Lecture 2 — Doubts on the Duties of Friendship

On the other hand, these questions are raised: whether a man ought to give preference to his father in all matters and obey him, or whether he ought to obey his doctor when ill, or whether a soldier ought to obey his general. Likewise, must someone aid a friend in preference to a virtuous man? Must a person return a favor to a benefactor or oblige a friend, if unable to satisfy both? [1773]

Certainly it is not easy to come to a decision in all such contingencies; for they vary greatly in degree, merit, and necessity. However, it is clear that all the deferences are not to be rendered to the same person. [1774]

As a rule, a man ought to recompense a benefactor rather than present gifts to friends, just as he ought to repay a loan rather than make one to a friend. [1775]

Perhaps this course is not always to be followed, such as in a case of ransom from robbers. Ought a man to ransom a person—whoever he may be—who has freed him from prison? Or ought he to repay the benefactor who is not a captive but asks repayment? Or ought he ransom his father even before himself? [1776]

It is, then, a general rule that a debt should be paid, as we have stated. But if a gift has a special goodness or urgency, it ought to be given. For, sometimes, previous benefits must not be returned equally, such as when the benefit is bestowed on a person known to be virtuous but compensation is paid to the other who is considered wicked. Indeed, a loan is not always to be made to a man who has given a loan, for the lender looks for profit from a good man, but the good man lends with no hope of gain from a bad man. Therefore, if all this is true, no equality is present; if it is not really true, but only thought to be, then the action will not seem unreasonable. [1777]

As we have indicated many times, discussions about our passions and actions have that definiteness belonging to their subject matter. [1779]

It is obvious that the same honors are not to be paid to everyone. Hence, all homage is not given to a father, just as all sacrifices were not offered to Jove. Since different obligations are due parents, brothers, friends, and benefactors, what is proper and becoming ought to be rendered to each group. And such is apparently the custom. For, people send wedding invitations to relatives belonging to the family and interested in its activities. For this reason, they think that kindred particularly should meet at funerals. [1780]

It seems that children should especially provide enough food for their parents; they are indebted to their parents for life itself and should aid them rather than themselves, in a spirit of honor similar to that given to the gods. However, a man should not render every honor to his parents, nor the same honor to his father and mother, nor again to a philosopher and a general. To his father, he ought to give the honor proper to a father, and to a mother, honor belonging to a mother. Similarly, to all elderly persons, he should show honor appropriate to age by rising for them, giving them seats, and so on. To friends and brothers, he should offer confidence and community of goods. Moreover, to kinsmen, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens, and others of this standing, a person must always try to allot appropriate honor and to accord each his due in conformity with propinquity and virtue or usefulness. [1782]

Judgment in these matters is easy when people are of the same class, but difficult when they are of different classes. Nevertheless, we should not avoid the decision but make it as best we can. [1784]

1773. On the other hand, these questions are raised. After the Philosopher has investigated the preservation of friendship by proportionate repayment, he now raises doubts concerning benefits and repayments to friends.

First, he raises the doubts;

second, at certainly it is not (1164b27; [1774]), he solves them.

In treating the initial point, he presents three doubts.

The first is whether a man must assist his father in all matters and obey him rather than anyone else, or whether he must obey other persons in some matters. For example, must a feverish or sick patient obey the doctor before his father? Or ought a soldier follow the general’s orders rather than his father’s?

The second doubt is whether someone is bound to help his friend in preference to a virtuous person.

The third doubt is whether a man ought to make a return to a benefactor for a favor before he makes a present to a friend, if unable to satisfy both.

1774. Next, at certainly it is not (1164b27), he solves these questions:

first, by a general answer;

second, at as a rule, a man ought, by specific answers.

He remarks first that it is not easy to decide all these questions with certitude, because their many variations can be considered in all sorts of ways—for instance, the greater or less degree to which someone is a good man or friend or benefactor. Likewise, there is a difference sometimes in goodness or necessity. Thus, it seems to be better to help a virtuous person or a friend, but more necessary to help a benefactor. However, in these matters, all the deference is not to be given to the same person, but one kind to some and another kind to others.

1775. At as a rule (1164b31), he solves previous questions by specific answers.

First, he solves the third doubt.

Second, at it is obvious (1165a14; [1780]), he solves the first doubt, and this is understood to include the solution to the second doubt.

He treats the first point under three aspects.

First, he teaches what must be observed generally. He notes that a man should make a return to a benefactor before making a present to a friend if it is not possible to do both. The reason is that a person is bound in honor to return benefits in the same way that he is bound to repay a loan in legal justice.

1776. Second, at perhaps this course (1164b33), he offers a case where this statement does not hold. He says that what has been affirmed is not always to be observed, such as in the event that someone can be freed from robbers. It can be uncertain which of three choices should be made.

First, ought a man to liberate from robbers a person—whoever he may be—who ransomed him from prison at one time?

Or, second, ought a man repay this benefactor who has not been captured but asks a return in some other form?

Or, third, ought a man to ransom his father from robbers?

The third choice must be made in preference to the others, because it seems that a man is bound to ransom his father even before himself.

1777. Third, at it is, then (1165a2), he shows how we must observe what was said previously.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at as we have indicated (1165a12; [1779]), he deduces a corollary from the discussion.

He remarks first that his preceding directive that we must pay a debt rather than give presents is to be generally observed. But, if a gratuitous gift has a special goodness (say, a very virtuous person needs assistance) or urgency (for example, someone is in a position to ransom his father), it ought to be given preference. For, the return that a person makes for previous benefits sometimes cannot be equalized by a gratuitous gift, such as when, on the one hand, the benefit is bestowed on a man known to be virtuous and, on the other, a return is made to him who is considered to be wicked.

1778. Nor is it surprising that a benefactor must not be repaid sometimes, for a person is not always bound to accommodate someone who has accommodated him. Sometimes a bad man does a favor for a good man, thinking to make a profit out of it. But the good man does not expect gain from a loan to a bad man. If, then, the man is really bad, obviously there is no equality between what should be returned to him and what to the virtuous person. If, however, the benefactor is not really bad but the recipient thinks so, it does not seem unreasonable to make a gift to the good man instead.

1779. Then, at as we have indicated (1165a12), he deduces a corollary from the discussion. Obvious from our present study [1774–78] is the truth we have affirmed many times that discussions about human actions and passions cannot settle anything with certitude; likewise, they cannot settle the matters treated by human actions and passions.

1780. Next, at it is obvious (1165a14), he solves the first doubt.

First, he explains that not all honors are to be shown to a father.

Second, at it seems that (1165a21; [1782]), he decides what honors are to be given to certain persons.

He notes first that, evidently, not the same honors are to be paid everyone. Hence, all homage is not to be offered to a father, just as all sacrifices among the pagans were not offered to Jove, but some were given to the other gods. Different obligations are due to parents, brothers, friends, and benefactors; hence, those that are proper and belong to each group are to be attributed to them. Likewise, the same notion is applicable to virtuous persons.

1781. In fact, people seem to act in this way: they send wedding invitations to all those who belong to the family, since, as a result of weddings, the family is increased. They also invite their kindred to activities connected with weddings. For the same reason, men think that relatives should meet in kedea, or council, to discuss matrimonial matches.

1782. At it seems that (1165a21), he shows what honors are to be given to certain persons.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at judgment in these matters (1165a33; [1784]), he shows in what cases judgment is easy and in which it is difficult.

He says that, in the matter of food, it seems that children ought to provide enough for their parents before all others. They are indebted in this way to their parents as the authors of their existence by generation. Consequently, in matters belonging to the conduct of life itself, they should aid their parents rather than themselves. Likewise, men owe honor to their parents, the authors of their existence, as to the gods.

1783. However, man is not bound to render every honor to his parents, since he neither owes the same honor to father and mother nor owes his father the honor due a philosopher or a general. But a son ought to give his father the honor proper to a father, and to his mother the honor that belongs to a mother. Similarly, one should show honor to an elderly citizen on account of his age by rising and bowing to him and so on. Besides, he ought to trust and share what he has with friends and brothers, and also with kinsmen, fellow tribesmen, fellow citizens and others of this standing. A person must always try to allot to everyone what is appropriate and to accord each his due in conformity with the dignity of age or virtue like wisdom, and with the exercise of an office like military commander.

1784. Then, at judgment in these matters (1165a33), he shows where this is easy and where difficult. He remarks that judgment in such matters is easy when people belong to one class. For example, of two relatives, we must help rather the closer; of two wise men, the wiser. But it is more difficult to make judgment if people are of different classes—for instance, whether we ought to help a wiser person in preference to a near relative. Although this matter is hard to decide, nevertheless we should not shirk its consideration, but settle the problem as best we can.