Lecture 12 — Limitation of the Number of Friends

Should a man, then, make as many friends as possible? Or, just as it has been wisely said about traveling—“may I be called neither a great traveler nor a homebody”—perhaps it will be fitting in friendship that a man should be neither without friends nor with an excessive number. [1913]

This statement seems to be quite applicable to those who make friends for utility. For, it is burdensome to repay the services of many people and a man’s life is not long enough for the task. Therefore, more friends than are sufficient for our own life distract and prevent us from noble living, and there is no need for them. [1914]

Likewise, a few friends for pleasantness are enough, as a little seasoning is enough in food. [1916]

But a question arises concerning virtuous friends as to whether we should have as many as possible. Or is there a limit to the number of one’s friends as there is to the population of a city? Ten men do not make a city, and with one hundred thousand men, it is no longer a city. Perhaps the exact size is not a particular number, and it might well be any mean between definite limits. [1917]

The number of one’s friends, too, should be limited; they may be as numerous as the people with whom a man can associate and divide himself, for this attribute seems to belong in a special way to friendship. That one cannot live and share himself with great numbers is all too evident. [1918]

Besides, one’s friends must be friends of one another if they are all to spend their time together. But with a large number, this is hard to achieve. [1919]

It is difficult also to share intimately in the joys and sorrows of a great number of people. Indeed, a man may very likely be called upon to rejoice with one and grieve with another at the same time. [1920]

It does not seem possible to have a great many friends for the reason that one cannot love several persons. Indeed, love is a kind of excess of friendship, and this is possible with one person only, or with a very few. [1921]

Perhaps, then, it is not well to seek as many friends as possible, but as many as are sufficient for living. We see that this is so in practice, for people do not have many friendships of the comradely type—comrades are said to sing in pairs. Those who have a host of friends and are on familiar terms with everybody seem to be real friends of no one; they are, though, friends in the way proper to fellow citizens, and are generally called obsequious. [1922]

One may have friendship with many as fellow citizens and not be obsequious, but really virtuous. But it is not possible to be friends to a large number for their own and for virtue’s sakes. A man should be satisfied to find a few such friends. [1924]

1913. Should a man, then, make as many friends. After the Philosopher has discussed doubts concerning friendship on the part of those who love, he now discusses doubts on the part of those who are loved.

He states three doubts concerning the initial point.

The first concerns the number of friends;

the second doubt, at are friends more (1171a20; [1925]), concerns the need of friends;

the third, at may we say then (1171b29; [1944]), concerns the companionship of friends.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he proposes the doubt, whether or not a man ought to make as many friends as possible. A sound point seems to have been made about traveling in someone’s proverb: may I be called neither a gadabout nor a stay-at-home; that is, let it not be said of me that I wander aimlessly through many countries nor that I never leave home for the purpose of traveling. The same is appropriately applied to friendship: a man should be neither without friends nor with an excessive number.

1914. Second, at this statement (1170b23), he solves the question.

He does so first as it concerns useful friendship. He remarks that the statement about avoiding a superfluous number of friendships seems to be quite applicable to those who are friends for convenience or utility, for if a man has many such friends from whom he receives favors, then conversely he must bestow many favors. This is excessively burdensome, such that those who wish to act in such a way do not have enough time.

1915. Therefore, if a man’s useful friends are more numerous than is necessary for his own life, they distract and hinder him from the blessings of a life that consists in virtuous activity. The reason is that, while a person gives extra attention to the business of others, he cannot properly care for himself. Evidently, then, a man has no need of many useful friends.

1916. Second, at likewise, a few (1170b28), he observes that a few friends are enough also for pleasantness. The external pleasantness provided by friends of this kind is sought in human living like seasoning in food that suffices even when very little is used. Hence, even a few pleasant friends are sufficient for a man that he may relax with them for a short time.

1917. Third, at but a question (1170b29), he solves a question regarding virtuous friends.

First, he proves his proposition by a reason;

second, at perhaps, then, it is not well (1171a13; [1922]), from experience.

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he repeats the question. He says that it remains to be considered whether someone ought to make as many virtuous friends as possible, such that, the more he has, the better he is. Or should he set some limit to the number of friends, as is evident concerning the number in a city, which is not composed of only ten men, but neither, on the other hand, is it composed of ten myriads (a myriad equals ten thousand)—for such a number of citizens forms not a city, but a country. But how great a multitude is required for a city has not been determined according to a particular number, because a city can be large or small. However, there can be two extremes, and whatever is a mean between these can be determined as a suitable population for a city.

1918. Second, at the number of (1170b33), he solves the question, saying there should not be an immense number of friends, but rather the number ought to be limited.

He proves this by three arguments.

The first is that friends can be as numerous as the people with whom a man can closely associate, for this attribute seems to belong to friendship more than others; that is, it seems suitable to virtuous friendship. Obviously, it is not possible for a person to associate with a vast multitude and share himself among many people. Clearly, then, one cannot have a great number of virtuous friends.

1919. He offers the second argument at besides, one’s friends (1171a4). It is evident that friends ought to live with one another. So, if a man has many friends, it is likewise necessary that all these should be mutual friends. Otherwise they cannot pass their time in each other’s company, nor consequently live on friendly terms. But it is difficult to arrange this among a great many such that they may be friends of one another. Thus, it is apparently impossible for one man to have a multitude of friends.

1920. He presents the third argument at it is difficult also (1171a6). We said above [1894–98] that a friend rejoices with a friend. But it is difficult for anyone to share intimately in the joys and sorrows of a great number of people. It may very likely happen that a person must at the same time rejoice with one and grieve with another, which is impossible. Therefore, it is out of the question for a man to have a vast number of friends.

1921. Third, at perhaps, then (1171a13), he concludes what he proposed for discussion, that it is well for a man not to seek as many friends as possible but as many as are enough for living together, because it does not seem possible for a man to be very friendly to great numbers. So, likewise, one man cannot love many women by an intense sexual love because perfect friendship consists in a kind of excess of love that can be felt for only one or a very few persons. For, what is superlative always belongs to the few, since achievement of the highest perfection cannot take place in most cases due to a multiplicity of defects and hindrances.

1922. Then, at perhaps, then, it is not well (1171a13), he proves his proposition from experience. We see in practice that a person has friendship for a few, for one does not have many friends according to the friendship of comrades, that is, companions or partners. This is shown by a proverb according to which comrades are said to sing in pairs.

1923. It is a widespread custom for young people to stroll two by two singing in good fellowship. But polyphiloi—that is, those who have a host of friends or are on familiar terms with everybody—seem to be real friends of no one, for they do not associate long with any particular person, but are friendly with everyone in passing. However, such persons are said to be friends in a civil way, as is usual among citizens who judge friendship according to compliments and familiarities of this sort. Those who are friendly with a great number of people in this fashion are generally called obsequious, which means an excess of external pleasantness, as was explained in book 4 [816, 828].

1924. Finally, at one may (1171a17), he shows the kind of friendship people have who are said to be friends with many. He observes that this is possible according to political friendship not only in the sense that an obsequious person is a friend of many, but also in the sense proper to a virtuous person. It has been indicated above [1836] that friendship between citizens seems to be identified with concord. But the good man is of one mind with many in affairs pertaining to civic life. However, it is not possible for a virtuous man to have friendship for a great number such that he loves them for themselves and not only for utility or pleasure. But rather it ought to be pleasing and dear to a man if he can have a few such friends for the sake of virtue and themselves.