Lecture 8 — Doubt Concerning Love of Self

Likewise, the question arises whether a person should love himself most or someone else. [1855]

For men criticize those who love themselves most and call them self-lovers, as if this were a term of disgrace. [1856]

The bad man apparently does everything for himself, and the more he acts this way, the worse he is. Therefore, people complain that he does nothing unrelated to himself. On the other hand, the virtuous man does what is honorable. And, the better he is, the more he works for the good and for his friend’s sake, even overlooking his own interests. [1857]

But the facts are not in agreement with the arguments presented, and this is hardly surprising. It is commonly held that we ought to love best the person who is our best friend. But that man who most wishes good to another for his sake is his best friend, even if no one will know about it. Certainly, in his attitude toward himself, a man best fulfills these conditions, and indeed all other conditions that enter into the definition of a friend. For, as has been pointed out, all the attributes of friendship are derived from this relationship, and are extended to other men. [1858–59]

Likewise, all the proverbs are in accord with this position, such as: “friends are of one mind and heart”; “friends share alike”; “friendship is equality”; and “friends are near as knee and shin.” Now all these sayings are verified especially of a person in relation to himself, for he is his own best friend, and therefore ought to love himself best. [1860]

It is questionable, then, which opinion we ought to follow, since both seem plausible. [1861]

Perhaps, in such discussions, we must distinguish and determine both to what extent and in what way each side is expressing the truth. If we understand how each uses the expression “lover of self,” the truth may then be evident. [1862]

People using it as a term of reproach call those “self-loving” who assign to themselves more than their share of money, honors, and physical pleasures. For, these goods are desired and zealously sought as being best by most men and, as a result become, a source of contention. Hence, those who are plentifully supplied with such things gratify their desires and passions in general and the irrational part of their soul. But most men are like this, and so the epithet has been taken from the generally existing type that is evil. So, men who are lovers of self in this sense are justly condemned. [1863]

Obviously, it is the people who amass these goods for themselves who are usually called self-loving, for if a person were zealous above all else to do works of justice, or temperance, or any other virtue, devoting himself entirely to the acquisition of good, no one would censure such a man as a lover of self. [1865]

1855. Likewise, the question arises. After the Philosopher has treated the preservation and dissolution of friendship, along with the works of friendship, he now raises some difficulties concerning it.

He does so first on the part of the one who loves;

second, at should a man then (1170b20; [1913]), on the part of those who are loved.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he solves the doubt concerning the love a person has for himself.

Second, at some doubt whether (1169b3; [1885]), he does so concerning the love a person has for others.

He considers the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he states the doubt.

Second, at for men criticize (1168a29; [1856]), he shows its plausibility.

Third, at perhaps, in such (1168b12; [1862]), he offers the solution.

He remarks first that a doubt exists whether a person should love himself most or someone else more than himself.

1856. Then, at for men criticize (1168a29), he shows that the doubt is plausible.

First, he objects on one side;

second, at but the facts (1168a35; [1858]), on the other side;

third, at it is questionable, then (1168b10; [1861]), he finishes doubting on the question.

He treats the first point under two headings.

First, he introduces the fact that men criticize those who love themselves most, and it is accounted as evil that some people are self-lovers.

1857. Second, at the bad man (1168a30), he observes that the evil person does everything for gain; and the more he follows this, the worse he is. And the more consistently he does this, the more severely people blame him as one who does nothing unrelated to himself, that is, nothing for the good of others, but only for his own. However, virtuous men do not act for themselves alone; rather, they do what is honorable both for themselves and their friends. For this reason they frequently overlook their own advantages.

1858. At but the facts (1168a35), he objects on the opposite side. He states that the facts are not in agreement with the reasons just presented, according to which men are shown to love themselves most. And this is not in a way unlikely.

This is first because, according to the general opinion, we must love best the person who is our best friend. But that man who most wishes good to another for his sake is his best friend, even if no one else might know it. Certainly these conditions exist especially in a man’s attitude towards himself, for everyone especially wishes good to himself. Evidently, then, a man ought to love himself most of all.

1859. Second, at and indeed (1168a35), he introduces in favor of this view the point he has just made [1858]. He observes that all the other conditions determining and defining the nature of friendship are found in a man’s attitude toward himself, as he noted there. The reason is that all the attributes of friendship that are considered in reference to others are derived from the amicable relation a person bears toward himself.

1860. Third, at likewise, all (1168b6), he offers several proverbs to the same purpose. He notes that current proverbs are in accord with this position that a man should love himself most of all, such as: friends are of one mind and heart; friends share alike; friendship is equality; and friends are akin as knee and shin (which are very close). All these sayings show us that friendship consists in a kind of oneness that especially belongs to a man in relation to himself. Thus, all the quoted proverbs are verified particularly of a person toward himself. And this because a man is his own best friend, and so a person ought to love himself most of all.

1861. Next, at it is questionable (1168b10), he finishes doubting on the question. He remarks that there is a reasonable doubt which of these arguments we ought to accept, since both appear to have some plausibility.

1862. At perhaps, in such (1168b12), he solves the doubt he has discussed.

First, he determines the method of solution;

second, at people using (1168b15; [1863]), he gives the solution.

He first observes that, in such discussions that marshal probable reasons for each side, we must distinguish and define to what extent and in what way each is expressing the truth. In this way, if we understand how a love of self is used in both parts of the objections, the truth we seek will appear.

1863. Then, at people using (1168b15), he solves this doubt by making a distinction.

First, he shows how a man may be called a lover of self in the blameworthy sense;

second, at but such a man (1168b28; [1866]), in the praiseworthy sense.

He considers the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he explains his intention.

Second, at obviously, it is the people (1168b23; [1865]), he proves his statement.

He says first that people who consider “lover of self” a term of reproach call those “self-loving” who assign themselves more than their share of material goods, like money, honors, and physical pleasures (of food and sex, for instance); for the majority desire goods of this nature, and men give their attention to them as though they were best.

1864. Because most people try to acquire an excessive amount of them and not everyone is able to have so much, strife and contention arise over these goods. Besides, those who are more plentifully supplied with them utilize this abundance to satisfy their desires and all passions in general, and accordingly the irrational part of the soul, to which the passions belong. Thus, men who seek goods of this sort love themselves according to the irrational or sensitive part of their soul. Most men are such that they follow sense rather than reason. Therefore, the epithet “lover of self” has been taken from what is evil—this is appropriate to many people. Thus, a philautos, a lover of self in this sense, can be frequently found among men, and is rightly condemned.

1865. At obviously, it is the people (1168b23), he proves his statement. He notes that, obviously, most people usually call philautoi or lovers of self those who amass for themselves these goods pertaining to the irrational side of man. For, if a person should wish to abound in goods of reason, namely, virtuous actions—for example, if he wishes among other things to do especially the works of justice or temperance or any other virtue—so that he always wants to acquire honorable good for himself, no one from the crowd will call him philautos or lover of self. Or if some wise man should call him self-loving, he will not say this in censure.