Lecture 6 — Concord

Likewise, concord seems to belong to friendship, and for this reason, it is not an identity of opinion that can exist among people unknown to one another. [1830]

Nor do we say that people are in concord who agree on any subject whatsoever, such as the heavenly bodies. For, common agreement on these questions does not pertain to the notion of friendship. [1831]

But we do say that citizens of a state are in concord when they agree on what is useful, vote for the same measures, and work together to achieve them. Therefore, they have concord about things to be done, which concern important matters capable of achievement by both or all parties. Thus, the citizens are in concord when they all think that public officials should be elected, or that they should become allies of the Spartans, or that Pittacus should be their ruler (when he is also willing to rule). But when two rivals want power, like the rivals in the Phoenissae, (Euripides, The Phoenician Maidens 588.) they introduce discord. For there is no concord when each of the parties wants something for himself, but only when they want it for the same person, as when the common people and the upper classes wish the best men to rule. In this case, everyone gets what he strives after. [1832–35]

Concord, then, seems to be friendship among citizens, as is commonly held. For it deals with affairs that advance their interests and concern their lives. [1836]

Now, this kind of concord is found among virtuous men, for they are in accord with themselves and with one another, being, so to speak, of one mind. Their wills remain constant and do not ebb and flow, like Euripos. They desire what is just and useful, and work together for these goals. [1837]

But it is impossible for vicious men to agree—except in a trifling way—just as it is impossible for them to be friends; for they desire a full share of the advantages but shirk their portion of labor and service. And, while each man is intent on gaining these profits, he watches his neighbor to prevent him from obtaining them. (The public good is destroyed by lack of vigilance!) Consequently, contention arises when they force each other to give way but are unwilling to render justice themselves. [1839]

1830. Likewise, concord seems to belong. After the Philosopher has defined goodwill, he now considers concord.

First, he explains what concord is;

second, he shows to whom it belongs, at now, this kind of concord (1167b4; [1837]).

About the first he does two things.

First, he explains its nature;

second, at concord, then (1167b2; [1836]), how it is related to friendship among citizens.

He discusses the first point under two aspects.

First, he investigates the category of concord;

second, at nor do we say (1167a24; [1831]), its subject matter.

He says first that concord seems to belong to the category of friendship. We have already pointed out [1800] that friends characteristically make the same choices, and the formal reason of concord consists in this. Obviously, then, concord is not homodoxia, meaning identity of opinion. It can happen that people who do not know one another hold the same opinion, although there is no concord among them, as there is no friendship.

1831. Then, at nor do we say (1167a24), he examines the subject matter of concord.

First, he shows those matters that it does not concern. He observes that men are not said to be in concord who agree on any subject whatsoever, like people who hold the same opinion about speculative questions, such as the heavenly bodies. Common agreement on these truths does not pertain to the concept of friendship, because friendship arises from preference; but judgment in speculative problems is not derived from compulsory preference. Consequently, nothing prevents some friends from holding different views and others the same view on these questions. It is evident, then, that concord, which pertains to the notion of friendship, does not deal with matters of this kind.

1832. Second, at but we do (1167a26), he shows the matters within concord’s competence.

First, he explains in general that it is concerned with things to be done. He remarks that citizens of a state are said to have concord among themselves when they agree on what is useful such that they vote for the same measures and work together on projects they consider for their interests. Thus, it is evident that concord deals with things to be done.

1833. Then, at which concern (1167a26), he explains with what particular practicable matters concord is concerned.

He indicates two kinds.

First, it refers to affairs having some importance, for people do not disrupt concord because of disagreement over minor points.

Second, matters of concord are of such a nature that they can belong to both agreeing parties, or even to all men or citizens of a state. If someone agrees with another that he may have what no one can possibly have, it is not of much concern to concord.

1834. He offers as an illustration states that are said to have concord: when all the citizens hold the same opinion that rulers should be determined by election and not by lot or succession; when the Athenians think they should form a military alliance with the Spartans to fight together against common enemies; when all the citizens agree that a particular man, Pindar, let us say, should be ruler (if, however, he be willing to rule). At such times, people who have these wishes are said to be in concord.

1835. But, when each wishes to rule, they begin to quarrel, like the characters in the play Phoenissae. Indeed, concord does not consist in the fact that both should wish good for themselves, however much there may seem to be a similarity to an equitable will, since everyone wishes good to himself. On the contrary, it is a cause of discord. But, in order to have concord, men must agree on the same numerical thing. For example, the common people and the upper classes are in agreement that the best men should rule. In this way, when everyone concurs in the same objective, all get what they are striving for.

1836. Next, at concord, then (1167b2), he shows how concord is related to friendship among citizens. He notes that political friendship, either between citizens of the same state or between different states, seems to be identical with concord. And people usually speak of it in this way: that states or citizens of one mind have friendship for one another. For political friendship is about utility and about those things pertaining to human life. We call this concord.

1837. At now this kind (1167b4), he indicates the possessor of concord.

First, he shows that it is found among virtuous men;

second, at but it is impossible (1167b9; [1839]), that it is not found among bad men.

He observes first that concord of the sort we have defined is found among those who are virtuous. These men behave in such a way that they are in accord with themselves and one another, inasmuch as they do not change their mind either regarding choices or works. The reason is that good men seemingly are not given to regrets; we have already noted this [1592]. He adds so to speak because it is impossible for men to have absolute immutability in this life.

1838. To explain the statement, he subjoins that they are of the same mind because the wills of these men remain fixed in good and do not change from one object to another, like Euripos, a strait along the coast of Greece where the water ebbs and flows. Such virtuous men wish what is just and useful, and they work together for these goals.

1839. Then, at but it is impossible (1167b9), he shows that concord is not found among vicious men. He remarks that bad men cannot agree, except perhaps in a trifling way, any more than they can be friends. Consequently, they cannot be of one mind because they want more than their share of all the advantages but lack the will to bear the labors—performed by the community and incumbent on them—and administrations, meaning expenses or services of any kind. And while each one wishes this—to have more of the benefits and less of the burdens—he inquires about his neighbor and prevents him from obtaining what he himself covets. Thus, while the common good of justice is not preserved, the common possession of concord among them is destroyed. In this way, contention arises when a person forces another to observe justice toward him while he himself is not willing to render justice to the other, but wants more advantages and fewer disadvantages—a condition that is against the equality of justice.