Lecture 9 — A Virtuous Man’s Love of Self

But such a man, rather than his vicious counterpart, seems to be a lover of self, for he assigns to himself the noblest and best goods. [1866–67]

He yields to the leading principle in him and makes everything obey it. [1868]

As a state or any other society seems to be identical with the most dominant element in it, so too does a man. Consequently, a person who loves and yields to this part will be a lover of self in a marked degree. [1869]

Furthermore, a person is called continent or incontinent inasmuch as this element is in control or not, which supposes that it is man himself. [1870]

And the actions that men do according to reason seem to be their own in the most proper sense, and to be voluntary. [1871]

It is evident, then, that everyone is, or chiefly is, this part, and that the just man loves it exceedingly. He is therefore singularly a lover of self, in a sense other than that of the man who is censured. The difference is between living according to reason and according to passion, between desiring what is good and desiring what seems advantageous. [1872–73]

But those who busy themselves with good works in an exceptional manner receive the approval and praise of all. [1874]

And if everyone strives for what is good and aims at doing what is best, the whole community will satisfy its needs and each member will possess the best of goods, since virtue is the best good. [1875]

Therefore, it is reasonable for the virtuous man to love himself, for in doing good, he will help both himself and others. But it is unfortunate for the bad man, because he injures both himself and his neighbors by following his passions. [1876]

As a result, what the evil man ought to do is in conflict with what he does, for the reason always chooses good for itself. But the good man obeys his reason. [1877]

It is true of the virtuous man that he does many actions for the sake of his friends—and country—and if necessary dies for them. He will sacrifice money, honor, and all the goods men strive for, gaining for himself an honorable good. [1878]

For he will prefer a short period of intense delight to a long period of quiet existence, an illustrious life of a year to an ordinary life of many years, a single notable good deed to many insignificant ones. Certainly, those who die for others seem to obtain this result; thus, they choose a great good for themselves. [1879]

Likewise, they throw away money so that their friends may gain more. This way, a friend gets the money but the virtuous man acquires an honorable good, and thus assigns to himself what is better. [1881]

He acts in the same manner toward honors and position. For, the good man readily sacrifices all preferments for a friend, since this action seems a laudable good. It is reasonable, then, to consider him virtuous when he prefers what is honorable to all other goods. [1882]

He may even defer to his friend in performing actions; for it is better to be the cause of a friend’s acting than to act himself. In all praiseworthy activity, the good man assigns to himself the larger share of virtue. [1883]

A person, then, ought to be a lover of self in this sense, as we said before, but not in the sense that most are lovers of self. [1884]

1866. But such a man, rather than his vicious counterpart. After the Philosopher has shown how a man may be called a lover of self in the blameworthy sense, he now shows how a man may be called a lover of self in the praiseworthy sense.

He discusses this point from two aspects.

First, he shows that there exists a way in which someone is a lover of self that differs from the preciding way.

Second, at but those who (1169a6; [1874]), he shows that to be a lover of self in this sense is praiseworthy.

He considers the first point under three headings.

First, he shows that a man is self-loving who takes for himself an abundant share of the goods of reason.

Second, at it is evident, then (1169a2; [1872]), he shows that the virtuous person is of this nature.

Third, at in a sense other than (1169a2; [1873]), he shows that this manner of loving oneself differs from that previously discussed.

He treats the first point in a threefold fashion.

First, he proposes his intention. He says that this man, who is anxious to excel in the works of virtue, seems to be philautos or a lover of self, rather than the man who assigns to himself an excessive amount of physical goods.

1867. Second, at for he assigns (1168b28), he proves his proposition by two arguments. The first is that a person loves himself more to the extent that he assigns to himself greater goods. But he who makes it his business to excel in virtuous works assumes for himself the goods that are noblest and best, that is, the honorable kind. Therefore, such a one especially loves himself.

1868. He offers the second reason at he yields (1168b30). A person of this type bestows good things on the principal element in him, namely, the intellect; and he induces all parts of the soul to obey the intellect. But the more someone loves an object, the more he loves what is more principal in it. It is evident, then, that the man who wishes to be eminent in good works loves himself in a high degree.

1869. Third, at as a state (1168b31), he proves what he had taken for granted: that the person who loves the most dominant element in him, the intellect or reason, particularly loves himself.

He proves this by three arguments.

The first is that, in the state, it is the most authoritative part that especially seems to be the state. Hence, what the rulers of a state do is said to be done by the whole state; and the same reason holds for any other composite of several parts. Consequently, in man, it is his reason or intellect, his principal element, that especially seems to be man. Therefore, he who loves his intellect or reason and treats it well seems to be philautos, or a lover of self, most of all.

1870. He presents the second argument at furthermore (1168b34). Someone is said to be continent because he controls himself and incontinent because he does not. It is to the extent that a man observes reason by following its judgment, rather than repudiates reason on account of incontinence, that he is this element, namely, his intellect. So it seems that such a man truly loves himself who loves his intellect.

1871. He states the third argument at and the actions (1168b35). He observes that men’s reasoned actions seem to be theirs in the most proper sense and to be done voluntarily. What a man does because of concupiscence or anger he does not seem to do by his own will, but under the direction of an external impulse. It is evident, then, that man is in a particular fashion what conforms to his intellect and reason. Hence, he especially loves himself when he loves his intellect and reason.

1872. Next, at it is evident, then (1169a2), he shows who is properly a lover of self in this sense. He remarks that it is obvious from the discussion [1869–70] that everyone is his intellect or reason, or rather (since several other ingredients concur in the essence of man) it can be said that man is especially this part, that is, intellect or reason because it is the formal and perfective element of the human species. Obviously, the virtuous person loves his intellect or reason exceedingly, because he perfectly preserves and universally obeys it. Hence, it is clear that the virtuous person is philautos, or a lover of self.

1873. Then, at in a sense other than (1169a2), he explains that this manner of loving oneself differs in kind from that previously discussed. He notes that the virtuous person is a lover of self according to a kind of self-love that differs from the brand censured before [1863–65].

He gives two differences.

Onet is on the part of the activity, for the good man loves himself inasmuch as he lives according to reason. For, the man who is blamed lives according to passion, following the irrational desires of his soul, as has been pointed out [1864].

The other difference exists on the part of the motive. For the good man loves himself inasmuch as he seeks for himself what is the absolute good. But the man who is blamed loves himself inasmuch as he seeks what seems a useful good but is really harmful.

1874. At but those who (1169a6), he shows that to love oneself in the second way is praiseworthy.

First, he presents his proposition.

Second, at it is true (1169a18; [1878]), he excludes from the person who loves himself in the second way that for which the lover of self is blamed.

He discusses the first point under three headings.

First, he shows that the man who loves himself according to reason is worthy of praise. For this man is anxious to excel in good works, as we have indicated [1867]. But it is evident that everyone approves and praises those who busy themselves with virtuous activity in a manner different from other men, that is, in a more extensive manner. It is obvious, therefore, that the person who loves himself according to virtue is to be praised.

1875. Second, at and if everyone (1169a8), Aristotle shows that this person is also helpful to both himself and others. We just said that he who loves himself according to virtue is eager to perform exceptionally good actions. But if all strove for what is good such that everyone aimed to excel his neighbor in virtue by doing his best, the whole community would have its needs satisfied. The reason is that one would come to the assistance of another and the goods that are best—namely, virtues—would become the property of each.

1876. Third, at therefore, it is reasonable (1169a11), Aristotle deduces two corollaries from the discussion.

The first is that it is best for the good man to love himself because, in doing good, he helps both himself and others. But it is unfortunate that the bad man loves himself, for in following his evil desires, he will injure both himself and his neighbors by depriving himself of virtue and them of physical goods.

1877. He states the second corollary at as a result (1169a15), noting that what the evil man does is opposed to what he ought to do; he is acting against his intellect or reason. But the intellect always chooses what is best for itself. Thus, the bad man does not do what he should do. On the other hand, it is characteristic of the virtuous man to obey his reason always.

1878. Then, at it is true (1169a18), he excludes from the person who loves himself according to virtue the complaint previously lodged [1855–65] against a lover of self: that he does nothing for anyone else.

He treats this point in a threefold manner.

First, he states his intention.

Second, at for he will prefer (1169a22; [1879]), he explains his intention.

Third, at a person, then, ought (1169b1; [1884]), he sums up the truth of the question in an epilogue.

He notes first the truth of the statement about the good man—that he, far beyond all other men, will do many acts for the sake of his friends and country. Even if it is necessary to die for a friend, he will not forsake him. For the sake of a friend, he will, as it were, cast aside and disdain wealth, honor, and all other external goods for which men strive, and by means of all this, he procures for himself an honorable good that is more excellent. Hence, even in this way, he shows more love for himself and procures his greater good.

1879. Next, at for he will (1169a22), he explains his statement:

first, concerning death, which a good man will undergo for his friend;

second, at likewise, they throw away (1169a26; [1881]), concerning the fact that he contemns external goods for the sake of his friend;

third, at he may even (1169a32; [1883]), concerning virtuous actions that a good man sometimes entrusts to his friends.

He remarks first that the good man dying for his friend procures good for himself, because he chooses to delight for a short time in a brilliant work of virtue rather than for a long time in a quiet existence, that is, indifferently in mediocre works of virtue.

1880. He prefers an illustrious life of a year to an ordinary life of many years. Similarly, he prefers a single notable good deed to many insignificant ones. Although those who die for virtue may live more briefly, nevertheless, by endangering themselves for a friend, they do a greater good in this one action than in many other actions. Thus, in acting virtuously by exposing their lives for a friend, they choose a great good for themselves. From this it is clear that they love themselves very much.

1881. At likewise, they throw away (1169a26), he explains this point concerning contempt for external goods.

First, in respect to money, he says that virtuous people throw away (that is, despise or disperse) money for the sake of friends, so that their friends gain more with the money. In this way also they really love themselves more, for when a person gives money to a friend and acquires an honorable good for himself, obviously he assigns the greater good to himself, and under these circumstances loves himself more.

1882. Second, at he acts (1169a29), he explains the same point in respect to honors and dignities, noting that the good man behaves in the same way toward honors and position. For, he readily gives up all these preferments for a friend, since this very action is a virtuous and laudable work. Clearly, then, the virtuous person acts in a reasonable manner when he chooses the great good of virtue instead of all external goods, and so he loves himself most.

1883. Then, at he may even (1169a32), he shows the same point about virtuous actions themselves. He observes that the virtuous man sometimes even defers to his friend in doing good actions. For instance, if a virtuous work is to be done by him or another person, he lets his friend do it to derive profit and praise in this way. However, even here the virtuous person takes what is better for himself; for it is better and more virtuous to cause his friend to do these actions than to do them himself. This is particularly true when the opportunity remains for him to do the same or greater deeds at another time. Thus, it is evident that the good man assigns to himself the larger share of virtue in praiseworthy activity, and so has much love for himself.

1884. He concludes by way of summary that a person ought to be a lover of self, as we said the good man is, but not as most men who are not virtuous are lovers of themselves.