Lecture 10 — A Doubt on a Happy Man’s Need of Friends

Some doubt whether or not a happy man needs friends. [1885]

It is said that, because happy people are self-sufficient, they do not need friends; since they have all good things, being self-sufficing, they need nothing else. Now, a friend is looked upon as another self who provides what a man himself cannot. [1886]

Hence the saying “if fortune favors us, what need of friends?” [1887]

There seems to be an inconsistency in attributing to a happy man all goods but not friends, since a friend seems to be the greatest of external goods. [1888]

If it is more characteristic of a friend to give than to receive a benefit, more proper to virtue and a virtuous man to do good for others, and better to be kind to friends than strangers, then the virtuous person will need friends whom he can benefit. [1889]

This is why the related question arises: does a man need friends more in prosperity or in adversity? Undoubtedly, the unfortunate man needs them to help him, and the fortunate man needs friends he can help. [1890]

It seems strange indeed to make the happy man solitary. For, no one would choose to have the whole world if he had to live alone, since man is naturally a social animal and fitted by nature to live with others. Therefore, the happy man lives in this way because he has what is naturally good. But obviously it is better to live with friends and virtuous men than with strangers and chance acquaintances. Therefore, the happy man needs friends. [1891]

What, then, are the followers of the first opinion holding, and to what extent is their opinion true? Do they, like the majority, look upon friends as useful people? Certainly the happy man will not need such friends, for he has useful goods already; nor will he need those whom one chooses for their pleasantness, except to a slight extent. Indeed, the happy man does not require pleasure from the outside, for his life is pleasant in itself. Since, then, he does not stand in need of friends of this sort, he seems not to need friends at all. [1892]

Certainly this is not true. For we said in the beginning that happiness is an activity; and activity obviously is a coming into being and is not like something in one’s possession. But happiness consists in living and doing, and the activity of the good man is virtuous and pleasurable in itself, as we noted earlier. Of all pleasures, happiness is proper to a virtuous man. Now we can study our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own. Evidently, then, virtuous persons find pleasure in the actions of friends who are good men, since they have both qualities that are naturally pleasurable. The happy man, therefore, will need such friends, inasmuch as he wants to study actions that are good and his own, and the actions of the virtuous man who is his friend are of this nature. [1894]

Besides, people think that a happy man should live pleasantly. Now, the man who lives alone does have a hard life, since it is not easy to keep up a continuous activity by oneself. But, with others and in relation to others, it is less difficult. Therefore, his activity will be more continuous and delightful in itself, as it ought to be for the happy man. Indeed, the good man, as such, rejoices in virtuous actions but is distressed by those that arise from wickedness; he is like a musician pleased by good music but irritated by bad. [1897]

Then, too, a companionship in virtue results from living with good men, as Theognis remarks. [1899]

1885. Some doubt whether or not a happy man. After the Philosopher has investigated and solved the question that was raised about a person loving himself, he now solves the question that was raised of a person loving another.

First, he proposes the doubt.

Second, at it is said (1169b4; [1886]), he shows that the doubt is reasonable.

Third, at what, then, are (1169b22; [1892]), he solves it.

He notes first that there is a doubt whether or not the happy man needs friends.

1886. Then, at it is said (1169b4), he shows that the doubt is reasonable by raising difficulties for both sides.

First, he objects for the negative;

second, at there seems to (1169b8; [1888]), for the affirmative.

He objects in a twofold manner for the initial position.

He does so first by an argument. Some say that happy people are self-sufficing and do not need friends; they have all good things, and so, being complete in themselves, they seem to need nothing else. But a friend, inasmuch as he is another self, seems to be necessary to provide what a man cannot obtain by himself. So, apparently, a happy person does not need friends.

1887. Second, at hence the saying (1169b7), he offers a pagan proverb in favor of the same view: “when the spirit is benign, there is no need of friends.” The pagans, especially the Platonists, believed the order of providence was such that human affairs were governed by divine dispensation through intermediary spirits. Some of the spirits, they held, were favorable, while others were malevolent. Therefore, the proverb says that, when a man enjoys the favor of divine providence, as happy people seem to do, he has no need of friends.

1888. At there seems to be (1169b8), he objects for the opposite side by three arguments.

It seems unreasonable to assign all external goods to a happy man and not assign him friends, since a friend is the greatest of external goods.

1889. He treats the second argument at if it is more characteristic (1169b10), handling it in a twofold manner.

First, he presents the argument. We have pointed out already that it is more characteristic of a friend to give than to receive a benefit. But it is proper to virtue to impart benefits, and happiness consists in virtuous action, as indicated in book 1 [127–28]. The happy man, then, is necessarily virtuous and beneficent. But it is better for a man to be good to friends than to strangers, other things being equal, because he does this with more pleasure and alacrity. Consequently, since a happy person is virtuous, he needs friends whom he can benefit.

1890. Second, at this is why (1169b13), he deduces a doubt from the premises: whether a man has need of friends more in adversity than in prosperity. He seems to need friends in both circumstances, for the unfortunate man needs friends to help him and the fortunate man needs friends he can help. But this doubt will be pursued later [1925–43].

1891. He presents the third argument at it seems strange indeed (1169b16), saying that it appears unreasonable for the happy man to be solitary, for this is contrary to everyone’s choice. No one would choose to live alone all the time, even after he had all other goods, because man is naturally a social animal and fitted by nature to live with others. Since, therefore, the happy person has what is naturally good for man, he should have people to live with. Obviously, it is better for him to live with friends and virtuous men than with strangers and others. Thus, it is clear that the happy man needs friends.

1892. Next, at what, then, are (1169b22), he solves the preceding doubt.

First, he shows how those who deny that a happy man needs friends may be saying what is true;

second, at certainly this is not (1169b28; [1894]), how they may be saying what is false.

He says first that, since we have just proved that the happy man does need friends, we must consider what the followers of the first opinion are holding when they deny the happy man’s need of friends, and to what extent their opinion may be true.

1893. On this question, we should note that most men consider as friends those useful to them in the bestowal of external goods—and these alone are appreciated by the common run of men. Therefore, the happy man does not need friends like this, for the goods he has are enough. Likewise, he does not need friends for pleasantness, except in that minor way in which we need jests for relaxation, as is said in book 4 [844–45]. Indeed, the happy man does not require external pleasures for which such friends are absolutely necessary, for his life is pleasant in itself, as we have indicated in book 1 [145]. Since, then, he does not stand in need of these useful and pleasant friends, it seems that he has no need of friends.

1894. Then, at certainly this is not (1169b28), he shows that their statement is not entirely true.

First, he proves this by moral arguments;

second, at looking more profoundly (1170a13; [1900]), by a more intrinsic reason.

He offers three reasons for the first point.

First, it is not true that, if the happy man does not need useful and pleasant friends, therefore does not need any friends at all, as affirmed previously [1892–93]. For there are virtuous friends whom he does need. The primary reason for this is that happiness is an operation [144–45, 180, 1267].

1895. It is evident that operation consists in doing; it is not an entity existing in the manner of permanent things, as if it were a possession that, once obtained, a man would be happy without the necessity of doing anything. But happiness consists in continual living and doing. Now, the operation of the virtuous man must be good and pleasurable in itself, because it is essentially good, as indicated in book 1 [156]. But, among pleasures, good operation is the pleasure proper to the virtuous man, for the person who would not delight in virtuous operation would not be virtuous, as we stated in book 1 [158].

1896. Therefore, it is a requisite of happiness that the happy man delights in the work of virtue. We can have pleasure only in what we know. But we can examine our neighbors better than ourselves, and their actions better than our own, because every man is a bad judge of his own case on account of the private affection he has for himself. Evidently, then, virtuous persons find pleasure in the actions of those who are both virtuous men and friends of theirs; in them are found both qualities pleasurable by nature: the good and the lovable. In this way, therefore, the happy man will need these virtuous friends, inasmuch as he seeks to study the virtuous actions of the good man who is his friend. Since a man’s friend is another self, so to speak, the friend’s actions will be his own in a sense.

1897. He presents the second argument at besides, people think (1170a4). It is generally thought, he says, that the happy man should live pleasantly, since pleasure is one of the conditions for happiness—we have noted this in book 1 [158]. But he who lives by himself experiences a hard and burdensome life; pleasure that he enjoys following upon activity must be interrupted, for it is not easy for a man to be continuously active by himself, namely, when living alone. But it is easy if he lives with another, since a kind of interchange of activities takes place while they perform good actions for one another. In this way, pleasure is continued.

1898. If, then, a man lives with friends, his virtuous activity delightful in itself will be more continuous. And this ought to be true for the happy man so that he may have uninterrupted pleasure in works of virtue. For, the good man as such rejoices in virtuous actions performed either by himself or others. Moreover, he is grieved by contrary actions arising from another’s wickedness, like a musician who is pleased by good music but irritated by bad.

1899. He presents the third argument at then, too (1170a11). Here, he observes that, because the virtuous person lives on friendly terms with good men, there results ascesis, or a companionship in virtue, as the poet Theognis has remarked. Such an association is advantageous for anyone disposed to virtue, just as other human activities also are more satisfactorily accomplished in partnership.