposed to correct universal reason. In fact, there is no judgment in itself opposed to right reason, as some philosophers have maintained.

1350. From this he infers a corollary, that dumb animals are not called continent or incontinent, for they do not make a universal judgment that is the foundation of rational action, to which concupiscence is opposed. They are moved only by imagination and memory of particulars.

1351. Next, at how this ignorance (1147b6), he explains how this opposition ceases. He says that the problem of dissipating an incontinent man’s ignorance about the particular and of his recovery of correct knowledge is the same as in the case of one inebriated or asleep. Their passions are dispelled when some bodily change occurs. Likewise, since the body is changed by the soul’s passions, like concupiscence and anger, this physical change must cease for a man to return to a sound mind. Hence, this problem is not proper to our investigation, but rather we ought to hear it discussed by physiologists, that is, natural physicists.

1352. Then, at but the ultimate (1147b9), in accord with the premises, he refutes the argument of Socrates, saying that the proposition and the ultimate, that is, the particular, judgment is made according to sensible knowledge and is directive of actions concerned with particulars. But a man under the influence of passion either does not have this judgment or premise at all as a habit or has a restrained habit, such that he cannot know actually, but speaks in these matters in the way that an inebriate repeats the verses of Empedocles. Since, then, these things are true, and since the universal, which is known by science, is not the ultimate term of practical operations, what Socrates held seems to follow. It is evident from previous statements that passion is not present with the principal knowledge that deals with the universal, since it is found only in the particular. It is not the knowledge of the universal that is dragged along by passion, but only the evaluation of the sensible, which is not so excellent.

1353. Finally, he summarizes the questions discussed: whether a person has knowledge or not when he acts incontinently, and how it is possible for him to have knowledge.