Lecture 5 — Goodwill

Goodwill resembles but is not really friendship. [1820]

For goodwill may be felt toward people who are unknown to us or who are unaware of it, but not friendship—questions we have discussed already. [1821]

Nor is it love, for it does not include intensity or desire, effects that follow love. [1822]

Moreover, love is accompanied by familiarity, while goodwill may arise suddenly, as it does toward athletes in contests: spectators become well disposed and sympathetic to the contestants but will take no active part, for they feel goodwill suddenly and love only superficially. [1823]

Goodwill certainly seems to be the beginning of friendship, as pleasure derived from seeing is the beginning of love. For, no one loves who has not been first delighted by what he has seen. However, a man who delights in the form of another does not therefore love him; but there is love if he desires the beloved when he is absent and longs for his presence. In a similar way, people cannot become friends unless they first have goodwill. But they are not therefore friends, since the benevolent only wish good to others and are neither active in their behalf nor distressed by their misfortunes. Therefore, by extension of meaning, goodwill can be called an ineffective friendship, though it does develop into friendship from continual and habitual goodwill. [1824]

But it is not friendship based on utility, nor that based on pleasure. [1826]

For there is no place for goodwill in these friendships. In that for utility, the recipient is merely acting justly when he returns goodwill for benefits received; and the person who wishes another to prosper in the hope of getting rich by means of him does not seem to have goodwill to the other, but to himself. Likewise, a man is not a friend who is anxious about someone in order to make some use of him. [1827]

As a general rule, goodwill is created by reason of virtue and equity when a person seems to another to be good or brave or the like in the way competing athletes do, as we have pointed out. [1829]

1820. Goodwill resembles but is not really friendship. After the Philosopher has shown what the works of friendship are and who does them, he now treats the works individually. These works of friendship can be reduced to three, as we have indicated [1789–1801]: beneficence, goodwill, and concord. So he now delineates the three of them:

first concerning goodwill, which consists in an interior affection for a person;

second, at likewise, concord (1167a22; [1830]), concerning concord, which consists also in affection, but based on personal considerations;

third, at benefactors seem (1167b17; [1840]), concerning beneficence that consists in exterior proof of friendship.

He considers two aspects of the first point.

First, he shows that goodwill is not friendship;

second, at goodwill certainly (1167a3; [1824]), that it is the beginning of friendship.

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows that goodwill is not friendship in its habitual character;

second, at nor is it, nor is it love in terms here of passion, as noted in book 8 [1602].

He treats the first point under two headings.

First, he states his intention, observing that goodwill seems to resemble friendship, inasmuch as all friends must be of goodwill. Nevertheless, it is not the same as friendship.

1821. Second, at for goodwill may be (1166b31), he proves his statement by two arguments.

The first is that goodwill can be felt for strangers whose acquaintance one does not have from familiar association. But this is impossible in friendship.

The second argument is that goodwill can be unknown to the person who has our goodwill; this cannot be said of friendship. These questions were discussed in the beginning of book 8 [1560].

1822. Then, at nor is it love (1166b32), he shows that goodwill is not love for two reasons.

The first is that goodwill does not include intensity of soul or desire, that is, passion of the sensitive appetite that, by its impulse, extends the soul with a kind of violence toward an enticing object. This occurs in the passions of love, but not in goodwill, which consists in a simple movement of the will.

1823. He assigns the second reason at moreover, love (1166b34). He remarks that love is accompanied by familiarity, for it indicates a vehement impulse of the soul, as was just stated. But the soul is not accustomed to be moved instantly and with vehemence toward an object, but is led gradually to what is greater. Therefore, love increases by means of familiarity. But, since goodwill implies a simple movement of the will, it can arise suddenly, such as when people watch athletic contests: the spectators become kindly disposed to one of the two contestants and would be pleased if this particular athlete won. However, they would do nothing to bring this about, because men are instantly benevolent and love superficially, that is, according to a mere feeble movement of the will that does not break forth into action.

1824. Next, at goodwill certainly (1167a3), he shows that goodwill is the beginning of friendship.

He handles this point in a twofold manner.

First, he proves that goodwill is the beginning of friendship.

Second, at but it is not (1167a12; [1826]), he shows which friendship has goodwill as its beginning.

He observes first that goodwill is called the beginning of friendship, as pleasure at the sight of a woman is the beginning of love for her. For no one begins to love a woman unless he has been first delighted by her beauty. However, when a man is pleased at the sight of a woman’s form, he does not immediately love her. But it is sign of complete love that he desires her, as if he feels her absence keenly and longs for her presence when she is absent. The same is true of friendship and goodwill, for it is impossible for people to be friends unless they have goodwill first.

1825. Nevertheless, they cannot be called friends from the fact that they have goodwill, because people of goodwill merely wish good to the objects of their benevolence, but not to the extent of doing good deeds for them or of being distressed by their misfortunes. Consequently, it can be said, changing our way of speaking, that goodwill is a kind of lazy friendship, since it is not joined with any friendly activity. But, when a person continues a long time in goodwill and becomes used to wishing well to anyone, his soul is strengthened in willing good, so that his will is not idle, but active, and friendship arises in this way.

1826. At but it is not (1167a12), he shows which friendship has goodwill as its beginning.

First, he shows which friendship does not have goodwill as its beginning;

second, at as a general rule (1167a18; [1829]), which does.

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he states his intention. He notes that goodwill is not raised by length of time and habit to the genuine kind of friendship that is based on utility or pleasure.

1827. Second, at for there is no place (1167a13), he proves his statement. Goodwill does not develop into that friendship that has no room for it. But goodwill has no place in the friendships just mentioned. This is obvious in pleasurable friendship, where each friend desires from the other his own enjoyment—a thing that is sometimes accompanied by harm to the other, thus destroying goodwill. However, goodwill is possible in useful friendship, so far as concerns the recipient of benefits; for he returns goodwill at least for the benefits he has received, if he acts justly.

1828. If one wishes another to be healthy and prosperous because he hopes to have an abundance of possessions through the other, he does not seem to have goodwill toward that other, from whom he hopes to become rich, but toward himself. Likewise, a person does not seem to be a friend of someone who is anxious about that person’s good for his own advantage, that is, in order to make some use of him.

1829. Then, at as a general rule (1167a18), he shows which friendship has goodwill as its beginning. Aristotle remarks that, in general, goodwill seems to exist for a person because of his virtue and equity; it seems to someone that the person toward whom he is benevolent is good or brave or the like—qualities that people are accustomed to praise. He notes this reaction we have manifested toward athletes for whom we have goodwill on account of the courage or similar virtue they seem to possess.