Lecture 4 — The Generic Matter of Continence and Incontinence

Now we must consider further whether anyone is totally incontinent, or whether everyone is said to be incontinent in a particular way. If totally so, then in what kind of matter is a man thus incontinent. [1354]

It is obvious that the continent and the persevering and the incontinent and the effeminate are concerned with pleasure and pain. [1355]

But, of the objects that give men pleasure, some are necessary; others are desirable in themselves, although capable of excess. I call necessary certain material things concerned with food, sex, and other physical goods that we previously established as the matter of temperance and intemperance. I mention as unnecessary, but desirable in themselves, things like victory, honor, riches, and other pleasurable goods of this kind. [1356]

Therefore, people who go to excess in these things contrary to right reason in them are not called simply incontinent, but with the added note that they are incontinent in matters of money, gain, honor, or anger, as if there were others absolutely incontinent and the former are called incontinent by way of resemblance. Thus, when we speak of the “man” who was the victor in the Olympics, (1148.) the common notion of “man” differed little from the notion of this individual man, but it was different. In confirmation of our contention, incontinence is censured not merely as a sin, but as a kind of vice either in the full sense or the partial sense. But none of those previously discussed are viciously incontinent. [1358]

But men who behave badly in physical pleasures, with which the temperate and the intemperate are concerned, and freely pursue excessive pleasures while avoiding discomforts, like hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and so forth pertaining to touch and taste but contrary to right choice and right reason, are called incontinent not in any limited way, as the incontinent in the matter of anger, but absolutely speaking. Confirmation of this is found in the fact that people are called effeminate in reference to these discomforts but not in reference to others. [1360]

For this reason we place the incontinent and intemperate and the continent and temperate in the same classification; not that one is the other, but because they are concerned with pleasures and pain in some measure, yet not in the same way. Some act from deliberate choice, others without it. [1361]

Consequently, we say the intemperate person is more blamable than another who sins from violent passion, because the intemperate man pursues excesses and avoids discomforts without passion, or at least only with mild passion. What would such a person do were he to experience youthful lust and the serious discomforts from lack of necessities? [1362]

Some kinds of desires and pleasures are in the category of the noble and good. (Some pleasures are by nature desirable; others, just the reverse; and still others are in between, according to the previous division, as in the case of money, profit, victory, and honor.) But in all the intermediate kinds, people are not blamed because they are affected by a desire and love for these things, but rather because their desire is excessive in some way. [1363]

Such are those who possess or pursue in an unreasonable manner any of the things that are noble and good by nature—for example, people having more zeal than they should about the acquisition of honor, or the care of their children or parents (are not blamed as evil). Certainly these operations are good, and people solicitous about them are praised. However, a kind of vicious excess can exist in these matters, for example, if someone should rebel against the gods as Niobe did, or should act toward his parents as did Satyrus, called “father-lover,” who seemed to have behaved rather foolishly in this matter. [1365]

So, then, there is no vice in these pleasures, for as was said, each of them is naturally desirable in itself; only their excesses are evil and to be avoided. Likewise, there is no incontinence in them, for incontinence not only is a thing to be avoided but is something censurable. [1366]

But people speak according as there is a resemblance to passion, putting limits on incontinence about each thing, such as a bad doctor or a poor actor whom they would (not) term a bad person without qualification. The same goes for the things called bad in this way, because badness is predicated of any of them only in an analogous sense. So in regard to continence we must judge as incontinence and continence (unqualifiedly) on that which concerns the same matters as temperance and intemperance. But we predicate incontinence of anger because of a resemblance, and for this reason we qualify, adding that a man is incontinent in anger as we say he is incontinent in honor and gain. [1367]

1354. Now we must consider further. After the Philosopher has shown that a man can perform evil actions contrary to the knowledge he possesses (by this we can know whether continence and incontinence exist), he here determines the matter of continence and incontinence.

First, he shows the matter of each;

second, at continence and incontinence (1150a9; [1404]), he compares them with other habits dealing with the same matter.

To clarify the first point, he employs a twofold procedure.

First, he declares his proposition.

Second, at it is obvious (1147b21; [1355]), he carries out his proposition.

The reasoning employed is this: in proposing the sixth doubt, it was already stated that, if continence and incontinence were concerned with all matters, no one would be incontinent in an unqualified sense. So, in an effort to solve this doubt, he presents two questions for consideration.

The first is this: can anyone be incontinent without qualification or is everyone said to be incontinent in a particular way?

The second question is this: if a man is totally incontinent, in what kind of matter is he so incontinent?

1355. Then, at it is obvious (1147b21), he carries out his proposition.

First, he presents the general matter, saying it is evident that the continent and the incontinent and the persevering and the effeminate are said to be concerned with pleasure and pain.

1356. Second, at but of the objects (1147b23), he investigates the specific matter of these states.

First, he shows how continence may he used in different ways about different pleasures.

Second, at now we will consider (1149a24; [1385]), he compares the kinds of incontinence in different pleasures with one another.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows how a man may be called continent or incontinent in different ways according to the difference in human pleasures among themselves;

second, according to the difference of human pleasures with regard to what is bestial, at of natural pleasures (1148b15; [1386]).

In support of the first statement, he uses a double process.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at some kinds (1148a22; [1363]), he clarifies some statements he had made.

The first point demands three clarifications.

First, he distinguishes human pleasures.

Second, at therefore, people (1147b31; [1358]), he shows how, in these pleasures, a man is called continent or incontinent in different ways.

Third, at for this reason (1148a13; [1361]), he infers certain corollaries from the premises.

1357. He says first of all that, of those objects giving us pleasure, some are necessary for human life, while others are unnecessary but, considered in themselves, desirable for men, however much they are capable of excess and defect. He designates as necessary certain bodily requirements, such as those pertaining to food, drink, sex, and material things of this kind, which we previously established as the matter of temperance and intemperance [267, 595, 599, 603]. But things desirable in themselves, which he mentions as unnecessary, are victory, honor, riches, and other goods and pleasures of the same kind.

1358. At therefore, people (1147b31), he shows in what way a man may be called continent or incontinent in regard to these things:

first, concerning the unnecessary;

second, at but men who (1148a4; [1360]), concerning the necessary.

His first remark is that people who go to excess in their pursuit of those unnecessary things in them that are contrary to right reason are not called simply incontinent, but with a limitation, such as incontinent in the matter of money, gain, honor, or anger, as if there were others absolutely incontinent. The former are called incontinent by way of likeness that the addition indicates; thus, when we say “man” is the victor in the Olympics, the common notion of man differs little from the proper notion, which this addition signifies, although it is different in some way.

1359. As an indication that a man may not be called incontinent without qualification in these matters, he remarks that incontinence is censured not only as a sin that someone can commit even in pursuing what is good though in an inordinate manner; but incontinence is censured as a kind of vice by which we tend to some evil. There is vice either in the complete sense, such as when the reason and the appetitive faculty aim at evil (this is the real vice that is contrary to virtue), or in an incomplete sense, such as when the appetitive faculty, but not the reason, tends to evil, which occurs in incontinence proper. But none of the incontinent previously mentioned are censured as wicked, but only as sinners, because they strive for good, but beyond what is proper. Hence, none of them is incontinent without qualification.

1360. Then, at but men who (1148a4), he shows how someone is called incontinent in regard to necessary things. He observes about men who behave badly in the matter of physical pleasures, with which temperance and intemperance deal—not in such a way that by deliberate choice they pursue excessive pleasures and avoid discomforts (such as hunger and thirst and suchlike pertaining to taste and touch), but such that they pursue these things contrary to the right reason in themselves—that men of this kind are called incontinent not with some limitation like the incontinent in regard to anger, but without qualification. He also offers confirmation of this by the fact that people are called effeminate—closely related to the incontinent—in reference to such discomforts (for instance, because they cannot undergo hunger or thirst or anything of this type), but not in reference to other things (for example, because they cannot bear poverty and suchlike).

1361. Next, at for this reason (1148a13), he infers certain corollaries from the premises.

The first is that incontinent and intemperate and continent and temperate are placed in the same classification, not in the sense that one of them is the other, but because in some measure they deal with the same things, bodily pleasures and pains, yet not in the same way, for the temperate and intemperate act with deliberate choice while the continent and incontinent act without it.

1362. The second, which follows from the first, he sets forth at consequently (1148a17). He says that, from the discussions, obviously the intemperate man is the greater sinner, and to be censured because he sins more in pursuing superfluous pleasures and avoiding slight discomforts when he does not feel passion at all or feels it only gently, that is, mildly. For this reason he is worse than a man like the incontinent fellow, who sins in these matters from violent passion. What would a man do who sins without passion, if he were to experience the vehement desires of youth and the serious discomforts arising from the lack of necessities?

1363. At some kinds (1148a22), he clarifies what he had said, assigning reasons why there is no incontinence without qualification in the case of unnecessary things.

First, he shows why such must be the case.

Second, at but people speak (1148b6; [1367]), he shows why only limited incontinence is predicated of such people.

On the first point, he makes three observations.

First, he points out what kinds of unnecessary pleasures there are.

Second, at such are those who pursue (1148a28; [1365]), he infers what kind of desire is aroused for these pleasures.

Third, at so, then, there is (1148b2; [1366]), he further infers that there is neither vice nor total incontinence in regard to them.

He shows first that some species of desires and pleasures concern things that are good and praiseworthy in themselves.

1364. There are three kinds of pleasures. Some, to which nature inclines, are desirable by nature. Others are just the reverse, such as those contrary to the natural inclination. Still others are midway between, as in the case of money, gain, victory, and honor. Hence, in those of the middle kind, people are not blamed because they are affected by a desire and love for these things, but because they desire them in an excessive manner.

1365. Next, at such are those who pursue (1148a28), he infers from the premises what kind of desire people have for these last types of pleasures. He remarks that those who, contrary to reason, possess or pursue any of the things that are noble and good by nature are not blamed as evil, for instance, people who are more zealous than they should be about honor or about the care of their children or parents. Certainly these operations are good, and men who are properly diligent about them are praised; nevertheless, a kind of vicious excess can exist in such matters, such as if a woman should rebel against God because of excessive love of her children—for example, in the event of their death, as we read of a woman named Niobe—or if a man should do something foolish out of immoderate love of a parent, as a certain Satyrus called philopater (or “father-lover”) seemed to act very foolishly because of the love he had for his father.

1366. Then, at so, then, there is (1148b2), he infers that there is no vice in these pleasures because each of them considered in itself is naturally desirable, while only excesses in them are evil and to be avoided. Likewise, there is no complete incontinence in these pleasures, because incontinence not only is a thing to be avoided as a sin, but is something censurable as being disgraceful. Therefore, it is with bodily pleasures, which are disgraceful and servile, as was said in book 3 [612], that continence is properly concerned. Nor are pleasures of this kind to be desired by men except on account of necessity.

1367. At but people speak (1148b6), he shows why partial incontinence should be predicated of unnecessary pleasures. He say this happens because of some likeness in passion: as someone has an immoderate passion for bodily pleasures, so too for money and other objects previously mentioned. There is a parallel case when we say a man is a bad doctor or a poor mimic (or actor) who nevertheless is not called simply bad. So, then, in the things that are called bad in this way, we do not predicate badness of any of them in an unqualified sense, but according to a proportionate likeness, because, as a bad doctor is compared to what a doctor ought to be, so is a bad man compared to what a man ought to be. Likewise, in the genus of continence, we call continence and incontinence without qualification that which is concerned with the same matters as are temperance and intemperance. But, with respect to anger, we predicate incontinence by similitude, and hence say a man is incontinent in the matter of anger, as we say he is incontinent in the matter of honor or gain.