Lecture 10 — The Prudent and the Incontinent Man

Nor can the same man be at once prudent and incontinent, for we have shown that a man is simultaneously prudent and virtuous in action. [1455]

Again, one is prudent not simply by knowing what is right, but especially by doing it, and the incontinent man does not do the right. [1457]

However, nothing hinders a shrewd person from being incontinent. This is why people sometimes seem to be prudent and still incontinent, because shrewdness differs from prudence in the way indicated in our previous discussion. [1458]

They are similar because both reason correctly; they differ because the prudent man follows deliberate choice, but the incontinent man does not. [1459]

This is not to say that the incontinent man resembles one knowing and actually considering; rather he is like a person asleep or drunk. [1460]

So he acts voluntarily, knowing in some way both what he does and why. But he is not evil, for his choice is in a way good. [1461]

Therefore, the incontinent man is partly evil and not absolutely unjust, for he is not a deliberate schemer. However, some incontinent people do deliberate but do not abide by the deliberation; while the impetuous do not deliberate at all. [1462]

The incontinent man is like a city that reckons everything that is logically necessary and has good laws but keeps none of them; as Anaxandrides sarcastically remarked: “A certain city wanted laws but cared nothing about observing them.” The evil man, however, is like a city that observes its laws but has only bad ones. [1464]

Continence and incontinence are concerned with matter that goes beyond the habit of the majority, for the continent abide by reason more than most men, and the incontinent less. [1465]

Among the kinds of incontinence, that by which the melancholic incontinently operate is more easily cured than the incontinence of those who take counsel but do not abide by it. [1466]

Then, too, the habitually incontinent are more easily cured than the naturally incontinent, for it is easier to change a habit than a nature. A habit is difficult to change for the very reason that it is similar to nature; as Evenus would have it: “I say that constant application evolves harmoniously, and it must become men’s nature in the end.” We have now discussed the notion of continence and incontinence and of perseverance and effeminacy, and we have shown in what way these habits are related to one another. [1467]

1455. Nor can the same man be at once prudent. Now that the Philosopher has shown how the continent stand by reason and the incontinent depart from it, he goes on to raise a question: can prudence (the right reason of things to be done) co-exist with incontinence? And his answer resolves his second hesitation that he was advancing on the fifth probability [1317–19].

In this business, there are two steps.

First, this conclusion that prudence and incontinence are incompatible;

second, at they are similar (1152a10; [1459]), the relationship of the incontinent to prudence.

He discusses the initial step in a threefold manner.

First, he plots his course, saying that it is impossible for the same man to be prudent and incontinent at the same time.

1456. Second, at for we have (1152a6), he proves this statement with two arguments.

The first, already explained in book 6 [1172, 1273, 1275, 1285, 1287], is this: prudence accompanies moral virtue, such that a prudent person is likewise morally good. But, in the present problem of the incontinent, there is no moral virtue, insofar as the passions are seductive. Therefore, it is impossible to be prudent and still incontinent.

1457. At again, one (1152a7), he gives his second argument. Prudence involves not just knowledge, but practice. According to previous discussions in book 6 [1216, 1239, 1240, 1269, 1289], prudence does not merely counsel and judge what is to be done; it commands. The incontinent man fails in practice, that is, he does not operate according to right reason. Therefore, the prudent man cannot be incontinent.

1458. Third, at however, nothing (1152a8), he offers a reason for the phenomenon of prudent people being incontinent. There is no reason why a shrewd character, ingenious and skillful, cannot be incontinent. So, it seems at times that prudent people are incontinent precisely because the shrewd have a reputation for prudence. Now, the reason is the difference between prudence and shrewdness, which is that prudence, as it were, adds a further connotation to shrewdness, in the way already described in book 6 [1275, 1279, 1280].

1459. Then, at they are similar (1152a10; [1459]), he compares the incontinent to the prudent man.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he compares the incontinent to the prudent man.

Second, at among the kinds (1152a27; [1466]), he compares the species of incontinence.

He develops the first point in two ways.

First, he makes the comparison.

Second, at the incontinent man (1152a19; [1464]), he uses a comparison.

He handles the first point in a twofold fashion.

First, he makes his comparison.

Second, at therefore, the incontinent (1152a15; [1462]), he infers a corollary from that.

There are three considerations on the first point.

First, he says what he is going to do. He states that the incontinent is like the prudent man in a limited way, according to reason, for both reason correctly. But they differ according to deliberate choice, the prudent man following it and the incontinent man not.

1460. Here, in the second place, at this is not (1152a13), he shows in what sense prudence and incontinence approach reason by denying that the incontinent person, as it were, habitually knows and actually speculates (that is, considers) particular things to be chosen. Rather, he acts like a dreamer or a drunkard, in whom the habit of reason is suspended, as was explained above [1351–52].

1461. Third, at so he acts (1152a14), he clarifies his statement about the difference in deliberate choice. The incontinent person sins willingly enough, for he knows in a way (that is, in general) what he does and why and the other circumstances. Therefore, his act is voluntary. Still, he is not bad, because he does not act by choice; when he is not in the throes of passion, his choice is the good or equitable. But when passion sweeps over him, his choice crumbles and he wills evil. So, the incontinent man differs from the prudent man according to deliberate choice because the choice of the prudent man is not corrupted but that of the incontinent man is.

1462. Next, at therefore, the incontinent (1152a15), he draws a corollary. Since the incontinent man did make a good choice before passion but wills evil through passion, he is consequently partly bad (he wills evil) but not absolutely unjust or evil (not a schemer doing evil, as it were, deliberately and by choice). However, one class of the incontinent—the weak—deliberate but do not stand by their resolution; another class, the melancholic and the highly sensitive—previously called impetuous [1421]—do not deliberate at all. So, it is clear that neither do evil deliberately and by choice.

1463. From these discussions [1455–62], we can gather what the subject of continence and incontinence is. We cannot say that the subject of each is sensual desire, since the continent and incontinent are alike, both having evil desires; nor is the subject of each the reason, since both have right reason. It remains, then, that the subject of each is the will, because the incontinent man voluntarily sins, as was just pointed out [1461]; the continent man voluntarily keeps to reason.

1464. Then, at the incontinent man (1152a19), he uses a comparison with which he does two things.

First, he presents his comparison: the incontinent man resembles a city that plans intelligently, arranges everything logically necessary, and has good laws, but keeps none of them. Thus, Anaxandrides sarcastically said that a certain city wanted laws but cared nothing about observing them. Likewise, the incontinent man does not use the right reason he has. But the bad or the intemperate man, in using perverse reason, is like a city observing bad laws.

1465. Second, at continence and incontinence (1152a25), he explains the last statement (how the incontinent man is like a city that does not observe good laws). In fact, not every excess of right reason makes a man incontinent, but continence and incontinence are so named as being beyond the inclination or habit of the majority. The continent man adheres to right reason more than most people can, for he is the master of sensual desires that are the master of most people. But the incontinent man abides by reason less than most men, because he is overcome by sensual desires that most men overcome, as indicated before [237, 439, 1406, 1410].

1466. At among the kinds (1152a27), he compares the species of the incontinent according to two differences.

First, he says that, among the kinds of incontinence, that by which the melancholic—who do not deliberate—incontinently operate is more easily cured than the incontinence of those who deliberate but do not abide by the deliberation. The reason is that the melancholic, it seems, can be cured when counsel has been taken, but not the others [1442–43].

1467. Then, at then, too (1152a30), he compares the incontinent according to another difference. He says that those who are incontinent by habit are more easily cured than the incontinent by nature—namely, bodily temperament inclining to it—because a habit can be changed more easily than a nature. That for the sake of which a thing exists is itself greater. But a habit is difficult to change because of this, that it is like nature. Evenus the poet expresses it this way: “I declare that daily meditation," that is, constant application, "develops agreeably, smoothly and harmoniously. This, I say, in the end," that is, when perfected, "is nature for all.”

1468. Finally, he ends with an epilogue that we have discussed the notion of continence and incontinence and of perseverance and effeminacy, and that we have shown in what way these habits are related to one another.