Lecture 13 — One Pleasure is the Highest Good

But it is obvious that pain is evil and to be avoided. Now one kind is evil simply, and another in a limited sense, in that it hinders good. But the contrary of what is to be avoided—to the extent it is evil and to be avoided—is good. Therefore, pleasure is necessarily a good. [1498]

To answer with Speusippus [that pleasure is opposed to pain and to good] as the greater is to the less and to the equal is not a valid solution, for he would not hold that pleasure is some thing really evil. [1500]

However, there is nothing to prevent some pleasure from being the highest good, even if some pleasures are evil; just as a particular science is the highest even if some sciences are bad. [1504]

Perhaps it is even necessary, inasmuch as there are unimpeded activities of every habit and happiness arises from the unimpeded activity of all these habits or of one of them, that activity should be the object most worthy of our choice. And this activity is pleasure. Therefore, some pleasure will be the highest good even though many pleasures are absolutely evil. [1505]

For this reason, everyone thinks that a happy life is a pleasant one; and understandably they associate pleasure with happiness, for no perfect activity is impeded. But happiness is a perfect good. [1506]

Therefore, the happy man needs goods of the body and external goods of fortune so that he may not be impeded in his activity. People who say that a virtuous man is happy even when tossed about and overcome by great misfortune talk nonsense either willingly or unwillingly. [1507]

Because of this need, it seemed to some philosophers that good fortune is identical with happiness. But this is not true, because too much good fortune is itself an obstacle. Moreover, it is perhaps not right to call superabundance good fortune, for its limit is fixed by reference to happiness. [1508]

The fact that all things including brutes and men seek pleasure is some indication that it is the highest good; for a belief prevalent among most people never dies completely. [1509]

However, since neither the same nature nor the same habit is the best for all, either really or apparently, all do not seek the same pleasure, although they all do seek pleasure. [1510]

Perhaps they do not think, nor would they acknowledge, that they pursue the same pleasure, but in fact they do, for all things naturally have in themselves something divine. [1511]

Bodily pleasures have usurped the right to the name because most people are inclined to them and all share them. Moreover, because these pleasures alone are familiar, they are thought to be the only pleasures. [1512]

Obviously, if pleasure and pleasurable activity are not something good, the happy man will not live a pleasant life. For what reason would a happy life need pleasure if it were not good? [1513]

But it would be possible to live a happy life in pain, for if pleasure is neither good nor evil, the same would hold for pain. Why, then, avoid it? [1514]

Nor would the life of a virtuous man be pleasurable if his activities were not pleasurable [1515].

1498. But it is obvious that pain is evil. After the Philosopher has treated the opinions and answered the arguments of those attacking pleasure, he now shows the opposite truth.

He supports his statement first by direct proofs;

second, at obviously, if (1154a1; [1513]), by concluding to the inconsistent.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows that pleasure is a good;

second, at however, there is (1153b7; [1504]), that one pleasure is the highest good.

He discuses the first point from two aspects.

First, he gives his argument.

Second, at to answer (1153b4; [1500]), he rules out one answer.

He remarks first that everyone admits that pain in itself is something bad and to be avoided; and this is twofold.

For one kind of pain is evil simply, such as sadness about good;

the other kind is evil in a limited way, as a hindrance to good, since even sadness about evil hinders the soul from doing the good readily and quickly.

1499. Obviously, there are two contraries of what is evil and inadmissible: one is evil and to be avoided, the other is good. Thus, to the evil of cowardice are opposed fortitude as a good and rashness as an evil. But to pain is opposed pleasure as a good. Hence, he concludes pleasure is necessarily a good.

1500. Then, at to answer (1153b4), he excludes an answer to this argument. The reason offered does not seem valid, because it concludes from one disjunctive element to its other part: if some good, or a thing to be avoided, is contrary to what is to be avoided, it seems that pleasure, which is contrary to pain—something to be shunned—is a good.

1501. For this reason Speusippus, a nephew and successor of Plato in the Academy, answered that, as the greater is opposed to the less and the equal, so is pain opposed to pleasure, not as to an equal, but as the greater to the less, and conversely—not as an extreme evil to a medium good, but as one extreme evil to another, such as what is deficient to what is excessive, or the reverse.

1502. But Aristotle says that this answer is not plausible, because it would follow that pleasure is really evil according to its own nature, like excess and defect. But no one maintains this.

1503. The Platonists, who were of the opinion that pleasure is not a good, did not hold that pleasure is evil simply and in itself, but they denied that it is a good inasmuch as it is something imperfect or an obstacle to virtue, as is evident from the procedure of the previous argument.

1504. Next, at however, there is (1153b7), he shows that one pleasure is the highest good.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at bodily pleasures (1153b33; [1512]), he assigns the reason for an error.

He shows the first point by two arguments;

the second argument begins at the fact that (1153b25; [1509]).

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he gives the argument.

Second, at for this reason (1153b14; [1506]), he clarifies his statement by some indications, inferring some corollaries from the discussions.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he refutes a contrary argument. Some pleasures seem to be evil. From this, a person can conclude that pleasure is not the best thing. But Aristotle says that this does not prevent pleasure from being the highest good. Likewise, we see that a particular science is the highest, namely, wisdom, as was pointed out in book 6 [1184]; nevertheless, some sciences are bad, not precisely as sciences, but on account of a defect they have either on the part of their principles—because they proceed from false principles—or on the part of the matter, as appears in the practical sciences whose use leads to evil.

1505. Second, at perhaps it is (1153b9), he gives the argument for his statement. He says there are some unimpeded activities of every habit. But happiness is an unimpeded activity either of all good habits or of one of them, as is evident from the discussions in book 1 [118, 130]. Hence, it is necessary that unimpeded activities of this kind are desirable in themselves. But pleasure is an unimpeded activity, as we have just indicated [1492–93]. Consequently, there is a highest pleasure in which happiness consists, although many pleasures are unqualifiedly evil.

1506. At for this reason (1153b9), he clarifies his statement by indications, inferring some corollaries.

The first is that, because happiness is an unimpeded activity—and it also causes pleasure—everyone thinks that the happy life is pleasurable, and they understandably connect pleasure with happiness, since no perfect activity is impeded. But happiness is a perfect good, as was explained in book 1 [111, 112, 117, 118, 201, 222]. Therefore, it is an unimpeded activity inasmuch as it causes pleasure.

1507. From this, at therefore, the happy (1153b17), he further concludes that, because happiness is an unimpeded activity, the happy man needs the goods of the body, such as general health and an uninjured state, and then external goods—called goods of fortune—so that he may not be impeded in his activity by a lack of them. People who say that a virtuous man is happy even when tossed about and overcome by great misfortune talk nonsense, whether they say this willingly (assenting to the statement by intuition, as it were) or unwillingly (as though forced by reason contrary to the available evidence). The reference, of course, is to the Stoic opinion.

1508. He infers a third corollary at because of this need (1153b21): since happiness needs good fortune, it seemed to some philosophers that happiness and good fortune are identical. But this is not so, because too much of the good things is an obstacle to happiness, since some people are hindered by wealth from the work of virtue in which happiness consists. Then, it is not right that a superabundance of this kind should be called good fortune, since the limit—that is, the end—or the norm of good fortune is established in comparison with happiness.

1509. Then, at the fact that (1153b25), he gives his second argument to prove that happiness is the highest good.

Hence, he first states his argument: the fact that everyone pursues pleasure is some indication that pleasure is the highest good; for a thing on which many, at least, agree cannot be entirely false. Thus, it is proverbial that a saying generally expressed among the people never dies completely. The reason is that nature does not fail in all or in most cases but only in a few. Therefore, what is found among all or most men seems to arise from a disposition of nature, which inclines neither to evil nor to falsehood. So it seems that pleasure in which the desire of all men concur is the highest good.

1510. Second, at however, since (1153b29), he excludes a possible objection—not all desire the same pleasure—by returning that his main contention is not so damaged.

This is for two reasons.

First, the same nature and the same habit are not best for everyone, either really or apparently, for the best tendency is one thing in a man and another in a horse. Likewise, the best tendency in a young man is different from that in an old man. And because what is agreeable to each one is delightful to him, it follows that not all desire the same pleasure, although all do desire pleasure. This is the reason why pleasure, but not the same pleasure, is the highest good for all; just as the same tendency of nature is not the best for all.

1511. He gives the second reason at perhaps they (1153b31), stating that it can be said that all men seek the same pleasure according to natural desire but not according to their own judgment. Indeed, not all think in their heart or say with their lips that the same pleasure is the best. Nevertheless, everyone is inclined by nature to the same pleasure as the highest—namely, the contemplation of rational truth—inasmuch as all men naturally desire to know. This happens because all things have in themselves something divine, an inclination of nature—which is derived from the first principle—or even their form itself, which is the basis of the inclination.

1512. At bodily pleasures (1153b33), he assigns the reason why some philosophers were of the opinion that pleasure is not a good or the highest good. He says the reason is that bodily pleasures have usurped the name “pleasure” for themselves as an inherited possession because we are more often inclined to them as being connected with the necessary things of life, and because everyone shares in them as being sensibly perceptible and known to all. Moreover, they alone are commonly acknowledged because people consider them the only pleasures. Since pleasures of this kind are not the highest, some think pleasure is not the highest good.

1513. Then, at obviously, if (1154a1), he explains his proposition by concluding to three inconsistencies.

The first is that, if pleasure and pleasurable activity are not something good, it follows that the happy man may not live a pleasant life; for, happiness not being a good in itself, the life of a happy man should not require pleasure if pleasure were not something good.

1514. Second, at but it would (1154a3), he says that, if pleasure is not a good, it is possible that living in pain is not an evil; for, if pleasure is neither good nor evil, the same would hold for pain, which is the opposite. Thus, pain would not be something to be avoided.

1515. Third, at nor would (1154a5), he arrives at the third inconsistency. It follows that the life of the virtuous man is not pleasurable if his activities are not pleasurable—which would be the case if pleasure were not a good. But it is obvious that virtue is productive of good.