Lecture 11 — Why a Happy Man Needs Friends

Looking more profoundly into the matter, it seems that a virtuous friend is naturally desirable to a virtuous man. [1900]

For, as has been noted, what is naturally good is in itself good and desirable to the virtuous person. [1901]

Now, life in animals is defined by capacity for perception, and in men by capacity for perception and thought. But capacity is reduced to operation, and what is principal consists in operation. Life, therefore, seems to be principally an act of perception or thought. [1902]

Likewise, life is numbered among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, for it is a determinate entity and what is determinate pertains to the nature of the good. Now, what is good naturally is good to the virtuous person. This is the reason why life seems delightful to all men. [1903]

However, we must not argue from an evil and corrupt life, or one passed in pain, because such life is indeterminate, as are the attributes connected with it. This will be made clearer in the following discussion on pain. [1906]

If life itself is good and pleasant (and this is apparent from the fact that all men desire it), then it will be especially so to virtuous and happy people. For, life is most desirable to such men, and their existence is happy in the highest degree. [1907]

When a man sees, he is aware that he is seeing; when he hears, he is aware that he hears; when he walks, he is aware that he walks. Similarly, in all other activities, there is a faculty in us that is aware that we are active: we perceive that we perceive and we understand that we understand, and in this, we perceive and understand that we exist. For, existence was defined as perception or thought. But perceiving that one is alive is numbered among the goods that are delightful in themselves, because life is by its nature a good, and to perceive the good existing in oneself is pleasurable. Now, life is desirable especially for the virtuous because, for them, it is good and pleasant at the same time; and when they perceive what is good in itself, they rejoice. [1908]

But the good man feels toward his friend as toward himself, since his friend is another self. Therefore, just as his own existence is desirable to everyone, so, or nearly so, is his friend’s existence. Now, a virtuous person’s existence is desirable because he perceives that it is good, and the perception is desirable in itself. Consequently, he ought to be conscious of his friend’s existence too; this takes place in associating with one another and sharing conversation and thoughts. In this way, we understand living together as applied to men; we do not understand it in the sense of feeding together as applied to cattle. If, then, a happy man’s existence is desirable in itself, inasmuch as it is naturally good and pleasant, and his friend’s existence is much the same, then a friend will be one of the desirable goods. [1909]

But what is desirable for the happy man he must have, or else he will be in want. To be happy, therefore, a man needs virtuous friends. [1912]

1900. Looking more profoundly into the matter. After the Philosopher has given the moral reasons indicating that the happy man needs friends, he now shows the same point by a more fundamental reason.

First, he shows that it is desirable for a happy man to have a friend.

Second, at but what is (1170b17; [1912]), he concludes in addition that the happy man needs friends.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he proposes his intention. He observes that, if someone wishes to judge by a more fundamental reason, it will be very evident that, for a good and happy man, a virtuous friend is naturally even more desirable than other external goods.

1901. Second, at for, as has been noted (1170a14), he proves his proposition.

First, he shows what is naturally desirable and pleasant to the virtuous person respecting himself.

Second, at but the good man (1170b5; [1909]), he shows what is desirable and pleasant respecting his friend.

He discusses the first point under two headings.

First, he shows that existence and life are naturally desirable to the good man.

Second, at when a man sees (1170a29; [1908]), he shows that it is delightful and desirable to feel this.

For the first statement, he offers this reason. Whatever is naturally good is in itself good and desirable to the good man, as is clear from the discussion in book 7 [1533]. But existence and life are naturally good and desirable to living creatures. Therefore, existence and life are good and desirable to the virtuous person.

1902. The major premise is self-evident in the text. He states the minor at now, life (1170a16), and makes three observations on it.

First, he shows the nature of life, remarking that, in all animals, life is defined in general by the capacity for sensation. But in man, it is defined by the capacity for perception relative to what he has in common with other animals or by capacity for thought relative to what he has proper to himself. Now, every capacity is reduced to operation as to its proper perfection. Consequently, what is principal is operation, and not mere capacity, for act is more excellent than potency, as is proved in Metaphysics 9. (Metaphysics 9.8,1049b4–1050b6; see Aquinas, In IX metaph., lecs. 7–8 [1844–66].) From this, it is evident that, for animal or man, life in the full sense is an act of sensation or thought. Indeed, a slumbering individual—since he does not actually feel or think—does not live completely, but has a half life, as was stated in book 1 [234–35].

1903. Second, at likewise, life (1170a19), he shows that life is naturally good and pleasant. He notes that life itself is numbered among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves. He proves this from the fact that life is something determinate, and what is determinate pertains to the nature of the good.

1904. To understand this, we should bear in mind that potentiality, considered in itself, is indeterminate because it can be many things; but it becomes determinate by means of act, as is obvious with matter and form. Potentiality without act, however, is potentiality with privation, which constitutes the nature of evil, just as perfection achieved by activity constitutes the nature of good. For that reason, just as a thing is evil to the extent that it is indeterminate, so it is good to the extent that it is determinate.

1905. But life is something determinate, especially as it principally consists in an operation, as we just pointed out [1902]. So it is evident that life is naturally good. Now, what is naturally good is also good to the virtuous person, since the good man is the norm in human kind, as we have indicated [1898]. Consequently, since life is naturally good, we see that it is pleasant to all men.

1906. Third, at however, we (1170a22), he removes a doubt. He points out that, in stating that life is naturally good and pleasant [1901, 1903–5], we must not include evil—that is, vicious and corrupt—life that departs from the right order, nor life lived in pain. Such life is not naturally good, because it is indeterminate, lacking in proper perfection, just as the attributes connected with it are indeterminate. Everything is made determinate by what exists in it; hence, if this is indeterminate, then the thing itself will be indeterminate. For example, if sickness is indeterminate, the sick body will be indeterminate and ill, as also will be moral evil and corruption or pain. This will be made clearer in the pertinent questions following, where pain will be discussed [2048–49].

1907. Then, at if life (1170a25), he deduces a conclusion from this argument. He remarks that, if life itself is naturally good and pleasant (which is apparent not only from the foregoing argument but also because all men desire it), then life will be good and pleasing to virtuous and happy people most of all. Since their existence is fullest and happiest, it must be most desirable to them.

1908. Next, at when a man (1170a29), he shows that perception of being alive is desirable and pleasant to the virtuous person. For, a man who knows that he sees is conscious of his seeing, and the same is true with someone who knows that he hears. Likewise, in other cases, a person is conscious that he is active. In this reflective act in which we perceive that we perceive and understand that we understand, we perceive and understand that we exist. We have said before [1902] that man’s existence and life are in the fullest sense perception or thought. But that someone should be conscious that he is alive is numbered among the goods that are delightful in themselves, because life is by its nature good, as we have already proved [1903–5]; and the consciousness that he possesses good is delightful. Since life is desirable especially to the virtuous, for whom existence is good and pleasurable, evidently, then, the realization that they perceive and understand is delightful to them. The reason is that simultaneously, in the very act (by which they are aware that they perceive and understand), they recognize what is good in itself, namely, existence and life; and they are delighted by this.

1909. At but the good man (1170b5), he shows from the premises what is desirable and pleasant to the virtuous and happy person with regard to his friend. He observes that the good man feels for his friend as if he were himself, since his friend is, in a way, another self. Therefore, just as his own existence is desirable and delightful to every virtuous man, so is his friend’s existence desirable and delightful to him—if not equally, at least very nearly so. For the natural unity a man has with himself is greater than the unity of affection he has with his friend. We have just noted [1907–8] that the good man’s existence and life are desirable to him because he perceives that they are good. But this perception, by which someone perceives good existing in him, is delightful in itself. Consequently, as a person rejoices in the perception of his own existence and life, so it is simply necessary for him to perceive them in his friend in order to rejoice in him.

1910. This takes place through constant association and the exchange of ideas and reflection. In this way, men are said to dwell with one another in an appropriate manner, not as cattle feeding together, but as human beings living a life that is proper to them.

1911. Thus, he concludes from the premises what he had set out to do. He declares that a happy man’s own existence is desirable in itself, inasmuch as it is naturally good and pleasant. And, since the existence and life of a friend are close to the life of a virtuous and happy man by affection, the friend too will be desirable to him.

1912. Then, at but what is (1170b17), he shows in addition that friends are necessary for the happy man. The happy man must have what is desirable for him, or else a deficiency will remain, which is contrary to the notion of happiness, which calls for a sufficiency. Therefore, it is necessary that the man who is in a state of happiness should have virtuous friends. Here, he is discussing the kind of happiness that is possible in this life, as we have indicated in book 1 [113].