Lecture 1 — Proportionate Properties in Friendship

In all friendships of dissimilar persons, proportion equates the parties and preserves friendship, as has been indicated. Thus, in justice between citizens, a return according to value is made to the shoemaker for the shoes he gives. A similar thing is done to the weaver and to other artisans. [1757]

For that reason people invented money to serve as a common measure, and all salable goods were referred to it and measured by it. [1759]

In friendship, however, the lover sometimes complains because his lavish love is not returned—but perhaps he has nothing deserving of love. On the other hand, the beloved very often complains that the lover had promised everything before, but now fulfills nothing. [1760]

These accusations are made when the lover seeks pleasure, the seeks beloved utility, and neither has the qualities the other seeks. Consequently, the friendship is broken off since the very reasons why it was formed no longer remain. The parties did not love one another for themselves, but for advantages to be gained, and these were not enduring; hence, neither were the friendships enduring. But friendship based on virtue remains, as we have indicated, because each friend is loved for himself. [1761]

Friends quarrel when given favors different from what they desire, for failure to get what a man wants is like getting nothing. This recalls the lyre player who was promised that, the better he sang, the more he would be paid, but next morning when he demanded fulfillment of the pledge, the man who promised replied that he had already given pleasure (that is, of expectation) for pleasure. Certainly, if each had wished this, it would have been satisfactory. But if one wanted amusement and got it while the other wanted gain and did not get it, an unfair exchange was made; for a man is intent on acquiring what he needs and will give what he possesses to get it. [1762]

But who is to fix the amount due to each, the person giving or the person receiving the benefit? The giver evidently seems to leave this to the recipient, as they say Protagoras used to do. For when he taught, he told the student to estimate the value of the knowledge imparted; and Protagoras accepted no more. But in such matters, some are satisfied to let a man have his fixed fee. [1764]

Those who first accept money and then carry out nothing they promised—their promises being extravagant—are proper targets for complaints; they are not doing what they undertook to do. The Sophists were forced to this course, for nothing would have been given for their teaching. Such persons, then, are justly accused for not doing what they are paid to do. [1766]

Where the gift is not made with a promise of service, people who give for the sake of others cannot be complained of—as we have noted. This is in accord with the nature of friendship for virtue, and a return is made in view of the giver’s intention, which has a special relevancy in a friend and virtue. A similar course should be followed with those imparting philosophy, for their value cannot be measured in terms of money, nor can they be given an equivalent return. Perhaps it suffices that we repay them what is possible, as is done with the gods and our parents. [1767]

If the gift is not of this nature, but was made in view of a recompense, a return that seems fair to both parties must be arranged. When this is not possible, appraisal of compensation by the beneficiary will seem not only necessary but just. [1769]

A person will have what is just when he is repaid according to the help and pleasure afforded the recipient; and this is what happens in buying. [1770]

In some places, the law prescribes that no legal action is possible in voluntary contracts, taking the position that a person who trusts another should be repaid according to the terms of the original agreement. It supposes that the person receiving the benefit makes a more just arrangement. In general, those who have things and those who want them do not make equal valuations; each group puts a big price on what it owns and has for sale. But a return is made according to the appraisal of the recipient. [1771]

However, a man ought to appraise a benefit not at the value it seems to have after he gets it but at the value it had before he received it. [1772]

1757. In all friendships of dissimilar persons. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of friendship and defined the kinds of friendship, he now discusses the properties of friendship in book 9.

First, he gives the properties.

Second, at likewise the question (1168a28; [1855]), he raises doubts on questions already settled.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he considers matters pertaining to the preservation and the breaking up of friendship.

Second, at kindly acts (1166a1; [1797]), he investigates the effects of friendship.

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he treats matters pertaining to the preservation of friendship.

Second, at a question comes up (1165a36; [1785]), he considers questions concerned with its destruction.

He handles the first point under three headings.

First, he proposes a means of preserving friendship.

Second, at for that reason (1164a1; [1759]), he shows how friendship is disturbed by the absence of this means.

Third, at but who is (1164a22; [1764]), he recommends remedies against disturbance of this sort.

1758. Obviously, friendship between equals is preserved by a fair return. Hence, he first explains how it is possible to preserve friendship existing between persons unlike one another—a thing that seems rather doubtful. He observes that, in all such friendships between dissimilar persons, like father and son, king and subject, and so on, friendship is equated and preserved by something that is analogous or proportionate to each. He makes this clear by an example found in political justice; accordingly, we said in book 5 [975–76] that a return in conformity with proportionate value is made to the shoemaker for the shoes he gives. The same thing applies to the weaver and other artisans.

1759. Then, at for that reason (1164a1), he shows how friendship is disturbed by lack of a proportion.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he states the reason why disturbance of this sort cannot happen in an exchange based on justice. He observes that here, in exchanges between citizens, there is found a common measure, currency, to which all articles of exchange are referred as to a criterion; and their price is measured by means of currency. Consequently, what is to be charged for them can be determined. But the relations that are exchanged in friendship, such as affections and services of friends, cannot be computed in money.

1760. Therefore, at in friendship, however (1164a2), he explains how friendship is disturbed by lack of a proportionate measure.

He shows this first from the fact that one friend does not repay the other;

second, at friends quarrel (1164a13; [1762]), from the fact that repayment is not what was deserved.

He discusses the first point under two headings.

First, he proposes the cause of the disturbance in friendship.

Second, at these accusations are made (1164a6; [1761]), he shows in which friendships this occurs.

Concerning the first point, we must note that repayment in friendship is judged according to two phases.

The first is in relation to the interior act of love. On this aspect, he says that, in friendship, the lover sometimes complains that, while he lavishes love on the beloved, the beloved does not return the love; and, at times, his complaint is unjustified, such as when he does not have anything making him deserving of love.

Second, repayment of friendship is made in external gifts or services. Regarding this aspect, he remarks that the beloved very often complains because the lover had promised him everything in the beginning but delivered nothing in the end.

1761. Next, at these accusations are made (1164a6), he shows in which friendships this occurs. He remarks that these mutual complaints between lover and beloved take place when the lover seeks pleasure and the beloved wants utility. But sometimes these qualities are not present because neither does the beloved provide pleasure for the lover, nor the lover utility for the beloved. Consequently, the friendship is broken off, since the very reasons for its existence no longer remain. The persons did not love one another for themselves, but for the conditions mentioned, namely, utility and pleasure; and these are not enduring, so neither are friendships of this kind. But friendship for the sake of virtue is permanent—as we have indicated [1622–23]—because friends love each other for themselves according to virtue.

1762. At friends quarrel (1164a13), he shows how friendship is disturbed because repayment is not made in the service sought, but rather in something else. He observes that, very often, friends contend among themselves when they have been given favors different from those they desire; for failure to get what a man wants is like getting nothing at all.

1763. He gives an example of a lyre player who was promised that, the better he sang, the more he would be paid. But the morning after playing, when he asked fulfillment of the pledge, the man who promised replied that he had already returned pleasure for pleasure, because he had conversely given the musician pleasure. If the lyre player was looking for pleasure, the repayment made him was sufficient. But, if the one who promised wanted amusement and the player gain, an unfair exchange was made since one party has what he wanted but the other does not. The man who offers a service is intent on getting what he needs and he gives what he possesses to get it.

1764. Then, at but who (1164a22), he recommends remedies against these disturbances in friendship.

He discusses this point from two aspects.

First, he suggests the means to be used to preserve peace in friendship.

Second, at on the other hand (1164b22; [1773]), he resolves a difficulty.

He treats the first point under two headings.

First, he explains who should determine a proper repayment in friendship.

Second, at where the gift (1164a33; [1767]), he shows how this repayment is made.

He handles the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows that the estimate of a fair repayment should be made by the person who first receives the benefit.

Second, at those who first (1164a27; [1766]), he shows how complaint in friendship follows from this person’s negligence.

1765. He notes first that the arrangement of the amount of repayment pertains to both the man who bestowed and the man who received the benefit. However, he who bestowed it seems to leave the estimate of the repayment to him who received it. Thus, it is said that, when Protagoras the philosopher taught students, he told each to reward him with presents that seem to the student fair for the instruction received from the teaching, and Protagoras accepted only that much. In such services of friendship, some are satisfied to be recompensed according to the recipients’ judgment of the benefits. In this way, they seem to receive an adequate fee, because it is given for the man doing the favor and not for the favor done. This is why it seems satisfactory that the fee suffice for the man even if it is not equal to the benefit.

1766. Next, at those who first (1164a27), he shows how friendship is disturbed by negligence on the part of those who first receive. He remarks that those who first accept money before they render any service and then do none of the things they promised—perhaps because their promises were extravagant—naturally meet with complaints, since they do not perform what they promised. This is what the Sophists are driven to do, because nothing would be given them for everything they know if the decision was left to their students, for all their learning consists in shallow and trifling doctrines. So, then, these men are accused when they do not perform the duties for which they accept a fee.

1767. At where the gift (1164a33), he shows how repayment ought to be made in friendship:

first, in friendships based on virtue;

second, at if the gifts (1164b6; [1769]), in other kinds of friendships.

He observes first that, where the gift is not made with an agreement or promise of a certain service, as was done in the friendships already treated, men sometimes bestow benefits for the sake of the person receiving them and not in view of a return. It is evident from discussion in book 8 [1743] that such people are not to be complained of, for this is characteristic of friendship according to virtue, in which a return must be made by considering the intention or will of the doer. Indeed, intention has a special relevancy to friendship and virtue, as has been noted [1538].

1768. Our view regarding friendship that consists in the sharing of virtue is the view we should take of the sharing of philosophy, for instance, between master and student. The value of philosophy to someone learning is not measurable in terms of money; neither can a student make an equivalent return to his teacher, but perhaps that return that suffices for God and parents is to be made.

1769. Then, at if the gift (1164b6), he shows the way a return is made in the other kinds of friendship.

He discusses this point from three aspects.

First, he proposes his intention.

Second, at a person will have (1164b10; [1770]), he proves his proposal.

Third, at however, a man (1164b20; [1772]), he answers an implied question.

He says first that, if the benefit is of such a nature that the person does not give for the friend’s sake, but wishes repayment, there must be a return that seems fair to both the giver and the recipient. If this is not possible, then he who was benefited ought to determine a compensation that is reasonable; such a procedure is not only necessary but just.

1770. At a person will have (1164b10), he proves his proposal:

first, by argument;

second, at in some places (1164b13; [1771]), by the authority of law.

He notes first that a fair repayment will be determined according to the help a person receives from a friend’s benefit in useful friendship and from pleasure acquired in pleasurable friendship. Buying, too, seems to be done in this fashion, that a man’s appraisal of a thing will be the price he pays for it. But the amount of help or pleasure derived from a benefit can best be known by the person receiving the help or pleasure. Consequently, it is necessary and just to make repayment according to his judgment.

1771. Next, at in some places (1164b13), he proves the same point by the authority of law. He observes that, in some states, the law prescribes that no redress is possible in voluntary agreements for one of the parties who afterward pleads deception. If a person voluntarily trusts someone with a benefit or service, payment must be made according to the judgment of the person trusted in conformity with the conditions of the original exchange. For, legislators are of the opinion that the person who was given the benefit at the outset ought to arrange the repayment more justly than he who granted it. They think this way because there are many things that are not valued at the same price by those who have them and by those who want to have them. Indeed, individuals apparently think that the goods they offer are worth a big price. But a return ought to be made according to the appraisal of the recipients.

1772. At however, a man (1164b20), he answers an implied question. He says that a man ought to estimate a benefit not at the price that he considers fair after he receives it, but at the value he gave it before he received it. For, men generally desire temporal goods less when they possess them than when they did not have them, and this is especially true of the necessities of life.