Lecture 7 — Beneficence

Benefactors seem to love those they have benefited more than those who are well treated love their benefactors. [1840]

This seems unreasonable, and we look for an explanation. [1841]

Many people think the reason is that beneficiaries are debtors while benefactors are creditors. Just as, in the case of loans, borrowers wish that the lenders did not exist but the latter worry about the welfare of their debtors, so the bestowers of benefits wish the recipients to live in order to receive their thanks but the recipients care little about giving thanks. Epicharmus would perhaps say that people who are of this opinion look at things in a bad light. But it does have the appearance of being very human, for most men are forgetful and more desirous of getting benefits than giving them. [1842]

But perhaps the reason is more in the nature of things and there is no parallel in the case of lenders. For they do not love their debtors, but wish them to be preserved for the sake of gain. On the other hand, benefactors love and feel friendship for those who receive their benefactions even when the recipients are of no use now and may never be. [1844]

This happens with craftsmen, for each one loves his product more than he would be loved by it were the product alive. Likewise, it occurs especially with poets, who love their own poems, doting on them as their children. A similar situation exists with benefactors, for the person benefited is the result of their efforts and they love him more than he loves them. The reason for this is that, for all men, their existence is a thing to be chosen and cherished. But our existence consists in an actuality—that is, in living and operating—and the operation is in a way the agent in action. For this reason, craftsmen love their products because they love their existence; and this is natural, for the product manifests in actuality what the agent is in potentiality. [1845]

Then, too, for the benefactor, his action is morally good, and therefore he finds joy in its object. But, to the recipient, there is nothing noble in his relation to the giver. If any good exists, it is utilitarian and has less of pleasure and friendship. [1848]

However, there is pleasure about the present in activity, about the future in hope, and about the past in memory. But the most delightful of these is activity, and it is more lovable too. For the benefactor, then, his activity remains, since good is enduring; but, for the recipient, the utility passes away. [1849]

Likewise, the memory of noble things is pleasant but that of useful things is either not at all or, at best, to a less degree pleasant. On the other hand, the opposite seems to be true with expectation. [1850]

Moreover, loving resembles activity, but being loved resembles passivity. Assuredly then, those who excel in activity love and have the concomitants of love. [1852]

Besides, people have greater love for things they get as a result of labor. Thus, those who earn wealth value it more than those who inherit it. Now, there is nothing burdensome about receiving a benefit, but bestowing one involves much labor. For this reason, mothers are fonder of their children than are fathers, since mothers suffer more pains in giving them birth; and they know better than do fathers who their children are. And this, too, seems to be applicable to benefactors. [1853]

1840. Benefactors seem to love those. After the Philosopher has defined goodwill and concord, he now considers beneficence.

First, he states an incident connected with it, observing that benefactors seem to love those they benefit more than those who are treated well love their benefactors.

1841. Second, at this seems (1167b18), he raises a question on this point, remarking that the statement is puzzling because it seems contrary to reason. For, beneficiaries are bound because of debt to love their benefactors, but not the reverse.

1842. Third, at many people (1167b19), he answers the question, assigning the reason for this phenomenon.

First, he gives an apparent reason;

second, at but perhaps (1167b28; [1844]), he gives the real reasons.

First, he says many think the reason is that beneficiaries are in debt to their benefactors. But a debt is owed to benefactors as to lenders. Now we see in the case of loans that borrowers wish their lenders did not exist, so that they might be free of debt. On the other hand, lenders, who have payments coming, take care of the welfare of their debtors for fear of losing what is owed to them. So, too, benefactors wish existence and life to those they have benefited for the sake of receiving thanks from them. But beneficiaries are not solicitous about returning thanks, but wish to be excused from this duty. For that reason, they love their benefactors very little.

1843. The philosopher-poet Epicharmus, in approving this reason, might possibly say that people who accept it consider men’s bad qualities; but it seems a common practice that is among many men. In fact, most people forget benefits and want to get more than they give.

1844. Then, at but perhaps (1167b28), he assigns four real arguments.

He makes two observations on the first argument.

First, he prefers this argument to that given earlier [1842–43]. He says that the reason for the statement just made seems to be the more natural one that is now offered, because it is taken from the nature of a benefit—unlike the reason assigned previously, which is taken on the part of the lender. Lenders do not indeed love the people they oblige; they wish them preservation not for love, but for profit. Benefactors, however, feel love and real affection for those who receive their benefactions, even when the recipients are not at all useful now and without promise of usefulness later.

1845. Next, at this happens (1167b33), he offers the first argument, observing that benefactors feel toward their beneficiaries the same way as artists feel toward their creations. Every craftsman loves his own product more than he would be loved by it were the product living by any chance. Apparently this is especially true of poets doting on their poems as parents on their children. Indeed, poems partake of reason, by which man is man to a greater degree than other mechanical works. There is a similarity here to what occurs when benefactors love those they have benefited; for a person who is treated well by another is in a way his product. For this reason, benefactors love their product, namely, the beneficiaries, more than the reverse.

1846. After giving the illustrations, he adds a general argument. The reason behind these statements is that existence is something chosen and cherished by everyone; to the extent that a thing exists, it is good, and good is worthy of choice and lovable. But this existence consists in an actuality, for to exist is to live, and consequently to operate. There can be no life without vital action of some kind. Hence, the performance of vital actions is desirable to everyone. But the producer actually producing is in some way the work produced, for the action of the mover and cause is in the thing moved and caused. For that reason, craftsmen, poets, and benefactors love their productions because they love their own existence, and it is natural that everything should love its own being.

1847. He clarifies his argument for this deduction that men love their creations when he adds, the product manifests in actuality what the agent is in potentiality. For a man exists inasmuch as he has a rational soul; the soul is the first act of a physical body having life potentially, namely, being in potentiality to vital operations. So, then, man’s first being consists in the fact that he has the capacity for vital actions. And the handiwork that a man produces in the actual exercise of vital activity indicates the reduction of this potentiality to actuality.

1848. He presents his second argument at then, too, for the benefactor (1168a9), and treats it from two aspects.

First, he gives the argument, stating that everyone loves his own good. But the benefactor’s good consists in his very act of bestowing benefits. For this reason, the benefactor takes joy in his beneficiary as the person in whom his good it attained. But the recipient, who accepts the benefit, finds nothing noble in the giver or benefactor; for it is not a virtuous act to receive benefits from another. But if he sees any good, it is utilitarian, and this is less pleasing and lovable than a noble good. Thus, obviously, the benefactor is less worthy of love in the eyes of the beneficiary than conversely.

1849. Second, at however, there is (1168a13), he proves in two ways what he has subjoined.

He does this first in general. What is pleasurable about the present is activity itself or operation; about the future, hope; about the past, memory. The most pleasurable of these is activity, which is also more lovable than hope or memory. But, for the benefactor, the honorableness of his own activity remains, because an honorable good does not pass away quickly, but is enduring. In this way, he delights in the person he benefits as in a present good. But the utility that the recipient gets passes away easily. Thus, the beneficiary delights in his benefactor as a memory of the past. Consequently, the honorable good that the benefactor finds in the beneficiary is more delightful and lovable than the useful good that the beneficiary sees in his benefactor.

1850. Next, at likewise, the memory (1168a17), he proves the same point again; he observes that the memory of virtuous or honorable deeds that a person performed in the past is pleasant. But the memory of useful goods that a person possessed at one time either is not pleasant at all (as when he grieves over their loss) or is pleasant (as when he retains some) to a degree less than the memory of honorable goods. However, the contrary seems to be true about the expectation of future goods; it is more pleasant to look forward to useful goods than to honorable ones.

1851. The reason for this diversity is that only a known good gives pleasure, not an unknown one. But no one knows an honorable good except the person who has it. Consequently, honorable goods are known if they are in the past but not if they are merely in the future. On the other hand, useful goods both past and future are known. Help from past goods has vanished, but help from them in the future gives pleasure as a remedy against tomorrow’s needs. Hence, a man is more delighted with the hope of useful goods than with their memory, or even the hope of honorable goods. But he takes more pleasure in the memory of honorable goods than in that of useful goods. Now, a benefactor remembers an honorable good, but a beneficiary a useful one. Therefore, the beneficiary is more pleasing and lovable to the benefactor than the other way round.

1852. He presents the third argument at moreover, loving (1168a19), remarking that loving is like activity, for it is characteristic of a lover to wish and to do good for the beloved. On the other hand, being loved is more like passivity. But the agent excels the patient. Consequently, it is reasonable that those excelling in activity—such as benefactors, artists, and poets—should love and have the consequent acts of love.

1853. He assigns the fourth argument at besides, people have (1168a21). Everyone prefers the results of his own work. So, those who earn riches by their own zeal and labor value them more highly than people who receive them as an inheritance from their parents or a donation from a benefactor. Hence, those receiving them in this manner are more generous, as we have pointed out in the book 4 [674]. Now, for a person to receive a benefit requires no labor on his part. But for a person to confer a benefit is a laborious task demanding work and toil. It is reasonable, then, that benefactors love their beneficiaries more than the reverse.

1854. He strengthens his argument by giving the example of mothers who love their children more than fathers do: both because mothers bear heavier burdens than fathers in the generation of children by carrying and giving them birth and because mothers can know better than fathers who their children are. Likewise, it seems to be characteristic of benefactors to love their beneficiaries inasmuch as they labor for them.